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MONEY CHANGES EVERYTHING















































Days before the clock ticked over into 2017, and a month before Chinese 
New Year, a giant statue of a rooster sprang up outside a shopping mall 
in China’s northern Shanxi province. The statue’s designer reportedly in-
tended its egg-shaped body and distinctive golden hair to convey a mes-
sage of prosperity. This message was enhanced by the rooster’s unmis-
takable likeness to Donald Trump, the newly elected billionaire president 
of the United States. In what may or may not have been ‘fake news’, CNN 
reported that the ‘Donald Trump Rooster’ had ‘taken China by storm’. 
China was well on its way towards prosperity before 2017 began. But 
Trump’s performance throughout the year — retracting America from 
its global commitments to free trade, foreign aid, and the environment, 
emphatically (and in bold type) tweeting that he would ‘MAKE AMERICA 
GREAT AGAIN’, and ruffling the feathers of even America’s closet allies — 
was like gifting a golden egg on a golden platter to Chinese President Xi 
Jinping. And Xi was ready to receive it.
Prosperity was a prominent theme in a string of significant speeches 
delivered by President Xi during 2017. In his January speech at the World 
The Donald Trump Rooster, Shanxi province
Source: YouTube
Economic Forum in Davos, he called for a doubling of efforts to ‘enable 
all countries to achieve inter-connected growth and shared prosperity’.1 
In May, at the opening ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for Interna-
tional Cooperation, he presented the Belt and Road Initiative as China’s 
plan for ‘common prosperity’, which would boost mutual respect, mutu-
al learning, mutual understanding, and mutual trust.2 At the Nineteenth 
Party Congress in October, Xi declared that the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP)  would deliver a ‘decisive victory’ in building a ‘moderately prosper-
ous society’ xiaokang shehui 小康社会 by 2020, leaving the goal of achiev-
ing the status of a fully developed nation until 2049 — the one hundredth 
anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).3 
The confidence of the CCP in Xi’s capacity to deliver on these pledges 
was evident in the decision to incorporate Xi Jinping’s Thought for the 
New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics as a ‘guiding ideology’ 
in China’s constitution — the only Chinese leader since Mao Zedong to be 
honoured in such a way during his own life time. Xi himself confidently 
stated that only by following the path, theory, system, and culture of 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (his Four Confidences), would the 
CCP succeed in taking China beyond ‘standing up’, as it did under Mao, 
and growing rich, as it did under Deng. If the promises and affirmations 
contained in his 205-minute speech to the Party Congress can be taken at 
face value, 2017 marked the beginning of a new era of greatness for China 
— no longer a rising, but now a risen, global power.
Not everyone shared Xi’s confidence or his vision, however. As the 
year progressed, there was growing anxiety across the globe, and in the 
West in particular, about how China’s wealth and power were challenging 
the global status quo and the ‘rules-based order’ that was defined and 
led for many decades by the United States. ‘China anxiety’ in Australia 
reached heights not known since the Cold War era, sparked by an ABC 
Four Corners episode in June called ‘Power and Influence: The Hard Edge 
of China’s Soft Power’, which contained far-reaching allegations about 















































of their rising affluence to influence Australian policy outcomes, and 
threaten freedom of speech in its media and academic institutions. China, 
our ‘best friend in Asia’ according to the 2016 Lowy Institute Poll of 
Australian public opinion, ranked Australia as ‘the least friendly country 
toward China in 2017’, the Global Times reported. The year 2017 marked a 
new era for us all, in which Chinese money did seem to change everything. 
From Billionaires to Beggars
Four decades of rapid growth had already transformed the Chinese econo-
my into the world’s second largest when 2017 began, and, if current trends 
continue, it will overtake the US to become the largest by 2030. In 2017, 
among many other remarkable feats, Alibaba eclipsed Amazon as the 
world’s biggest e-commerce company, and the ride-hailing service Didi 
overtook Uber in market valuation. China’s artificial intelligence, genet-
ic engineering, and other high-tech industries made significant advances, 
underpinned by globally competitive and innovative Chinese enterprises 
that would have been inconceivable even two decades ago. 
Private jets are the ultimate symbol of personal wealth and social status, with Hurun’s Business Jet Owners 
2017 report identifying 114 Chinese business people owning 164 private jets. 
Source: YouTube
Nor could it have then been 
conceived that of the world’s 2,257 
billionaires in 2017, 609 would come 
from China (in first place), compared 
with 552 from the United States (in 
second).4 According to the Hurun 
Report’s China Rich List, released in 
October 2017, China’s 2,130 richest 
individuals enjoy combined assets of 
US$2.6 trillion — a figure comparable to the GDP of the United Kingdom. 
China’s newly anointed richest man, real estate mogul Xu Jiayin 许家印, 
has a net worth of US$43 billion — falling well short of Bill Gates’s fortune 
(at world number one) of US$81 billion, but making Rupert Murdoch 
seem somewhat of a pauper with just US$15.3 billion. The Rich List also 
revealed that the 200 richest members of the National People’s Congress 
and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress have combined 
fortunes of RMB3.5 trillion, or US$507 billion. The wealth of the richest 
100, all of whom are dollar billionaires (a person with a net worth of at 
least one billion US dollars), increased by a whopping 64 per cent in the 
four years since Xi Jinping rose to power — accounting for RMB3 trillion.5 
If to ‘get rich is glorious’, as Deng Xiaoping famously claimed, then 2017 
was a ridiculously glorious year, for some Chinese citizens at least.
Rapid growth has not only benefited those at the top end of China’s 
income spectrum. In 1981, 88.3 per cent of China’s population lived on 
less than US$2 a day; this figure dropped to less than 6 per cent in 2017. 
This phenomenal accomplishment is due to the extraordinary resilience 
and resourcefulness of a population that has taken advantage of every 
opportunity provided by the scaling back of Mao’s centralised command 
economy to lift themselves, their families and communities out of poverty 
and on to the road to prosperity. In the five years since Xi Jinping rose 
to power, a further 60 million Chinese people rose from poverty — an 

















































population of 1.41 billion, even 6 per cent is some 84 million people. And 
despite close to two decades of policy effort — on paper at least — to rectify 
the inequalities that Deng knew his reforms would create, and to ensure 
that ‘all would prosper eventually’, stark income disparities exist between 
city and country, coastal and inland areas, men and women, and, above 
all, those with political connections and those without. 
In his Nineteenth Party Congress address, Xi Jinping explicitly 
recognised this point in what he called the ‘principal contradiction’ of 
China’s society — unbalanced and inadequate development set against 
the need for people to live better lives. He also celebrated the Party’s ‘firm 
action’ in taking out ‘tigers’ (high-level corrupt officials), ‘swatting flies’ 
(low-level corrupt officials), and ‘hunting down foxes’ (corrupt officials who 
have absconded overseas) — while being clear that more remained to be 
done in the anti-corruption campaign that has become one of the hallmarks 
of his leadership.
Two stories from 2017 illustrate just how much has changed in China 
during the last four decades, and the challenges that lie ahead as Xi sets 
out to achieve his domestic and global goals. In April 2017, Yicai Global 
reported that beggars in tourist areas of Jinan, Shandong province, were 
using QR codes to solicit alms via mobile payment systems such as Alipay 
and WeChat Wallet — some were even using point of sale machines. Beyond 
the fact that beggars were using such modern technology to conduct their 
‘transactions’ — surely only in China! — there are at least two other 
remarkable features of this story. The first is the news source. Yicai Global 
is the English-language arm of Yicai, China’s leading financial news group. 
Forty years ago, China did not have financial news groups, much less 
‘leading’ ones. It had the Xinhua News Agency feeding tightly controlled 
information and opinion to the tiny handful of propaganda broadsheets 
such as the People’s Daily and the Workers' Daily, and the China News 
Service producing similar content for overseas Chinese publications. Now, 
China has a number of financial news groups including one launched by 
Xinhua itself in 2017: the new China Fortune Media Corporation Group, 
which will expand into financial services 
including wealth management. This may 
seem only natural for a country that is 
home to three of the world’s ten largest 
stock exchanges in the world — Shanghai 
(at number four), Hong Kong (at number 
five), and Shenzhen (at number nine).6 
Wind back the clock four decades and 
any Communist Party official would have 
denied the possibility of the country even 
having one. 
The second remarkable thing about 
this story is the beggars’ target: Chinese 
tourists. They are the ones with Chinese 
mobile payment systems on their 
smartphones, and disposable wealth, a 
yuan or two of which might be spared for the down and out. Forty years 
ago, China had virtually no domestic tourism. Only at Chinese New Year 
did anyone enjoy a holiday of more than one day. People needed official 
permission to travel and, besides, with per capita incomes of 134 yuan 
(US$20) in the country, where over eighty per cent of the population lived, 
and 343 yuan (US$50) in the cities, there was not much money to spare. 
What there was went on ‘luxuries’ such as meat, radios, and bicycles. 
Domestic tourism only got going in the 1990s, with rising incomes and 
more holidays. It has been on the up and up ever since. In the first half 
of 2017 alone, Chinese citizens made 2.53 billion trips around their own 
country, spending 2.17 trillion yuan — about US$336 billion — along the 
way. Chinese tourists have also become major contributors to international 
tourism, including the luxury tourism market in diverse destinations from 
Paris to the Arctic. 
A far more prominent story in 2017 featured Chinese billionaire Guo 
Wengui 郭文贵, also known as Miles Kwok. Guo made global headlines 
Chinese beggar with WeChat QR code
















































following his largely unconfirmed revelations — via tweets, YouTube 
and Facebook — of a web of corruption among the highest levels of the 
Chinese leadership. By the end of 2017, he was identifying himself an 
‘exile’, ‘whistleblower’, and ‘dissident, and had applied for political asylum 
in the US. Meanwhile, in China, the Global Times was referring to him as a 
notorious criminal; while Xinhua news declared him to be ‘one of China’s 
most-wanted fugitives’. The Chinese government demanded that the US 
deport him back to China, following a failed attempt by Chinese security 
agents to escort him back there of his own accord. In the first instance, 
Donald Trump appeared willing to help China, but was apparently talked 
around by his staff, who reminded him that Guo was a member of his 
own Mar-a-Lago club. Among the many dramatic headlines that prompted 
by Guo’s dramatic situation, was one that appeared in The Diplomat in 
December, asking if he was ‘A Ticking Time Bomb For US–China Ties in the 
Trump Era?’ 
The (unfinished) story of Guo Wengui illustrates just some of the 
quandaries that prosperity has brought to the Chinese Communist 
Party. One is that in a political system in which both transparency and 
accountability are limited, and wealth precarious, corruption flourishes. 
In 2017, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection announced that 
since Xi launched the anti-corruption campaign in 2013, it has punished 
1.34 million lower ranking officials (‘flies’) for corruption. Among the 
high-level ‘tigers’ who fell from power in 2017 were Sun Zhengcai 孙政才, 
the Party Secretary of Chongqing and youngest member of the Politburo, 
and General Zhang Yang 张阳 of the Central Military Commission, who 
committed suicide in November, less than three months after being put 
under investigation for bribery. Guo, they allege, is a fox — and certainly 
not the only one. 
A second quandary is that while the pursuit, maintenance, and 
enjoyment of wealth (at any level) seems to keep many of China’s people 
relatively content with the political system, it can also empower others 
to pursue change; prosperity is a double-edged sword that not only aids 
control, but also threatens it. As with the story of the techno-beggars above, 
none of this would have been conceivable ten years ago, never mind forty. 
A (Moderately) Prosperous Age with Chinese 
Characteristics
Some observers might consider it unusually humble that Xi Jinping only 
wanted China to become a ‘moderately prosperous society’ by 2020. The 
earliest appearance of the phrase xiaokang (‘small’ and ‘health’) was in the 
classic Book of Odes 诗经 (11th–7th centuries BCE), in which it indicated 
a fairly basic standard of living. In Confucian thought, as developed 
over succeeding centuries, it also came to stand for an ideal standard of 
social harmony and order, political righteousness, and general economic 
wellbeing. Xi is not the first post-Mao leader to use the phrase — Deng 
Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin also cited it aspirationally — but he is the first 
to have the goal in sight. Xiaokang is indeed a more humble concept 
than that of a ‘Prosperous Age’ shengshi 盛世. The historical concept of 
shengshi, as Geremie Barmé described in the 2014 China Story Yearbook, 
refers to ‘universally acknowledged periods of remarkable social grace, 
political rectitude and cultural richness’. If the contents of this book 
are anything to go by, it 
appears that Xi Jinping 
made a sensible choice — a 
truly prosperous age will 
have to wait. 
That said, ‘Prosperity’ 
seemed an obvious choice 
for the 2017 China Story 
Yearbook, because it so well 
encapsulated the multi-
faceted developments in 















































culture, and economy over the course of the year, as well as some of its 
biggest news stories. We might have chosen to represent this English term 
on the cover using the Chinese characters for ‘moderately prosperous’ 
小康 xiaokang. But we instead decided to represent prosperity by two 
Chinese characters, 富 and 福, both of which are pronounced in Modern 
Chinese as 'fu' (one in the fourth, and the other in the second tone).
Wealth, fortune, happiness, success, opportunity, dreams, 
achievements, and celebrations: these are recurring themes throughout 
the Yearbook, suggesting there was plenty for Xi Jinping to feel confident 
about during the course of 2017. But power, control, corruption, crime, 
punishment, inequality, poverty, and anxiety are recurring themes as 
well. Together, they reveal the many complexities and conundrums 
surrounding China’s prosperity as it enters a new era: with far-reaching 
implications not only for China’s own 1.41 billion people, but for the rest 
of the world as well. 
Prosperity
Prosperity is the sixth volume in the China Story Yearbook series. It con-
tains a series of nine chapters that focus on (some of) the year’s hottest 
topics, beginning with Brian Martin’s analysis of the Nineteenth Party 
Congress, which he sees as confirming President Xi’s ascendancy to a po-
sition of supreme power, and China’s emergence as a global economic 
and strategic power. Jane Golley and Adam Ingle examine the Belt and 
Road Initiative through the lens of geoeconomics, a relatively new disci-
pline that is concerned with the interaction between economic and polit-
ical power on a global scale. Sang Ye and Richard Rigby provide insights 
into Chinese perspectives on North Korea, while Hugh White reflects on 
the evolving power dynamics between China and America, and the panic 
this has set off in Australia — a country that has benefited so hugely from 
China’s rising wealth in the past. Gerry Groot describes the ‘precarious 
wealth’ of China’s jet-setting billionaires, and their search for status and 
security as they navigate the Communist Party, the global economy, and a 
fast-news media cycle that does not always discern truth from facts. Next 
comes Carolyn Cartier’s depiction of the contradictions underlying China’s 
unique approach to urbanisation, seen vividly in the plans for the Xiongan 
New Area announced this year. Gloria Davies then contrasts the artists 
and writers who are flourishing in Xi’s China — those who demonstrate 
their eagerness to study his thought — with those who have perished, most 
prominently Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波, whose death was mourned 
by millions in 2017. Elisa Nesossi and Ivan Franceschini explore the de-
terioration of China’s human rights record in 2017, a year Human Rights 
Watch has described as the worst since 1989. And Anthony Dapiran looks 
at the dilemmas facing Hong Kong in its twentieth year since returning to 
Chinese sovereignty — a year in which official Chinese celebrations of the 
anniversary were awkwardly juxtaposed with a stagnant economy, rising 
income inequalities, and growing anxiety about the loss of autonomy and 
freedom in the Special Administrative Region.
The complexities and conundrums of China's prosperity will have implications for China's own 1.38 billion 
people and the rest of the world 















































These chapters are interspersed with Information Windows that 
highlight particular words, issues, ideas, people, and events — for example, 
the unfortunate fate of Beijing’s ‘hole-in-the-wall’ businesses, by Zhang 
Yichi; the ultra-modern phenomenon of dockless bikes, by Gao Yu; Yang 
Qin’s description of the anti-corruption television series In the Name of 
the People 为人民的民意; and Nicholas Loubere’s take on the Cambridge 
University Press debacle and the challenges facing academic publishers in 
China’s lucrative market.  
Chapters are complemented by a number of Forums, which expand on 
the contents of the chapters or discuss a topic of relevance to the Yearbook's 
theme. Chen Jingjing and Mark Strange review the fascinating evolution 
of the characters 富 and 福; this is coupled with a piece by Christopher 
Rea, who literally/figuratively turns 福 upside down in his examination of 
the ‘toppling’ of Liu Xiaobo. A Forum on the ‘Culture of Money’ includes 
Linda Jaivin’s piece on the cultural confidence engendered by prosperity 
in 2017, on display in the patriotic smash hit film Wolf Warrior 2 
战狼	II, and William Sima’s take on Ode to Joy 欢乐观,	another television 
hit from the year that explores the plight of ridiculously wealthy ‘left-
over women’ shengnü 剩女. Prosperity takes on a multicultural flavour 
in Forum pieces about the failing dreams of Chinese migrants in Papua 
New Guinea, by Graeme Smith; and Arabian traders pursuing their own 
‘Chinese dreams’ in the Zhejiang city of Yiwu, by Wen Meizhen. Power 
plays among the Asian powers — India, China, Japan, and Korea — are 
apparent in the pieces by Andrew Chubb and Brittany Morreale. 
Tom Cliff reflects on the ‘art of not smoking’ for Uyghurs in Xinjiang, 
while Ben Hillman focusses on Shangri-la, where Xi Jinping’s anti-
corruption campaign has brought about the demise of a once-thriving 
tourist industry. Uchralt Otede takes us to Kangbashi, the ‘richest ghost 
town in China’, and Zhu Yujie considers the shared destinies of the Dungan 
and Hui Muslims along the old Silk Road. We see cases of conspicuous 
consumption in China’s rising demand for ivory and ‘donkey hide glue’, as 
told by Craig Smith and Natalie Köhle respectively, along with an account 
of wealthy Chinese travellers seeking ‘extreme-luxe’ experiences, by 
Linda Jaivin. Stories of generosity in life and death are explored by Paul 
Farrelly and Benjamin Penny, while the challenges of deriving happiness 
from wealth are evident in the rise of psychotherapy, as told by Huang 
Hsuan-Ying in ‘Psycho Boom’. In a Forum on ‘Those Less Fortunate’, Susan 
Trevaskes covers death penalty reform, Shi Xinjie considers challenges 
in agricultural development, and Børge Bakken depicts an underworld 
economy of ‘crime villages’. Lorand Laskai focusses on the Party’s latest 
efforts to control uncivilised Internet content — no mean feat given rapid 
advances in the algorithms used by online news services to give their 
readers what they want. We close with two stories from Taiwan — one 
on the contested (seventieth) anniversary of the 28 February Uprising by 
Mark Harrison, and the other by Paul Farrelly on the constitutional ruling 
to rewrite the marriage laws to include same-sex relationships — a first in 
Asia, calling for rainbow celebrations. 
To get rich may well be glorious, but there is clearly more to prosperity 
than mere money!
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The Cover Image
The character in the centre of this Year-
book’s cover is fu 富, which has had the 
meaning ‘prosperous’ from at least the 
third century BCE. (For more information 
on the etymology of the character, see 
Forum ‘Wine, Gods, and Morning Dew’, 
pp.5–7.) It is written in a cursive script 
known in Chinese as xingshu 行书, or run-
ning script, which was developed as a fast-
er way to write characters.
The book cover has been design- 
ed to look like a Chinese red envelope, 
or hongbao 红包. Red envelopes con- 
tain gifts of money which are given 
at social and family gatherings, such as weddings and Lunar 
Cover of the China Story Yearbook 2017
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New Year. On the cover flaps of the Yearbook, there are two 
Chinese decorative knots 中国结, which symbolise good luck and prosper-
ity. Traditionally, knots were tied using one piece of thread and are gen-
erally red or gold, which are both regarded as ‘lucky’ colours. Inside the 
knot, the character fu 福, meaning ‘good fortune’ — including in the sense 
of wealth  — has been turned upside down. This custom is based on an 
aural pun: the verb 倒 — meaning to turn upside down — is a homophone 
of 到,	to arrive. To turn prosperity upside down is to wish that prosperity 
will arrive. (For more on this, see Forum ‘Toppling Liu Xiaobo’, pp.9–12.)  
A cascade of gold yuanbao or sycee 元宝 flows down the back cover. 
These were a form of gold ingot currency used in imperial China from the 
Qin dynasty. In present-day China, gold sycees remain a symbol of wealth 
































富 ,  福 , 	AND 
Wine, Gods, and Morning Dew 
· CHEN JINGJING AND MARK STRANGE
Toppling Liu Xiaobo 

















































IN ORACLE BONE inscriptions from the second millennium BC, we find 
the graph   . Modern scholars iden-
tify it as fu 畐. They understand it to 
represent a wine vessel, which had an 
important role in ancient sacrificial 
rituals. In these inscriptions, fu 畐 is 
usually associated with the figure of 
the king in his role as chief mediator 
between the human and spirit worlds.
Over time, the graph appeared 
with different radicals, classifiers that 
tended to indicate semantic differenc-
es. One was the mian 宀	 radical, rep-
resenting a roof and used to connote 
domestic objects and activities. Fu 
富 seems to have carried the sense of 
wine vessels stored indoors. Another 
form of the graph, fu 福, took the shi
礻	 radical, associated with ritual and 
worship. In early documents, the two 
forms were often used in similar con-
texts, possibly because of their graphic 
resemblance before the standardisa-
tion of script under Qin imperial rule 
(221–202 BC). 
In written records from Zhou 
times (1046 BC–256 BC), fu 畐 is increas-
ingly associated with social and polit-
ical status. This is probably because 
members of the Zhou royal house and 
its regional aristocracies used wine 
vessels and jars for sacrifice. In inscrip-
tions from the fourth and third centu-
ries BC, there is a recurring connection 
between the graphs fu 富, ‘wealth’, and 
gui 貴, ‘nobility’. The collocation fugui 
富貴	 survives to the present. In the 
second century AD, the author of a 
commentary on the canonical Classic 
of Ritual 禮記 framed his definition of 
fu 富 in terms of hereditary titles and 
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official salaries; by this time, wine was 
used as a form of official salary along 
with rice, silk, meat, and fruit.
As orthographic standards crys-
tallised with the establishment of em-
pire under the Qin, so the meanings as-
signed to fu 福 and fu 富 grew stable. Fu 
福 retained early ritual connotations: it 
denoted blessings received from the 
spirit world. Under the influence of 
Buddhism, this meaning of the graph 
was adopted to refer to karmic merit 
generated by pious acts. In Daoism, 
too, it eventually found expression in 
the figure of the Star of Good Fortune
福星, one of three personified deities 
— the others were the Stars of Sta-
tus and Longevity — who emerged in 
the Daoist pantheon from Ming times 
(1368–1644). 
From at least the third century 
BC on, meanwhile, political advisors 
sought to ensure that the peoples of 
their own states would be more ‘pros-
perous’, fu 富, than those of their rivals. 
For example, Xunzi 荀子 (or ‘Master 
Xun’), a leading political thinker of the 
third century BC, argued in an essay 
that ‘the true king brings prosperity 
to the people, and the overlord brings 
prosperity to men of service’ 王者富民
霸者富士. Similar rhetoric has endured 
into contemporary times, and has even 
spread beyond Chinese borders. The 
leaders of Japan’s Meiji 明治 govern-
ment (1868–1912) adopted as their 
guiding slogan ‘bring prosperity to 
the state and strengthen the military’, 
fukoku kyōhei 富国強兵. And when the 
Eighteenth National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China convened 
in 2012, it listed national ‘prosperity 
and strength’ 富強	first in a set of ‘core 
Socialist values’ 社會主義核心價值觀.
As fu 富 increasingly came to 
signify the accumulation of wealth, 
The Star of Good Fortune, Wang Dafan, 1936 
Source: auction.artron.net
power, and official status, it developed 
negative connotations as well. Already 
in the Confucian Analects 論語, we find 
an aphorism on living a frugal life: 
‘prosperity and noble status acquired 
without propriety are to me as elusive 
as the passing clouds’ 不義而富且貴於
我如浮雲. Also, in successive versions 
of a saying attributed to Laozi 老子, 
later considered the founding figure of 
Daoism and an elder contemporary of 
Confucius, we find an admonition that 
‘if noble status and prosperity should 
lead to arrogance, then one will only 
have oneself to blame’ 貴富而驕自遺
其咎. Similarly, a bronze inscription 
dated to 330 BC (see image on right), 
found in the tomb of a ruler, advised: 
‘do not be arrogant on account of your 
prosperity’ 毋富而喬. The loss of moral 
integrity was already a cause for con-
cern in a political and social environ-
ment where power and material gain 
were prized. Following Confucius, later 
writers frequently commented on the 
fleeting nature of prosperity and sta-
tus. They likened them to flowers that 
blossomed but quickly faded, or to the 
morning dew. Prosperity also became 
associated with the dangers of corrup-
tion: one thirteenth-century commen-
tator wrote that fu ‘means bribery’ 
富賄賂也. 
Bronze inscription: ‘Do not be arrogant on account 
of your prosperity’ 毋富而喬
Source: Zhang Shouzhong 張守中	ed., Zhongshan wang 





































AS THE LUNAR NEW YEAR ap-proaches, Chinese households 
might paste onto their front doors a di-
amond of red paper with the character 
for ‘prosperity’ or ‘good fortune’, fu 福, 
upside down as 福. This folk custom is 
based on an aural pun: the verb dao 
倒 — meaning to turn upside down, 
invert, or topple — is a homophone of 
dao 到, to arrive. To turn prosperity up-
side down is to express the wish that 
the New Year will bring prosperity to 
one’s door. Dao fu 倒福 leads to fu dao 
福到.
The inversion of characters con-
veys allegorical meanings ranging 
from the auspicious to the innocuous 
to the hostile. Joke books of the early 
twentieth century would invert the 
character for ‘laughter’ 笑 on their 
covers to indicate that the reader 
would be toppled by or bowled over 
with laughter 笑倒, a phrase that also 
appears as the title of a Ming dynasty 
joke collection.
On 5 August 1903, the Chi-
nese-language Melbourne daily The 
Chinese Times 美利賓埠愛國報, fol-
lowing a practice common among an-
ti-Manchu newspapers, expressed its 
hope that the Qing government would 
fall by printing the characters for Qing 
清 and Empress Dowager Cixi 慈禧太后 
upside down. 
On 19 December 2013, Taipei’s 
Apple Daily 蘋果日报	 newspaper re-
TO P P L I N G  L I U  X I A O B O
Christopher Rea
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Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波 wrote an essay 
about ‘political humour in a post-total-
itarian dictatorship’ in which he ana-
lysed the rise of e’gao 恶搞.2 The term 
refers to a culture of parody, mockery, 
hoaxing, and facetiousness and their 
various expressions in the Internet 
age. Over two short years, he wrote, 
Chinese netizens had begun e’gao-ing 
everything and anything, but espe-
cially the authoritative, the faddish, 
and the self-important. Liu credits the 
Internet with enabling this culture to 
flourish by radically expanding access 
to information. But he also traces its 
tone of sarcasm back to 1980s rebels 
such as the singer Cui Jian 崔健 and the 
writer Wang Shuo 王朔, both of whom 
appropriated and subverted the ideo-
logical language of China’s Communist 
Party-state in their work.
Having seen its ‘passions for 
freedom impaled on bloody bayonets’ 
during the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, 
Liu wrote, a generation turned from 
making defiant statements to express-
ing opposition through sarcasm and 
mockery. Wang Shuo’s legacy to later 
generations, including the netizens of 
today, was a flair for merging popular 
slang — in his case, Beijing’s urban ar-
got — with pompous official jargon to 
create a new language entirely: cool, 
ported on a New Year’s greeting coined 
by a member of the opposition in Tai-
wan’s legislature.1 The president at the 
time was Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九, whose 
surname, Ma, is the character for 
‘horse’. From the time of his election in 
2008, the Taiwan press would routine-
ly report that Ma’s visits to constitu-
ents were ‘an instant success,’ punning 
on the idiom ‘victory as soon as the 
horse arrives’ 馬到成功. Democratic 
Progressive Party legislator Lee Chun-
yi 李俊俋 suggested that citizens post 
New Year’s couplets with the character 
Ma inverted: ‘success will arrive when 
Ma is toppled’ .
Laughter and political protest 
alike feed on inversion and subver-
sion. On 18 September 2006, the cul-
tural critic and human rights activist 
Lunar New Year’s couplets reading ‘Success will 
arrive when Ma is toppled.’
Source: apk.tw
playful, insouciant, and ironic. In doing 
so, he spurred the rise of a new culture 
of amusement.
Liu Xiaobo recognised that the 
e’gao trend had negative effects too, es-
pecially in how it fostered malice and 
cynicism, and saw it partly as a symp-
tom of ‘spiritual hunger and intellec-
tual poverty at the same time’. Cynical 
laughter inoculates against genuine 
rage leading to meaningful political 
action; it placates and pacifies. But Liu 
also saw hope, observing that in places 
such as Czechoslovakia ‘truth-telling 
and joke-making have worked hand-
in-hand to dismantle post-totalitarian 
dictatorships’. A few fearless people 
of conscience tell the truth, while 
joke-makers dig away at the base of 
the wall of popular support for the re-
gime. ‘Without the truth-tellers, there 
would be no open expression of pop-
ular resistance or of moral courage; 
without the jokesters, the words of 
the truth-tellers would fall on barren 
ground.’
On 26 June 2017, the Liaoning 
Prison Administrative Bureau an-
nounced on its website that Liu, who 
had been awarded the 2010 Nobel 
Peace Prize while incarcerated under 
vague charges of state subversion, was 
suffering late-term liver cancer and 
had been released on medical parole. 
During the following weeks, Chinese 
state media broadcast images of Liu 
receiving medical attention in hospital, 
smiling for the camera and assuring 
viewers that he was being well cared 
for. The diagnosis and treatment both 
having arrived too late, this carefully 
orchestrated media spectacle did not 
last long. Liu Xiaobo died on 13 July 
2017.
Liu Xiaobo’s true crime was not 
just his truth-telling — his advocacy of 
free speech, democracy, and political 
freedoms, or his broadcasting of collec-
tive will in Charter 08 — but also what 
he shared with China’s joke-tellers, 
namely irreverence toward a govern-
ment that demands obedience from cit-
izens and claims immunity from their 
Liu Xiaobo




































criticism. Liu professed that he was 
not motivated by personal animus, 
that he had ‘no enemies, no hatred’; 
his critical writings also show that he 
revered no sacred cows and would in-
veigh against dissidents as readily as 
against dictators. The state’s response 
to Liu’s refusal to defer to power, real 
or symbolic — his lack of reverence — 
was: no clemency.
Over a decade ago, Liu recognised 
that the Internet was a boon to Chinese 
civil society. It had enhanced freedom 
of expression and emboldened a cul-
ture of impertinence that delighted 
in breaking taboos and venturing 
into prohibited zones of speech and 
thought. Individual truth-tellers might 
be silenced, but a collective voice is 
harder to tame. A viral e’gao campaign 
pitting Grass-Mud Horse 草泥马 (caon-
ima) against River Crabs 河蟹 (hexie) 
— a homophonous ‘fuck-your-mother’ 
操你妈  (caonima) against ‘[the] har-
monious [society]’ 和谐［社会］(hexie 
[shehui]) — which evaded censorship 
for a time, was one of the many subse-
quent signs that he was right. By that 
time, early 2009, Liu had already spent 
months in detention in what was to 
be his final stint of imprisonment; he 
was formally arrested in June and in 
December sentenced to eleven years. 
Liu was the first Nobel Peace Prize lau-
reate to die in custody since Carl von 
Ossietzky died in a Nazi prison in 1938.
A critic who understood both 
the power and the limits of political 
humour, Liu would have appreciated 
one irony occasioned by his horri- 
fic fate. In toppling him, the Chinese 
Communist Party made him an even 
more powerful symbol of political re-
sistance. Death is inevitable, but not 
martyrdom, and this reversal of for-
tune has ensured that memories of 
Liu Xiaobo’s moral courage — and of 
the regime’s brutal response — will 
























































THE NINETEENTH PARTY CONGRESS: 
HERE COMES THE FUTURE
Brian Martin
Xi Jinping meets with senior military officers in Beijing
Source: Xinhuanet 
THE NINETEENTH Communist Party Congress 
in October put the coping stone on Xi Jinping’s 
ascendancy over the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP), and ensured the Party’s continuing central 
role in China’s political, social, and economic life.1 
Xi’s key message to the Congress was that China had 
finally emerged as a global power. But the Party will 
continue to face growing social, environmental, 
and economic challenges. How well it meets them 
will depend on Xi’s capacity to exercise the supreme 





















































The authoritarian Xi Jinping dominates and controls the Party, which, 
through the Congress, awarded him greater power than his two predeces-
sors, Jiang Zemin 江泽民 and Hu Jintao 胡锦涛, and a status on par with 
Deng Xiaoping 邓小平, who led China’s post-Mao transition into the era of 
economic reform. The Congress amended the Party constitution to add ‘Xi 
Jinping Thought for the New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’
习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想 as the guiding ideology for the ‘New 
Era’. Its central message, in fourteen ‘fundamental principles’, is restoring 
China to the greatness that it lost during the ‘hundred years of humilia-
tion’ that began with the Opium Wars (1839–1860) and the further dep-
redations of Western and Japanese imperialism. The means for achieving 
greatness is a rejuvenated CCP, cleansed of corruption, and dedicated to 
its leadership of China and the advancement of China’s national interests. 
Xi is the first leader since Mao Zedong to have an official ideology 
named after him. Added to his designation in September 2016 as the ‘cen-
tral core’ of the Party, it so comprehensively identifies Xi with the Party 
that any criticism of him from within the Party could be considered trea-
son against the Party itself.  It is possible to detect shades of the Maoist past 
in the treatment of rivals and enemies. Liu Shiyu 刘士余, chairman of the 







‘saving the Communist Party’ from an alleged anti-Party plot. Liu named 
Sun Zhengcai 孙政才, former Chongqing Party Secretary and a recent ri-
val of Xi Jinping who was arrested and expelled from the Party several 
months before the Congress, as part of this anti-Party plot, linking him 
with former Party and military heavyweights Bo Xilai 薄熙来, Zhou Yong-
kang 周永康, Ling Jihua 令计划, Xu Caihou 徐才厚, and Guo Boxiong 郭伯
雄. All of these men, who had enjoyed ‘high positions and great power in 
the party, but [who] were hugely corrupt and plotted to usurp the party’s 
leadership and seize state power’, are currently in prison. 
The Congress endorsed an almost complete change in the members of 
the Politburo Standing Committee (the Party’s — and therefore China’s — 
supreme governing body) with only Li Keqiang 李克强, who was appointed 
to a second term as premier, and Xi Jinping himself as holdovers from the 
outgoing Standing Committee. Of the five new members, three are clearly 
aligned with Xi: Li Zhanshu 栗战书, Director of the CCP General Office and 
a long-time friend and aide to Xi who was responsible for pushing the idea 
of Xi as the ‘leadership core’; Wang Huning 王沪宁, Director of the CCP Pol-
icy Research Office, an academic turned party ideologist who is believed 
to have helped to craft Xi Jinping’s speeches, reports and even the ‘China 
Dream’; and Zhao Leji 赵乐际, who succeeds Wang Qishan 王岐山 in the 
politically sensitive role heading up China’s anti-corruption watchdog, the 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). The remaining two, 
Wang Yang 汪洋	 and Han Zheng 韩正, belong at least nominally to the 
two other informal factions: Wang, former party chief in Guangdong, to Li 
Keqiang’s Communist Youth League faction; and Han, former mayor and 
party boss of Shanghai, to Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai faction. These appoint-
ments maintain a nominal but diminished factional balance within the 
Standing Committee, with both the Communist Youth League faction and 
the Shanghai faction suffering a clear loss of political clout. Han Zheng, 
moreover, has moved closer to Xi Jinping in recent years and, as the new 
executive vice-premier, it is believed that he will keep an eye on Li Ke-





















































The make-up of China’s leadership
Source: China Daily
Xi is entering his second five-year term as Party chairman. It has pre-
viously been customary for the Party Congress that confirms the second 
term to reveal the chairman’s designated successor. The most striking fea-
ture of the new leadership line-up is that there is no designated successor 
among them. All of them are essentially administrators. This has aroused 
the suspicion of many foreign commentators that Xi Jinping intends to ig-
nore the customary two terms for the senior leader and go for a third in 
2022. But this could encourage a backlash from other ambitious leaders 
who are waiting for their turn. 
On the other hand, it might also be that Xi is biding his time, waiting 
to see how the members of the Standing Committee and the full Politburo 
perform. Of the fifteen new members appointed to the twenty-five mem-
ber Politburo, two-thirds either worked for or have had long-standing con-
nections to Xi Jinping. Two, in particular, deserve a mention: Chen Min’er 
陈敏尔, the new Chongqing party secretary, who many foreign academic 
and media observers (wrongly) tipped for promotion to the Standing Com-
mittee; and Liu He 刘鹤, the Director of the Central Committee’s Leading 
Group on Financial and Economic Affairs, who has advised Xi on econom-
ic issues, and who played a key role in drafting the economic reform blue-
print endorsed by the Eighteenth Central Committee’s Third Plenum. It 
might well be from the ranks of people like these that Xi eventually draws 
his successor.
Xi Jinping’s speech to the Congress underscored his determination to 
strengthen the leadership of the country by the Party. Guided by Xi Jin-
ping Thought, which senior academics at the Party School have declared 
to be ‘Marxism for the twenty-first century’, the Party will continue to ex-
pand its control over economic enterprises — state-owned, private, and 
joint ventures with foreign companies — through Party cells embedded in 
these organisations. At the same time, the Party will strengthen ideologi-
cal instruction in China’s schools and universities, in order to encourage 
Chinese youth to commit to the Party’s values. This will be accompanied 





















































and a narrowing of the scope for intellectual discussion and debate. The 
appalling fate of leading intellectual dissident and Nobel Peace Prize win-
ner, Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波, who died in custody only a few months before the 
Congress, sends a chilling warning to all intellectuals to conform to the 
Party orthodoxy or remain silent. 
At the same time, Xi Jinping seeks to improve the quality of the Party’s 
eighty-nine million members and their commitment to the values of the 
Party-state. He will continue with his coercive but popular anti-corruption 
campaign, implemented by the CCDI. The creation of supervisory 
commissions at all levels of Party government — national, provincial, city, 
and county — will strengthen and extend the supervisory functions of the 
CCDI . This bolstering of the CCDI’s functions will ensure that it remains an 
essential instrument through which Xi Jinping controls the Party. 
A Better Life for the New Era
In his speech to the Congress, which lasted 205 minutes, Xi Jinping indi-
cated that he intends to have a fundamental shaping influence on China’s 
future. He spoke of China since 1949 having gone through two thirty-year 
periods, first that of Mao Zedong, which founded and consolidated an 
independent new China (the People’s Republic), and that of Deng Xiao- 
ping, which laid the basis for contemporary China’s prosperity through 
economic reform and opening up to the outside world, lifting 700 million 
people out of poverty. Xi set out his vision for a third era to be guided 
by his ‘Thought’ in which he will restore China’s greatness, drawing on 
both socialist and nationalist aspirations. This will be a two-stage process 
beginning in 2020, with the aim of achieving by 2050 ‘a great modern so-
cialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, 
harmonious and beautiful’. Xi sees himself defining this ‘New Era’ in the 
same way that Mao and Deng defined the two earlier periods. They now 
explicitly make up a triumvirate of key leaders of the People’s Republic.
Xi stressed that the Par-
ty must address the Chinese 
people’s rising economic and 
environmental aspirations 
for a ‘better life’ 美好生活. It 
is clear that Xi sees this as the 
major domestic political task 
facing the Party, and the one 
on which its future credibili-
ty will depend: the principal 
economic and social contra-
diction facing China, he told 
the Congress, was ‘between 
unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing 
needs for a better life’. While listing among his achievements raising over 
sixty million people out of poverty and creating thirteen million urban 
jobs since 2012, he also insisted that much still needs to be done. Poverty 
alleviation remained ‘a formidable task’, and he acknowledged the large 
(and increasing) disparities in income and development between urban 
and rural areas and between regions, as well as problems with meet-
ing the Chinese people’s needs for employment, education, healthcare, 
housing, and aged care. Xi’s Beautiful China Initiative 美丽中国, which 
acknowledges the Chinese people’s concern for their environment, mean-
while, addresses environmental issues, including water security and pol-
lution, both of which have become serious political concerns as well. All of 
these urgent social problems pose major challenges for Xi’s second term.
To successfully tackle its social and environmental problems, China 
needs to maintain a GDP growth rate of 6.7–6.8 per cent, and Xi indicated 
that the aim is for continued, moderately high growth over the next few 
years. He pointed to the strength of China’s economy during his first term, 
when GDP rose from US$8.2 trillion to US$12.1 trillion. He also drew at-
tention to the fact that China’s economy had become the second largest in 






















































the world, contributing thirty per cent to global economic growth (a figure 
confirmed by Forbes magazine) and, in a triumphalist flourish, noted that 
‘China now leads the world in trade, outbound investment, and foreign 
exchange reserves’. 
For all its dynamism, the Chinese economy is bedevilled by serious 
structural problems, the most significant being the growing debt-to-GDP 
ratio. According to the New York Federal Reserve, since 2005 China has 
accounted for fifty per cent of all new credit created globally — a huge 
burden for an economy that accounts for fifteen per cent of the global 
economy. And China’s growth continues to be funded by injections of cred-
it from domestic sources. This ongoing expansion of China’s debt-to-GDP 
ratio poses some longer term risks to the economy, and is beginning to 
concern international financial institutions: in May 2017, the rating agen-
cy Moody’s downgraded China’s credit rating for the first time in nearly 
thirty years. Straight after the Party Congress, Zhou Xiaochuan 周小川, the 
governor of the People’s Bank of China, warned that Chinese corporate 
debt was so high it threatened financial stability, and called for fiscal re-
forms to constrain local government borrowing. 
Enter the Dragon: A Mighty China
In his speech, Xi asserted that by the middle of the twenty-first century 
China will have ‘emerged as a global leader in terms of comprehensive na-
tional power and international influence’. He underlined the commitment 
to economic globalisation and the multilateral trading system that he first 
made at Davos in January 2017, as well as China’s continuing adherence 
to the Paris climate accord. His emphasis on global governance reflects a 
desire to capitalise on the uncertainty produced by the nativist and anti- 
globalisation policies of the Trump Administration as well as a belief that 
the United States itself has been in long-term decline ever since the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008. 
As in his earlier 
speeches regarding 
the Belt and Road In-
itiative (discussed in 
Chapter 2, pp.42–59), 
Xi put forward China 
as a developmental 
model that ‘offers 
Chinese wisdom and 
a Chinese approach 
to solving the problems facing mankind, and that other countries can em-
ulate’. At the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit 
in Xiamen in September, immediately before the Congress, Xi Jinping ex-
tended an invitation to five other developing economies (Egypt, Mexico, 
Thailand, Tajikistan, and Guinea) to partner with BRICS. This explicitly 
challenges the Western developmental model and is also part of a larger 
implicit challenge to the Western liberal democratic order, underwritten 
by the US, that has underpinned the international order since 1945. 
Xi adopted a similarly muscular tone with regard to the South China 
Sea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Of course, China’s earlier rejection of the 
United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling on the South Chi-
na Sea dispute does not bode well for China’s global citizenship in areas 
where international law conflicts with its perceived national interests. Xi 
did not mention North-East Asia or the North Korea nuclear weapons cri-
sis. This is currently the biggest threat to Chinese and world security. Any 
direct confrontation between the US and North Korea would inevitably 
involve China. 
Another topic of the epic speech was the modernisation of the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army (PLA), which Xi said would be ‘basically completed’ 
by 2035; by the middle of the twenty-first century, the PLA ‘will be trans-
formed into a world-class military’. This will be the finishing touch on 
wide-ranging military reforms that Xi began in 2012. These involved the 






















































recentralisation of decision-making in the Central Military Commission 
(CMC), which he heads, administrative reorganisation, the downsizing of 
the PLA, and the retirement of over fifty senior military leaders, including 
two formerly powerful CMC vice-chairmen. All of this has strengthened 
the Party’s, but particularly Xi Jinping’s control over the PLA as CMC chair-
man. In his speech, Xi reiterated the ‘absolute’ nature of the Party’s leader-
ship over the military. The purpose of modernising the PLA is not only to 
defend China’s national security interests but also to be able to contest US 
military power in East Asia in the future. 
Xi Ascendant
In sum, the Nineteenth Party Congress affirmed Xi Jinping’s ascendancy, 
essentially letting him take control over China’s political system, Party, 
and military. Xi’s ability to surmount various political challenges in the 
run-up to the Congress and the shape of the new leadership line-up re-
veal how astute and formidable a politician he is. His landmark speech 
sketched out ambitious long-term social, economic, and environmental 
goals, while proposing China’s development model as an alternative to 
that of the West. The Congress is a turning point for China, highlighting its 
international ambitions, including Xi’s clear determination to wrest lead-
ership in global governance from the US, and a more assertive and robust 
foreign policy. The global balance of power is shifting and, as Xi’s speech 
made plain, China is rapidly emerging as a centre of global economic and 
strategic power. 



































THE CULTURE OF MONEY
Saviours and Slackers 
·  LINDA JAIVIN
Ode to Joy 





































T HE 2017 FILM Wolf Warrior 2 战狼	II, which is set in an unnamed 
African country, portrays the dramatic 
rescue of Chinese and African hostages 
from ruthless American mercenaries 
by a Chinese special forces operative. 
The film’s tag line is as muscular as its 
director and action hero star Wu Jing 
吴京: ‘Whoever offends our China will 
be put to death’ 犯我中华者，虽远必诛. 
(A more literal reading would be 
‘whoever offends our China, no matter 
how far away, must be punished by 
death’.) Patriotism sells. Within two 
weeks of its late-July release, Wolf 
Warrior 2, based on the cult 2006 
military novel Bullet Hole 弹痕 by 
Fenwu Yaoji 纷舞妖姬	 (the pen name 
of Dong Qun 董群), became the highest 
grossing film in Chinese history. 
Within one month, it had taken in 
US$800 million at the box office, 
becoming the second-highest grossing 
film in any single territory worldwide 
after Star Wars 7 in the United  States. 
Not long after the film’s release, 
a rumour arose online that Wu Jing 
was a foreign-passport holder. On 
7 August, the official Weibo account of 
the Jiangsu Police posted the Chinese 
passports of both the director and his 
wife, affirming that the whole family 
held Chinese citizenship, following this 
statement with a bouncing ‘thumbs up’ 












































emoji. The police reminded people that 
the ‘malicious spread of rumours and 
slander’ was a crime.1 It is uncertain as 
to whether the police were suggesting 
that it was slanderous to say someone 
held foreign citizenship. There can be 
a thin line between patriotic pride and 
anti-foreign sentiment. That line was 
crossed more than once in Chinese 
popular culture in 2017. 
There is not a huge conceptual leap 
from the patriotic heroism of Wolf War-
rior 2 to the pimp-rolling xenophobic 
swagger of Chengdu rapper Xie Di 谢帝, 
aka ‘Fat Shady’. In his expletive-filled 
music video ‘Stupid Foreigners’ 瓜老外, 
released in July, Xie Di accuses foreign-
ers in China of being losers who could 
not make it in their own countries, in-
vites them to polish his (foreign) car 
and his (foreign) boots, and then be-
heads with a baseball bat a mannequin 
on which is written ‘stupid foreigners’. 
New York film critic Simon Abrams, 
writing on rogerebert.com, said of Wolf 
Warrior 2: ‘its characters’ sense of pat-
riotism is built on the back of racist as-
sumptions that would, in a European or 
American narrative, be rightfully crit-
icized for being part of an ugly “white 
saviour” power fantasy’. Noel Murray 
of the Los Angeles Times commented: 
‘there is something bracing about its 
patriotic fervor, which asserts that the 
Chinese will act in the best interests of 
the world’s downtrodden, while the rest 
of the world just exploits them’. 
China’s prosperity has sparked 
a huge resurgence in national pride, 
and a growing sense of China taking its 
rightful place in the world. The Party- 
state’s carefully curated narrative 
of China’s rise slates all the pain and 
sorrow that the Chinese people have 
suffered over the last two centuries 
home to foreign exploitation, begin-
ning with the Opium Wars of the early 
nineteenth century. Some fifty-three 
per cent of the population was born 
after 1976; most of them would have 
no idea of the suffering of previous 
generations at the hands of the Party 
itself in the decade-long Cultural Rev-
olution, the three-year famine that 
preceded it, or any of the other move-
ments later swept under the carpet of 
official history. Many have only known 
increasingly higher standards of living 
and ever-greater social and personal 
opportunity. With limited access to 
uncensored international discourse 
around such topics as China’s actions 
in the South China Sea, they are aston-
ished and outraged by negative per-
ceptions abroad of how China is man-
aging its growing power: Wolf Warrior 
2 and Fat Shady’s lyrics are among the 
cultural expressions of this.
With its assertive delivery and 
association with bling, ‘pimped rides’, 
and all the rest, hip hop 嘻哈 appeared 
well suited to conveying a message of 
prosperity pride. Hip hop was part of 
China’s diverse popular music scene 
for some years, but went mainstream 
in the summer of 2017 with the broad-
cast on the video channel iQiYi of the 
first episode of the music competition 
The Rap of China 中国有嘻哈 (with 
the prize being gold chains that spell 
‘R!CH’). By October, The Rap of China 
had racked up billions of views. 
Within a mostly anodyne scene 
that has produced, for example, songs 
about the local delicacies of the Xi’an 
region, a number of what you might 
call patriotic prosperity rappers had 
emerged. In 2016, the group Tianfu 
Shibian 天府事变 (also known as CD 
Rev) produced an English-language 
‘red rap’ 红色嘻哈 called ‘This is China’ 
听好了，这才是中国. Singer Li Yijie 李
毅杰 (who goes by the English name 
‘Pissy’) said he wrote it as a response 
to Western media ‘fabrications’ about 
China and his conviction that the 
American government hires people in 
China to brainwash Chinese children 
into loving the US.2 The lyrics boast 
about China’s national achievements 
including the space program and mo-
bile phone payment systems. CD Rev’s 
previous songs include ‘The Force of 
Red’ 红色力量, which refers to the pres-
ident of Taiwan as the ‘bitch Tsai Ing-
wen’, and another that addresses for-
eign correspondents as ‘media punk 
ass white trash fuckers’ and ‘faggots 
from the West’. Swearing, misogyny, 
and homophobia are traits that Pissy’s 
lyrics share with some of the more in-
famous rap songs from the US; missing 
is the anti-authoritarian spirit of genre- 
defining songs such as N.W.A.’s ‘Fuck 
Tha Police’. Pissy’s message is more 
‘don’t fuck [with] tha’ police’. 
Although at the start of 2018, the 
Party-state decided to ban rap and hip-
hop from television. Yet, the Commu-
nist Youth League had helped produce 
‘This is China’, and Pissy widely vaunt-
ed his Party connections and support. 
Stating that it is important for young 
people (he is twenty-three) to ‘step 
into this system’, he told Reuters that 
the members of his group ‘frequently 
dined with officials to exchange ideas’.3 
Domestic critics of ‘red rap’ dismiss 
them as typical ‘50-cent-ers’ 五毛党	— 
that is, hacks paid by the Party to spout 
the Party line — and the Hong Kong 





































taste for the form as well. This does not 
bother the red rappers, however. One 
article on the Chinese-language web-
site xihachina.com responded to such 
critics using the English phrase: ‘What-
ever’.4 Despite the ban, at time of pub-
lication xihachina.com was still going 
and so was hip hop.
‘Whatever’ could be the slogan for 
another, entirely opposite genre of cul-
tural, or rather subcultural production 
that rose to prominence in 2017 as well: 
‘sang culture’ 丧文化. The character 
sang when pronounced in the first tone 
means funeral or mourning. When 
pronounced in the fourth tone, as it is 
here, it signifies to lose or have lost, as 
in ‘lose virtue’ 丧德, meaning degener-
ate; ‘lose ambition’ 丧志	or ‘lose qi’ 丧
气, to have bad luck and become dis-
couraged. Sang culture icons include 
the Netflix animated comedy Bojack 
Horseman (now banned in China) and 
Catcher in the Rye. One of the most 
typical expressions of sang culture is 
through the creation of memes, in-
cluding from the 1990s Chinese sitcom 
I Love my Family 我爱我家, in which 
comedian-actor Ge You 葛优	 plays an 
archetypal loser, spending much of his 
time sprawling dishevelled and listless 
on a friend’s sofa. 
Sang culture appeals on the basis 
of humour. But as many commentators 
have noted, it also expresses the futil-
ity felt by many young people in the 
face of barriers to social mobility and 
shared prosperity such as the prohib-
itive cost of housing as well as corrup-
tion and nepotism. Working hard, as 
urged by the People’s Daily in its re-
sponse to sang culture, does not solve 
everything. Clearly onto its more sub-
versive implications, the Party organ 
has labelled sang culture ‘ideological 
opium’ and linked it to crime and sui-
cide.5 But sang culture is also an anti-
dote to the frenetic pace of a rampant-
ly materialistic society that provides 
scant opportunity for leisure or idle-
ness. Another exemplar of sang culture 
is a conversation in the 2016 Japanese 
film Setoutsumi セトウツミ, in which 
a schoolboy laments the notion that 
young people should always be  ‘run-
ning and sweating’; he asks a question 
that has become a popular meme: ‘why 
can’t I just waste time by the river?’ 
A Ge You sofa meme
Source: Baidu
DO’S AND DON’TS, by Linda Jaivin
China’s State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) 
had a busy 2017. The following are among the year’s major directives:
• China’s 2,500-odd television stations 
must no longer broadcast shows ‘fo-
cussed on entertainment’ or ‘with for-
eign elements’ during primetime. 
•  Online video content must follow a new 
set of ‘general rules’ 通则 issued in 
September. These include a ban on de-
pictions of homosexuality, which they 
lump together with incest and sexual 
assault under ‘abnormal sexual behaviour’ — despite homosexuality having been de-
criminalised in 1997 and struck off China’s official list of ‘mental disorders’ in 2001. At 
the end of September, the online forum Tianya 天涯 announced the closure of its sub- 
discussion board ‘Accompanying You Along the Road’ 一路同行, which for eighteen years 
had been a meeting place and publishing hub for personal stories and fiction for China’s 
LGBTQ population — due to ‘external factors outside our control’. 
•  Mid-year, in the interest of ensuring that online video ‘adheres to the correct political 
direction, and works hard to disseminate contemporary Chinese values’, SAPPRFT tar-
getted 155 online programs as problematic; by September, 125 were permanently offline. 
Among them: Phoenix TV’s online video services and the popular talk show Behind the 
Headlines 锵锵三人行, which for nearly twenty years had hosted lively — perhaps too 
lively — discussions on a range of topics. 
•   Even the title of the talk show Behind the Headlines entered the growing lexicon of banned 
words. These now include the use of ‘boss’ 老板 for Party leaders; the word ‘citizens’ 公民	
to describe the people 民众	of Taiwan; and the use of ‘foreign visit ’ 出访 to describe Party 
leaders’ trips to Hong Kong and Macau (such trips are ‘inspections’ 视察).6 
•  Celebrity culture took a hit as well. The press is no longer to speak of celebrities in terms 
such as ‘emperor of the big screen’ 影帝, ‘superstar’ 巨星, and ‘goddess’ 女神. They are all 
now simply to be known as ‘famous actors’ 著名演员. The authorities shut down a number 
of entertainment-focussed sites and banned online promotion of ultra-luxe lifestyles.
•  Go to the cinema and before the main feature you will now sit through one of four vid-
eo shorts produced by SAPPRFT and featuring famous actors including Jackie Chan, Li 
Bingbing, Angelababy, and Donnie Yen. These promote the twelve ‘socialist core values’, 
including prosperity and the ‘China Dream’ as well as the building of a ‘moderately pros-
perous society’. 

































I N THE SEASON TWO FINALE of the smash-hit sitcom Ode to Joy 欢乐颂, 
the character Fan Shengmei 樊胜美, 
who has struggled with financially 
needy parents continually pressuring 
her to marry, boldly declares her New 
Year’s resolution: ‘I am going to stay 
single and do whatever I want. I will 
be the fighter plane among the left-
over women [shengnü 剩女]!’
For over a decade, young Chinese 
women have been bludgeoned with 
the awful term shengnü, for which the 
closest equivalent in English is ‘spin-
ster’, in state propaganda, film, and 
television. The message is: if you want 
to marry, do not be too educated or you 
will not be attractive to men. Marry by 
your mid-twenties (and marry up), be 
a mother at home, and a ‘white collar 
beauty’ 白领丽人 at work. It leaves 
young women confronting a ‘moral-
ised female sexuality’ that forces them 
to navigate between the extremes of 
the unsociable housewife, and the 
powerful woman 女强人 who achieves 
success at the expense of her feminine 
charm.7 
Ode to Joy stars five unmarried, 
educated protagonists, aged from their 
early twenties to mid-thirties. This is a 
novel concept for Chinese TV. The Peo-
ple’s Daily praised the show for its ‘real-
ism’ 现实主义 in depicting the life pres-
sures of urban women; the US-based 
news site SupChina called it a ‘breath 
of fresh air’ in a TV industry still dom-
inated by propagandistic historical 
dramas and dynastic epics.8 These still 
topped the 2017 TV rankings, followed 
by the anti-corruption drama In the 
Name of the People 人民的名义 (see 

































Bix.10  Andy feels no pressure to marry, 
but struggles in her relationships due 
to anxiety and fear of physical contact, 
resulting from an inherited mental 
illness. It is a confusing message, and 
not a particularly joyful one. 
The admirable Qiu Yingying 邱
莹莹, the youngest of the friends and 
the least well-off, lands a job at a local 
café and sets about revolutionising its 
business model through online sales. 
Her (affable, male) boss is delighted; 
her (catty, female) floor manager en-
vious. Around the time she gets her 
own office, Qiu meets Ying Qin 应勤, 
an introverted but charming IT guy, 
and their relationship starts off like a 
dream come true. But in the most-dis-
cussed episode, Ying turns into a mon-
ster upon discovering that Qiu has lost 
her virginity: ‘that girl is a stain 污点’.
The two later reconcile and get 
engaged. In another controversial 
episode, Ying Qin’s traditional, mid-
dle-class parents browbeat Qiu’s laid-
back working-class parents over the 
marriage arrangements. For this view-
er, who wanted to see Ying Qin in a 
noose by this point, it was not a satis-
fying resolution. 
If Qiu were wealthy, virginity 
would not be such an issue. It certain-
ly is not for Qu Xiaoxiao 曲筱绡, an 
Forum ‘In the Name of the People’, 
p.155), which narrowly edged Ode to 
Joy into fifth place. But Ode to Joy was 
by far the most popular urban drama 
都市剧, with the fifty-five episodes of 
season two garnering a total of twenty- 
two billion online views by the time of 
the 10 June finale.9 
Ode to Joy broaches the taboo of 
young women remaining single in a 
blatant attempt to fan outrage on so-
cial media in between episodes. Each 
episode, in turn, is packed with enough 
product placement to drown out any 
pretense of meaningful social com-
mentary. Products are the real stars of 
Ode to Joy: they stand for wealth, and, 
for those that can afford them, greater 
agency in love and marriage. The less 
wealthy characters are shown to have 
much less choice in such matters.
The eldest of the five neighbours 
is Andy 安迪, a Columbia-educated 
maths genius and CFO in a finance 
company. She is beautiful, ruthless in 
the boardroom, and a role model to 
her friends. She also drives a Porsche 
911 (and numerous other luxury cars), 
and goes jogging in lululemon active-
wear. In one episode, which gained the 
Sanitarium company unprecedented 
exposure in the Chinese market, she is 
seen eating imported Australian Weet-
archetypal ‘young nouveau-riche’ 富
二代 who flirts outrageously, works in 
her father’s company, and goes crying 
to him in his gated mansion whenever 
life does not go her way. By far the most 
loathed of Ode to Joy’s protagonists, 
she nonetheless wins the love of the 
dashing Dr Zhao 赵医生, and flaunts 
their love continually. While a discreet 
view of quivering bed sheets does not 
make Ode to Joy quite Sex in the City, to 
which it has been compared, the rich 
girl with means brings us as close as 
we get to material climax.  
Then there is quiet, studious 
and hard-working Guan Ju’er 关雎尔. 
Despite her upper-middle class back-
ground, she has no yearning for hand-
bags, only the right guy. This might 
well be Xie Tong 谢童, who has run 
away from a broken home to chase his 
dreams in Shanghai’s underground 
rock scene. ‘Everyone disapproves of 
us’, Guan tells her friends in the season 
finale, ‘but I know our love will survive 
all tests.’ If the show hopes to shake its 
derisive nickname, Ode to Advertising 
广告颂, their love will be the test for 
season three.




































































THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE:  
HOW TO WIN FRIENDS AND  
INFLUENCE PEOPLE
Jane Golley and Adam Ingle
Gwadar Port, Pakistan
Source: Gwadar News 
THROUGHOUT THE 1980s, Deng Xiaoping famously 
counselled Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials 
that in international affairs, China must ‘bide [its] 
time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never 
claim leadership’. Under each successive leader 
through to Hu Jintao (2002–2012), the CCP largely 
followed Deng’s counsel. In the era of President 
Xi Jinping, however, Chinese leadership on such 
global issues as free trade, emissions reductions, 
and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank represents a strategic shift, which 
is epitomised by the centrepiece of Xi’s foreign 
policy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 一带一路. 
Although Xi first touted the BRI in 2013 (then known 
in English as One Belt One Road), it was in 2017 that 
the whole world took notice. China’s low-profile era 


































































In mid-January 2017, during his keynote speech at the World Econom-
ic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Xi pledged China’s ongoing commitment 
to free trade, including ‘open, transparent and win-win regional free trade 
agreements’. He adamantly rejected the ‘pursuit of protectionism’, which 
he likened to ‘locking oneself in a dark room. While wind and rain may 
be kept outside, that dark room will also block light and air. No one will 
emerge as a winner in a trade war.’ Xi said China was committed to ‘ad-
dressing problems facing the global and regional economy, creating fresh 
energy for pursuing interconnected development and making the Belt and 
Road Initiative deliver greater benefits to people of countries involved.’1 
In preparation for the inaugural Belt and Road Forum on Internation-
al Cooperation in Beijing on 14–15 May, Xi took his vision for the BRI a 
step further. In a promotional video released on YouTube under the title 
of ‘Why I proposed the Belt and Road’, subtitled in English, Xi says he ‘feels 
that [he] can hear the sound of the camel bells ringing in the mountains 
and see plumes of smoke rising over the desert’. He then voices his con-
cerns about the future of lands that were once prosperous and bustling 
but whose names are now synonymous with difficulty, conflict, and crisis. 
A still from the music video ‘The Belt and Road is How’
Photo: YouTube
Against a CGI-enhanced backdrop of camels travelling across the desert 
and eagles soaring above oceans dotted with seafaring junks, Xi explains 
that: 
The Belt and Road Initiative draws inspiration from the ancient Silk 
Road and aims to help realise the shared dream of people worldwide 
for peace and development. Shining with the wisdom from the East, 
it is a plan that China offers the world for seeking common prosperity 
and development 共同繁荣发展.2
 
This conceptualises BRI as the culmination of two of Xi’s other favourite 
tropes: the ‘China dream’ and a ‘shared destiny’ (the title of the China Story 
Yearbook 2014).
In case this was not convincing enough, a second video features 
ukulele-playing children from many of the BRI partner countries singing 
‘The Belt and Road is How’ (a pun on the Chinese word for good, hao 好). 
The children explain how the BRI will enable us all to share in a world 
of prosperity. To top it off, the China Daily launched its ‘Bedtime Stories’ 
campaign online, in which an American staffer at the paper explains the 
initiative to his young daughter to put her to sleep!3  
Meanwhile, the world was waking up to a very different global order, 
with the election of Donald Trump as the president of the world’s other 
largest economy. The contrast between his and Xi’s visions could not have 
been starker. In one of Trump’s first acts as president, in December 2016, 
he created the National Trade Council to implement the ‘Buy America Hire 
America’ program.4 He did not fulfill his election promise to slap forty-five 
per cent tariffs on all Chinese imports (and his daughter’s business con-
tinued to manufacture goods in China). But, in January, he did deliver on 
his promise to withdraw the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
the ambitious trade liberalisation initiative proposed by his predecessor, 
Barack Obama. Throughout the year, Trump continuously tweeted his de-


































































ing very little to assure the global community of America’s commitment to 
any international common cause. His decision to withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change in June was a significant case in point. 
Geoeconomics: Sticks and Carrots
‘Geoeconomics’ is a useful concept for understanding Xi and Trump’s two 
distinct approaches to the global political economy. In their 2016 book 
War by Other Means: Geoeonomics and Statecraft, Robert Blackwill and 
Jennifer Harris, senior fellows at the US Council on Foreign Relations, de-
fine geoeconomics as ‘the use of economic instruments to promote and de-
fend national interests and to produce geopolitical results; and the effects 
of another nation’s economic actions on a country’s geopolitical goals’.5   
Blackwill and Harris lament the decades-long demise of the US’s 
geoeconomic strategy, in which they saw the TPP as the overriding com-
ponent, ‘tying together America’s friends in Asia and negotiating terms of 
engagement between US collaborators in the Western and Eastern Hemi-
spheres’.6 Trump’s TPP withdrawal no doubt dismayed Blackwill and 
Harris — with little to make up for it as the year unfolded.
Instead, throughout the year, Trump tweeted erratically on the sub-
ject of how the US would or could use its economic might to achieve its 
diplomatic goals. He focussed primarily on China’s role in dealing with 
an increasingly recalcitrant North Korea, sometimes offering carrots and 
other times threatening it with sticks. For example, on 11 April, he tweet-
ed: ‘I explained to the President of China that a trade deal with the US will 
be far better for them if they solve the North Korean problem!’ Less than 
five months later, on 3 September, however, he warned that ‘The United 
States is considering, in addition to other options, stopping all trade with 
any country doing business with North Korea’. (See Information Window 
‘Trump’s Tweets’, pp.50–51).
As Blackwill put it to The Washington Post in April prior to Xi Jinping’s 
US visit: ‘It is very dangerous for presidents to be utterly extemporane-
ous in their interactions with major powers’. He observed that by con-
trast Xi Jinping would undoubtedly be arriving ‘with a very clear set of 
strategic objectives and strategies’.7 Likewise, in a Foreign Policy article in 
July, Jamie Fly, a senior fellow at the non-partisan American think tank the 
German Marshall Fund, criticised Trump’s China policy as short-sighted, 
calling his approach to China and North Korea the ‘geopolitical equivalent 
of tic-tac-toe’.8  
The US was not the only global superpower playing geoeconomic 
games in 2017. Following South Korea’s decision to deploy the US-supplied 
THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Defense) missile defence system in 
March, China’s state media encouraged a boycott of South Korean goods, 
culture and tourism, inflicting high costs on the South Korean economy. 
This method of punishing countries for acting against its foreign policy 
interests is not new to China. Previous campaigns have targetted Japan, 
the Philippines, and Taiwan, and other countries are justifiably concerned 
about who might be next. This kind of behaviour will not help China win 
friends in the region. But the BRI just might.
US President Donald Trump



































































17 March: North Korea is behaving 
very badly. They have been ‘playing’ 
the United States for years. China 
has done little to help! 
13 April: I have great confidence 
that China will properly deal with 
North Korea. If they are unable to 
do so, the U.S., with its allies, will! 
U.S.A. 
16 April: Why would I call China a 
currency manipulator when they 
are working with us on the North 
Korean problem? We will see what 
happens! 
21 April: China is very much the economic lifeline to North Korea so, while nothing is easy, 
if they want to solve the North Korean problem, they will. 
28 April: North Korea disrespected the wishes of China & its highly respected President 
when it launched, though unsuccessfully, a missile today. Bad! 
5 July: The United States made some of the worst Trade Deals in world history. Why should 
we continue these deals with countries that do not help us? 
5 July: Trade between China and North Korea grew almost 40% in the first quarter. So much 
for China working with us — but we had to give it a try! 
29 July: I am very disappointed in China. Our foolish past leaders have allowed them to 
make hundreds of billions of dollars a year in trade, yet ... 
29 July: ... they do NOTHING for us with North Korea, just talk. We will no longer allow this 
to continue. China could easily solve this problem! 
Trump tweets
Photo: Marco Verch, Flickr
The Belt and Road Initiative: The Big Carrot
During the last four decades, economic growth has been the cornerstone 
of the CCP’s legitimacy for retaining sole stewardship over the state. Pres-
ident Xi Jinping’s 2013 statement on the ‘Chinese Dream’ expressed this in 
concrete terms by committing the Party to delivering better education, sta-
ble employment, higher incomes, greater social security, improved med-
ical care, a healthier environment, and work satisfaction for the Chinese 
people. Creating a global environment favourable to continued domestic 
growth aligns perfectly with this goal. 
3 September: The United States is considering, in addition to other options, stopping all 
trade with any country doing business with North Korea.
25 October: Spoke to President Xi of China to congratulate him on his extraordinary eleva-
tion. Also discussed NoKo & trade, two very important subjects!
9 November: In the coming months and years ahead I look forward to building an even 
STRONGER relationship between the United States and China.   
9 November: I don’t blame China, I blame the incompetence of past Admins for allowing 
China to take advantage of the U.S. on trade leading up to a point where the U.S. is losing 
$100’s of billions. How can you blame China for taking advantage of people that had no clue? 
I would’ve done same!
9 November: My meetings with President Xi Jinping were very productive on both trade 
and the subject of North Korea. He is a highly respected and powerful representative of his 
people. It was great being with him and Madame Peng Liyuan!
15 November: President Xi of China has stated that he is upping the sanctions against 
#NoKo. Said he wants them to denuclearize. Progress is being made.
29 November: Just spoke to President XI JINPING of China concerning the provocative ac-
tions of North Korea. Additional major sanctions will be imposed on North Korea today. This 
situation will be handled!
30 November: The Chinese Envoy, who just returned from North Korea, seems to have had 
no impact on Little Rocket Man. Hard to believe his people, and the military, put up with 
living in such horrible conditions. Russia and China condemned the launch.
28 December: Caught RED HANDED — very disappointed that China is allowing oil to go 
into North Korea. There will never be a friendly solution to the North Korea problem if this 
continues to happen!
And this is where the BRI comes in. It began in 2013 with two sepa-
rate proposals, for a ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and a ‘Twenty-first Century 
Maritime Silk Road’ connecting under-developed border provinces with 
developing countries in the region. These regional partners now include 
sixty-four countries that cover the entire Eurasian zone, involving a di-
verse range of projects with an approximate value of US$900 billion. 
The initiative calls for a multi-dimensional infrastructure network 
including a number of economic ‘corridors’ (such as the China–Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC), China–Mongolia–Russia Economic Corridor, 
and the New Eurasian Continental Bridge). It will upgrade land, sea, and air 


































































The initiative will also create mechanisms for the Five Connectivities 五通: 
policy dialogue, infrastructure connectivity, tariff reductions, financial sup-
port, and people-to-people exchanges across the participating countries. 
In his Belt and Road Forum speech in May, President Xi iterated the 
global objectives of the BRI: peace, prosperity, cooperation, openness, 
inclusiveness, and mutual benefit. He called for the creation of an envi-
ronment that will facilitate opening up and development; establish a fair, 
equitable, and transparent system of international trade and investment 
rules; and facilitate the orderly flow and allocation of resources such as 
labour, capital, and energy, as well as full market integration.10 At Octo-
ber’s Nineteenth Party Congress, these loosely defined ideas were in-
troduced into the Chinese constitution, which now commits China to 
‘following the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion 
and collaboration, and pursuing the Belt and Road Initiative’.11 Although 
China’s constitution is a little more flexible than its Western counterparts, 
it is clear that China is all in when it comes to the BRI — the centrepiece 
of a long-term foreign policy strategy designed to make China (and the 
Chinese Communist Party) strong.
Domestically, the BRI aims to sustain China’s economic development. 
GDP growth has decreased from 7.7 per cent in 2012 to 6.9 per cent in 
2017. While no single factor is responsible for the slowdown — and indeed, 
while 6.9 per cent is still extraordinarily high from a global perspective — 
China’s past growth model of exporting labour-intensive manufacturing 
goods has evidently run its course. Two clear signs of this are over-produc-
tion by a number of China’s industries, including coal, steel, and cement, 
along with excessive foreign exchange reserves (peaking at over US$4 tril-
lion in 2014, although on the decline since then). The BRI promises to solve 
both of these problems and kick economic growth back into high gear by 
cultivating new export markets for Chinese goods — including coal, steel, 
and cement — and new destinations for Chinese investment. It will also 
provide new sources of growth for the global economy, which for so long 
has sustained China’s domestic growth.
The BRI is also intended to bring both growth and economic stability 
to China’s less-developed western regions, particularly Xinjiang and Tibet 
— further integrating these areas into the Chinese economy. It would 
transform Xinjiang into an energy corridor for Eurasia and create new 
opportunities to exploit its untapped resources. For Tibet, the Himalayan 
Economic Rim Project would connect Tibet with the Bangladesh–China– 
India–Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM), and develop border trade and 
economic exchange with Nepal, India, and Bhutan, with a focus on tour-
ism, Tibetan medicine, and animal husbandry.12 Shared prosperity could 
help to reduce ethnic tensions in these areas and calm the sporadic violence 
that has plagued these regions in the past, sparked by resentment of what is 
widely perceived as exploitative and repressive rule by the central govern-
ment. So many prosperous possibilities — what could possibly go wrong? 
Wake-up Call
More than 1,500 delegates from over 130 nations, including twenty-nine 
heads of state and government leaders, attended the Belt and Road Fo-
rum held in Beijing in May. The grandeur of the event reflected the scale 






































































China’s $1 trillion plan to shake up the economic order’, Jane Perez and 
Huang Yufan surmised that: 
Mr. Xi is aiming to use China’s wealth and industrial know-how to cre-
ate a new kind of globalization that will dispense with the rules of 
the aging Western-dominated institutions. The goal is to refashion the 
global economic order, drawing countries and companies more tightly 
into China’s orbit.13  
While Xi and other Chinese officials have stressed explicitly that this is 
not China’s goal, it is not hard to understand why some are suspicious. 
The BRI will be implemented by the world’s largest one-party state, which 
officially defines its economic system as ‘Socialism with Chinese char-
acteristics’. It plans to direct investment into state-favoured regions by 
predominantly state-owned firms and financed by state-controlled banks. 
For all its altruistic rhetoric, the BRI is clearly not entirely compatible with 
the current global economic order that Xi has pledged to uphold.
This point is well illustrated by the BRI’s flagship project, CPEC. (See 
Information Window ‘The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor’, pp.56–57.) 
This project has been the greatest concern for India, the only country with 
a formal invitation to have boycotted the Belt and Road Summit in May. 
India’s resistance to China’s growing prominence in the region has been 
increasingly apparent since 2014. That year, Prime Minister Modi intro-
Participants at the Belt and Road Forum, May 2017
Photo: Wikipedia
duced an ‘Act East’ policy, which aims to ‘strengthen strategic and eco-
nomic ties with South-East Asian countries that would possibly act as a 
counterweight to the influence of China in the region’.14   
Likewise, in 2015, Japan announced its own US$110 billion infrastruc-
ture fund, promoting economic integration between South-East Asia and 
the global economy. Its east–west orientation is a deliberate counter to 
China’s infrastructure projects that run from north to south, seeking to in-
tegrate South-East Asia with the Chinese economy.15 Also in 2015 came the 
Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) — a customs union of former 
Soviet states with Moscow as the economic centre. The International Crisis 
Group observed in July 2017: 
They [the BRI and the EEU] have divergent goals, but Russia 
and China have committed to cooperate politically and econom-
ically. Their initiatives offer investments and enhanced coop-
eration in a region beset by economic and political challenges. 
Poorly handled, however, these initiatives could encourage and 
entrench local behaviour that risks generating instability and 
conflict.18  
 
This point goes straight to the crux of the issue. Geoeconomic rivalries 
between China, India, Japan, and Russia could translate into much-need-
ed investment being channelled into less-developed countries, providing 
a substantial boost to global economic growth. Investments from India, 
Japan and Russia could also help the Asia–Pacific region rebalance away 
from the excessive reliance on China that many countries fear. Yet poorly 
coordinated projects with high levels of political and economic risk and 
susceptibility to corrupt dealings on either side could also exact danger-
ously high costs to both the source and host countries.
Preventing this latter outcome should be high on the list of Xi Jin-
ping’s priorities in the years ahead, particularly if he remains commit-


































































THE CHINA–PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR (CPEC)16
The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor
Image: Wikimedia Commons
The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor runs 2,000 kilometres from Kashgar in north-west-
ern China to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, through roads, railways, and pipelines and encom-
passes other specific infrastructure and agricultural projects. The US$60 billion project will 
provide China secure access not only to Central Asian energy sources but also the Arabian 
Gulf, bypassing the Strait of Malacca and dramatically shortening the time it will take for 
Chinese goods to reach Africa and the Middle East. 
In addition to serving as a commercial hub, Gwadar may be transformed into a safe 
harbour for the Chinese navy. This would allow China to project its power deep into the Gulf 
and Indian Ocean. In return, Pakistan expects to receive much-needed infrastructure and a 
reliable energy supply to alleviate its persistent power shortfalls.
Two chief financiers of CPEC, the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Exim Bank 
of China, are well placed to fund projects that align with Beijing’s geoeconomic interests.  
Government policy guides the distribution of CDB and Exim loans, with state-owed 
enterprises (SOEs) the primary beneficiary. The Chinese government also holds a stake of at 
least sixty per cent of the commercial Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and can also 
direct it to provide loans to SOEs to benefit CPEC projects.  
In addition, China aims to create favourable economic conditions for Chinese firms 
investing in Pakistan. Multiple special economic zones (SEZs) are being established, offering 
investment incentives to both Pakistani and Chinese businesses. To date, it appears that 
mainly Chinese firms have taken advantage of the SEZs, such as a Chinese SOE operating 
the Gwadar Port, which recently received permission from the Pakistani government to set 
up an SEZ with a forty-three-year lease.
While no direct evidence suggests that the CPEC SEZs are a product of Chinese influence 
designed to attract Chinese firms, China does have a tradition of establishing ‘strategic’ 
overseas SEZs, in coordination with host governments. Deborah Bräutigam and Tang 
Xiaoyang, who have written about China’s economic statecraft and the use of SEZs,17 note 
that the Ministry of Finance has previously financed and monitored overseas SEZs populated 
by Chinese firms. Past SEZ programs projected ‘soft power’ while increasing demand for 
Chinese-made machinery and encouraging the outward investment of mature Chinese 
firms. There is no reason to think that the strategy for CPEC SEZs will differ. 
Yet the influx of Chinese firms is already stirring some trouble in their host country. 
According to a report by the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 
citizens of Balochistan (where the Gwadar Port is located) are concerned that Chinese 
workers may take their jobs. Similarly, others worry that infrastructure spending seem 
mainly to benefit Chinese, not Pakistani, companies as firms import equipment and 
technology as well as manpower from China. Reports also detail alleged violations of 
Pakistani laws and social customs by Chinese firms, reminiscent of longstanding problems 
associated with China’s African investments. While Beijing is able to direct investment to 
Pakistan, it may lack the ability and/or will to regulate the businesses operating there, even 


































































region. There is much that he can do domestically to improve on levels of 
openness and transparency and to make China’s state-owned enterprises 
and state-controlled banks compete on a more level playing field than they 
have in the past. Ensuring that institutions such as the Asian Infrastruc-
ture Investment Bank maintain the highest possible standards of govern-
ance will increase the likelihood that individual BRI projects succeed, with 
widespread benefits for the region as well. 
Yet Xi Jinping — and by extension China — is not solely responsible for 
upholding the global economic order. Nor should he take all of the blame 
when certain BRI projects fail, as some are bound to do. Partner countries 
also need to improve their legal, regulatory, and policy frameworks to en-
sure that the benefits of Chinese trade and investment flow through their 
societies and are not just captured by political and economic elites.  
One country where this challenge seems well within reach is Austral-
ia, with its relatively sound legal, regulatory, and policy frameworks, and 
low level of corruption compared with so many other countries on the 
BRI map. Yet in March 2017, the Turnbull government rejected a request 
made by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (just prior to his visit to Australia) for 
Australia to ‘formally align’ its AU$5 billion Northern Australia Infrastruc-
ture Facility with the BRI. Australia’s reluctance reflects its increasingly 
cautious attitude towards Chinese state investment, caught as it is between 
a historical strategic alignment with the US and a burgeoning economic 
alignment with China. Yet New Zealand, facing a similar conundrum, opt-
ed into the BRI. In a world in which geoeconomic strategies are becoming 
increasingly important — for countries large and small — it will be worth 
watching how bilateral relations with China pan out for these two ‘West-
ern’ economies of the Asia–Pacific region. 
Meanwhile, Donald Trump’s protectionist stance against the global 
economy, which targets China in particular and is solely concerned with 
American advantage, is conceivably a far greater threat to the internation-
al economic order than anything contained in the BRI. Beijing’s warm re-
ception of Trump in November, self-described by Trump as a ‘state plus 
plus’ visit, and the apparent bromance between Xi and Trump has not 
softened America’s rhetoric in the time since then. The Trump administra-
tion continues to threaten action against perceived ‘economic aggression’ 
by China — in December, initiating an anti-dumping investigation into 
Chinese imports of aluminium sheeting, and accusing China of undermin-
ing the international order in his administration’s first national security 
strategy.19 Indeed, Trump’s first year ended with no apparent resolution 
to the issues that provoke America’s China hawks. Despite the imposi-
tion of UN sanctions throughout the year, and China’s unilateral ban on 
North Korean bank accounts in an effort to restrict financial flows to the 
regime,20  the ‘North Korean problem’ remained just that, and there was 
little, if anything, to suggest that Trump’s tweets helped the situation. 
Trump would do well to wake up to the fact that, like the US, China has 
many geoeconomic sticks up its sleeve. And while a ‘war by other means’ 
between the world’s two superpowers would be less catastrophic than 
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IN MARCH 2017, a Uyghur cadre in Hetian prefecture, south Xinjiang, 
was demoted and publicly reprimand-
ed for failing to smoke in front of a Uy-
ghur elder. The Global Times described 
the rationale thus: 
According to local religion (sic) 
customs, smoking is not allowed 
in front of older people or among 
religious people… In a sense, 
whether officials ‘dare to’ smoke 
in front of religious people reflects 
their commitment to seculariza-
tion.1 
A commentator quoted in the Global 
Times claimed that it was an ‘isolated 
case’. There was no suggestion that 
there is any official government order 
that prescribes smoking in certain sit-
uations. But similar reports have ap-
peared over the past few years. Some 
village leaders have held beer-drink-
ing competitions during Islamic reli-
gious festivals, for example, despite the 
prohibition on alcohol in Islam. Video 
from one such event showed middle- 
aged Uyghur women competing to 
drink 600ml of beer the fastest. Across 
Xinjiang, authorities have reportedly 
forced pious Uyghur shopowners to 
sell both liquor and cigarettes.2 
Such incidents represent attempts 
by low-level officials to demonstrate 
their ‘anti-extremist’ credentials. They 
apply what they understand to be the 
‘spirit’ of instructions coming from 
above in ways calculated to win polit-
ical points. This was surely the case 
in the demotion-for-not-smoking in-
cident. Officials in Hetian would have 
been even more eager since early Jan-
uary, when the Xinjiang Commission 
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Fear drives official actions at 
all levels in cases like these. Fear 
of demotion or disciplinary action 
prompts local officials to scramble 
to demonstrate their own reliability 
and counter-terror efforts — in this 
case, by devising creative ways to 
carry out their superiors’ absurd 
order to ‘secularise religion’.3 Many 
recent incidents of violence have 
been sparked by the suppression of 
or disrespect towards Uyghur Islamic 
practices. Both producing and feeding 
off such incidents, many Han see 
the practice of Islam by Uyghurs as 
inherently threatening — and this fear 
is now institutionalised.
for Discipline Inspection placed the 
prefectural Party Secretary, Zhang 
Jinbiao 张金彪, under investigation 
for ‘serious disciplinary breaches’ and 
‘dereliction of duty’ following a fatal 
attack in December 2016 on a gov-
ernment building in the region. The 
Chinese authorities blamed Islamic 
separatists for the attack, in which five 
people died and three were injured. 
By early August, Zhang had lost his job 
and was declared guilty of ‘violations 
of political discipline’ and ‘abnormal 
sexual relations’, as well as ‘not ex-
ert[ing] himself in carrying out his 
counter-terrorism and stability main-
tenance responsibilities’. 
Uyghur family outside Tuyok village, Xinjiang 
Source: Damien Polegato, Flickr
One Saturday morning in sum-
mer 2009, I was crossing Construction 
Bridge in Korla, a Han-majority city in 
Uyghur-majority south Xinjiang. Also 
crossing the bridge were the well-off 
wives of Han Chinese oil company 
employees, families, peddlers, kids 
on skateboards, and six lanes of mo-
torised traffic. Coming in the opposite 
direction was a large Uyghur group 
— a number of burqa-clad women, at 
least one bearded patriarch, younger 
men, and children. Suddenly, during a 
rare break in the traffic, the group of 
ten or twelve people left the footpath 
and headed diagonally across the road 
towards another, very similar, group 
that was crossing from the other side. 
The two groups met in the middle of 
the road and stood, exchanging hand-
shakes, blessings, and lengthy saluta-
tions, as traffic ground to a halt. Some 
Han Chinese passers-by stopped and 
observed the spectacle. Nobody was 
vocally upset or abusive, but I could 
see that for many of them the actions 
of the Uyghur families were at once 
amusing and unsettling. Many Han 
people have used similar stories in dis-
cussions with me to demonstrate why 
they consider Uyghurs a ‘backward’ 
落后 people. 
The Uyghur groups’ disregard for 
traffic rules were potentially unsettling 
to Han on a number of fronts. Han on-
lookers may feel that any attempt to 
move the Uyghurs on (by traffic police, 
for example) might cause offence and 
a conflict. Adding to the tension, the 
conservatively dressed Uyghurs were 
engaged in an exchange with visible re-
ligious overtones. Finally, by blocking 
traffic for this performance, the Uyghur 
families prioritised human relation-
ships over regulations, and Islamic cul-
tural etiquette over the modern ideal 
of continuous motion — so-called ‘de-
velopment’. This latter interpretation is 
borne out by observations in Septem-
ber 2017 that Chinese authorities were 
compelling shops and restaurants in 
Uyghur areas of Ürümqi to repeatedly 
play a ‘somber acoustic tune that pro-
motes core Communist values’, and ‘a 
jolly children’s song about obeying 
traffic laws’.4 These two songs ful-
fil similar functions: stressing public 
order, productivity, and obedience.
The Uyghurs’ actions thus posed 
a direct challenge to the social con-
tract in Xinjiang. The social contract is 
based on the mutual interdependence 
of stability and development: Rising 









































cial stability, and social stability is 
deemed a necessary precondition for 
development. Moreover, to counter the 
‘Three Evil Forces’ of terrorism, sep-
aratism, and extremism — and thus 
maintain stability — security forces 
must be granted extraordinary pow-
ers. Together, the theory goes, social 
stability and economic development 
will ensure the long and peaceful rule 
长治久安 of the Chinese Communist 
Party. State discourse claims that Chi-
nese occupation has brought develop-
ment and modernity to Xinjiang, and 
liberated its people from feudalism, 
and promises it will be even better in 
the future. It says to non-Han: you are 
indebted to us and should be grateful.5 
The two civilisations, Han and 
Uyghur, have aspects in common, for 
example, reverence for one’s parents 
and elders, which the Chinese call ‘fil-
ial piety’. But there are also differenc-
es, and these undermine some of the 
Party-state’s efforts to ‘modernise’ Xin-
jiang. Ironically, ten years before the 
demotion-for-not-smoking incident, 
glossy booklets distributed to every 
household in Korla in 2007, as part of 
that year’s spiritual civilisation cam-
paign, stressed that it was uncivilised 
to smoke in confined public spaces 
and in the company of young children 
and women. Yet when carried out by a 
Uyghur in 2017, the civilised act of not 
smoking was instead connected first 
with Islam and thence with Islamic 
extremism, separatism, and terrorism, 
ultimately being construed as a threat 
to national security.
‘Long and Peaceful Rule’ propaganda
Source: 58pic.com
This kind of thinking existed be-
fore the current Xinjiang Party Secre-
tary Chen Quanguo 陈全国 took office 
in 2016, and it is an integral part of his 
approach to governing Xinjiang. ‘All 
our work in Xinjiang,’ he has declared, 
‘revolves around maintaining a tight 
grip on stability.’6 Chen has since im-
plemented a series of measures that are 
the most repressive and intrusive since 
Xinjiang was under the military rule of 
Wang Zhen 王震 in the early 1950s — 
and arguably ever. The tactics of Wang 
Zhen and the Nationalist and Qing gov-
ernors who came before him were bru-
tal, but less comprehensive. In the inter-
ests of security, Chen has implemented 
grid-style surveillance, with small po-
lice observation stations no more than 
500 metres apart in key urban areas. 
He tripled police recruitment in 2016 
(adding 31,687 new positions), and then 
nearly doubled that again by August 
2017 (over 53,000 new positions). Car-
rying on with programs begun under 
under his predecessor, Zhang Chunx-
ian 张春贤, Chen has made it illegal 
to own a mobile phone that does not 
have a government surveillance app 
installed, and has greatly expanded the 
role of ‘re-education centres’. To be-
come a candidate for incarceration and 
re-education, you may only need to 
possess banned religious materials 
(including most works published 
overseas), have accessed foreign In-
ternet sites, studied or travelled over-
seas, dress in conservative religious 
garb, or be Uyghur, unemployed, and 
between fifteen and fifty-five years 
old. So many Uyghurs have been taken 
away without warning or explanation 
that some smaller communities’ pop-
ulations are noticeably depleted. Ka-
zakhs in Xinjiang are now subject to the 
same pressures.
Things are not all rosy in Han 
Xinjiang either. Capital infrastructure 
construction continues to drive GDP 
growth. But many developers from 
other parts of China who came for the 
largely state-financed boom are nerv-
ous about the future, and are cutting 
their losses and heading back to east-
ern China. The Special Economic Zones 
and border trade zones that opened 
with much fanfare over the past five 
years are today nearly desolate. In late 
2016, a few Han informants furtive-
ly warned me to be careful: ‘Xinjiang 
looks all peaceful and beautiful, but 
underneath, it is bubbling with dissent 
and violence’. Both stability and pros-
perity appear increasingly elusive for 













































IN 2002, the remote Yunnan province county of Zhongdian 中甸 became 
instantly famous when it officially 
changed its name to Shangri-la 香格里
拉.7 The name change was the centre-
piece of a new economic development 
strategy based on domestic tourism. 
The largest county in the Diqing Tibet-
an Autonomous Prefecture, Shangri-la 
was home to several ethnic groups, 
Tibetans, Naxi, Yi, Bai, and Han, living 
side by side in valleys surrounded by 
snow-capped mountains — a natural 
and cultural landscape straight out of 
the pages of James Hilton’s Lost Hori-
zon. Allured by the exotic promise of 
a mythical paradise, and aided by new 
road and air links, Chinese tourists be-
gan flocking to the rural backwater. 
As arrivals rose from tens of thou-
sands to hundreds of thousands per 
year, Shangri-la grew rich, with tour-
ism the key to its prosperity. Local of-
ficials began building more roads and 
erecting fences and ticket gates around 
newly designated tourist sites. They 
named and re-named places to make 
them sound more exotic: grasslands 
at the foot of Shika mountain became 
known as Blue Moon Valley, and two 
lakes outside town were incorporated 
into the new Lakes of Heavenly Arrival 
national park. Local authorities fund-
ed the gilding of temple rooftops with-
in the Tibetan Buddhist monastery at 
the edge of town and built a new car 
park to accommodate tour buses.8 Of-
ficials then commissioned the world’s 
largest Tibetan Buddhist prayer wheel 
(mani-chos-‘khor མ་ནི་ཆོས་འཁོར or ‘khor 
for short) to be mounted on a hill over-
looking the town. Later, authorities 
added a giant stupa at the entrance 
to the city (municipal status was con-
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ferred on Shangri-la in 2011 following 
its breakneck urban expansion). In 
2017, they decided to double the size of 
the stupa to make it the world’s largest 
as well.9 As tourist numbers contin-
ued to swell, grand museums of local 
culture and history and performance 
theatres designed in a kitsch, pseudo- 
Tibetan style began to replace the 
town centre’s drab government offices, 
which were relocated to purpose-built 
sprawling, pseudo-Tibetan complex-
es on the outskirts of town. Dozens, 
then hundreds of hotels of all types, 
from backpacker hostels to five-star 
luxury resorts, sprang up. Property 
prices soared, particularly in the ‘old 
town’, which was, in fact, a complete 
reconstruction.10 
In the early years, some local offi-
cials were concerned that the spoils of 
tourism would flow to a few rich inves-
tors and the outsiders they recruited 
to work in hospitality and other tour-
ism-related businesses because few lo-
cals had the skills to find jobs or start 
new businesses in tourism. Eventually, 
however, there was enough money 
sloshing around that just about every-
one benefitted. At first, locals with 
landholdings close to town were able 
to sell or rent their land at high prices 
The world’s largest Tibetan prayer wheel sits above Shangri-la’s new town square 
Photo: Ben Hillman
for redevelopment as tourism-based 
enterprises. With a little help from 
training projects and social enterpris-
es, others started finding work in ho-
tels, travel agencies, and restaurants.11 
There was also plenty of demand for 
local produce so farmers in surround-
ing villages, who were mostly Tibetan, 
began to get rich too. Shangri-la’s ever- 
expanding streets and residential 
neighbourhoods started filling up with 
imported cars. At least two local Tibet-
an entrepreneurs bought Humvees 
(High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 
Vehicles). Soon there were also fancy 
restaurants, bars, and karaoke bars. 
Local officials dined extravagantly, 
fuelling a boom in upscale hotels 
and eateries, including Western-style 
steakhouses and multi-storey hotpot 
houses.12 
And then, all of a sudden, the par-
ty stopped. From 2013, Shangri-la’s 
bars and restaurants started to empty. 
The boom had turned to bust, seem-
ingly overnight. Locals knew who to 
blame: the newly appointed General 
Secretary of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Xi Jinping. Xi came to power at 
the end of 2012 determined to clean 
up official corruption, including local 
profligacy. The Party set new guide-
lines for official expenditure at all 
levels, beginning with entertainment 
and the use of government vehicles. 
Expenses had to be within budget, 
conform to strict regulations (includ-
ing how many dishes were allowed 
to be served at official functions) and 
be well documented. Government offi-
cials could no longer keep their drivers 
waiting for them outside nightclubs 
until the early hours of the morning 
— and now even being seen to visit 
‘unsavoury establishments’ could ruin 
careers. Local Party bosses ‘got the 
memo’, and official spending dried up. 
Businesses began to shutter. A police-
man told me that all the xiaojie (female 
sex workers) had left town. (They had 
mostly been from poorer parts of Yun-
nan and Sichuan). Locals grumbled 
about the tough new operating envi-
ronment even though many acknowl-
edged that the policies were correct 
and that official spending and corrup-
tion had to be reined in.
Soon, fewer and fewer tourists 
came to Shangri-la. Big groups, the 
lifeblood of the boom, stopped com-
pletely. At first the plummet in tourist 
arrivals was a mystery. People won-
dered aloud if the general economic 
slowdown was to blame. But the drop-
off was precipitous. Slowly, it dawned 












































might be responsible for this prob-
lem, too; there was a rapid decline in 
the previously large number of danwei 
(work unit) tours — groups of state em-
ployees enjoying a holiday as a perk of 
their employment. State-owned enter-
prises or government bureaucracies 
sometimes used group tours to reward 
staff when they were unable increase 
salaries. Shangri-la was a popular des-
tination for the danwei holiday indus-
try. Danwei groups were big spenders 
because they were not spending their 
own money, and tour members had 
plenty of spare cash to spend on sou-
venirs such as dried yak meat, and 
Tibetan medicines such as caterpillar 
fungus (believed to be an elixir of lon-
gevity as well as a cure for all kinds 
of ailments, including asthma and 
low libido). 
Xi Jinping’s regime of strict offi-
cial discipline forced work units to cut 
back on perks, such as holidays. As the 
tour groups stopped coming and hotels 
and restaurants began to close down, 
Shangri-la locals began cursing Xi Jin-
ping. ‘Xi has definitely screwed us’ 搞砸
了我们, a local official told me privately 
in the lead-up to the Nineteenth Party 
Congress in 2017. ‘For a long time we 
thought the anti-corruption campaign 
would eventually come to an end and 
we could return to business as usual.’ 
However, with Xi Jinping settling into 
his second term, and with anti-corrup-
tion remaining high on his agenda, it 
now seems that the old business mod-
els are defunct, and that money will 
not grow on trees any more. ‘Xi has de-
stroyed our old way of doing business,’ 
the official told me, ‘we can only wait 
to see what a second term of Xi Jinping 
will bring. Xi is promising the Chinese 
people a China Dream, but in Shangri-


















































IN 2010, Time Magazine sardonically reported that Kangbashi, in Ordos, 
Inner Mongolia, is ‘a new Chinese 
city that, apart from people, has 
everything’.13 Seven years later, 
Kangbashi is still working hard to 
attract residents. On 20 April 2017, a 
reporter for the Inner Mongolia Daily 
内蒙古日报, Hao Xuelian 郝雪莲, 
wrote that as a gift to Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region on its seventieth 
anniversary, the local government of 
Ordos has commenced a Steppe Silk 
Road Cultural Scenic Area project 
草原丝路文化景区项目	 in Kangbashi 
district. This two-billion yuan project 
will occupy 335 hectares of what is 
now a green park, and will promote 
the development of tourism in the 
Kangbashi district.14 
The decision to build Kangbashi 
district on what had been a rural vil-
lage was made after Ordos’s sudden 
ascent to wealth in 2004. Ordos’s pros-
perity comes from its plentiful reserves 
of energy and mineral resources. It has 
one-sixth of the country’s total coal re-
serves, its proven natural gas reserves 
are equivalent to one-third of the coun-
try’s total, and its proven rare earth 
and kaolin deposits account for half 
of total domestic reserves. These rich 
underground resources have propelled 
an economic growth rate of nearly thir-
ty per cent, with urban development 
to match. As Lian Ji 连辑, the deputy 
chairman of the Inner Mongolian gov-
ernment, proclaimed in 2009: ‘China 
has the fastest growing economy in the 
world, Inner Mongolia has the fastest 
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growing economy in China, and Ordos 
has the fastest growing economy in 
Inner Mongolia’.15   
Coal mines are the largest single 
source of wealth in Ordos. Each year, 
close to half a billion tonnes of coal 
are mined by around 240 enterprises, 
bringing in around a quarter of a billion 
yuan to Ordos. In 2016, per capita GDP 
was RMB227,700. Ordos, not surpris-
ingly, has more ‘nouveau riche’ 土豪 
residents than any other city in China. 
In 2011, the Chinese Private Capital 
Investment Survey Report 中国民间资
本投资调研报告, jointly issued by the 
Ministry of Housing and Urban–Rural 
Development and private capital firm 
Go High Investment 高和投资, indi-
cated that more than 7,000 wealthy 
individuals, with assets in excess of 
RMB100 million, lived in Ordos, as did 
at least 100,000 individuals with as-
sets of over RMB10 million. According 
to the Hurun Report’s China Rich List 
2016 胡润百富榜, of the twenty-nine 
entrepreneurs from Inner Mongolia 
on the list, fifteen were from Ordos.16 
Construction of Kangbashi began 
in 2003 to accommodate the number of 
outsiders flocking to Ordos and its min-
ing boom. The new district, which had 
more access to water resources than 
Ordos, was located thirty kilometres 
away from the old city/town centre. 
Three years after its construction, the 
government of Ordos moved its ma-
jor agencies, schools, and hospitals to 
Kangbashi in the hope of giving the 
district greater vitality. Nevertheless, 
many officials and residents continued 
to live in the old city and commute to 
the new one by car, complaining that 
Kangbashi lacked amenities like super-
markets, clothing shops, department 
and other convenience stores. 
As a consequence, in the early 
years fewer than 30,000 people lived 
in a city that had been built for a mil-
lion; it seemed empty and desolate. 
Apart from street cleaners, the roads 
were virtually empty, and most of the 
residential buildings entirely dark 
at night. Kangbashi gained the repu-
tation of being a ghost town. Adding 
to this sense were the rows of half- 
finished buildings: approximately five 
million square metres of them, fully 
forty-five per cent of the district’s en-
tire construction area, according to 
a report in 2015.17 The coal industry 
began shrinking in 2009, dealing a 
major blow to Ordos’s industrial base 
and making it difficult for the city 
government to continue its support 
for massive development projects. 
The flourishing of private lending has 
Kangbashi panorama 
Photo: Alan Leu, Flickr
also been problematic, as declining 
profits have failed to meet heavy in-
terest burdens — rupturing the capital 
chain and leaving no money to finish 
building projects. 
As a partial solution, in recent 
years the local government of Ordos 
has built thirty-four schools of various 
types; Kangbashi even has a branch of 
Beijing Normal University. The estab-
lishment of top-ranking elementary 
and middle schools has induced many 
parents to buy homes nearby. In addi-
tion, four city-level hospitals, includ-
ing Ordos Central Hospital and Ordos 
Maternal and Child Health Hospital, 
have opened. To promote the purchase 
of new homes in Kangbashi District, 
the local government has also issued 
housing vouchers to those willing to 
relocate from Ordos. According to Liu 
Hai’e 刘海娥, an employee of the Kang-
bashi District Bureau of Housing and 
Construction, a total of 2,098 homes 
were sold throughout the district in 
2016, and another 1,700 homes had 
been sold as of 20 June 2017.18 The 
local government has also recently 
redrawn the boundaries of Kangbashi 
district to include only its core urban 
area, leaving out the area on the south 
bank of the Ulaanmuren River, where 
a large number of the empty residen-
tial buildings are located. 
According to the latest govern-
ment report of Kangbashi district, 
the population of the district reached 
153,000, with an annual increase 
of thirty-two per cent by the end of 
2016.19 The original planned popula-
tion of the district was one million — 
suggesting that it may well resemble 
the country’s richest ghost town for 
some time to come. 
Housing vouchers 

























































NORTH KOREA — A YEAR OF CRISIS
Sang Ye and Richard Rigby 
(translated by Linda Jaivin)
Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump
Source: ML Martin, Flickr 
ON 3 SEPTEMBER 2017, the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (North Korea) conducted its sixth 
nuclear test at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site in 
Kilju county. That evening, Pyongyang’s national 
television station announced that this hydrogen 
bomb test, the largest to date, had been a complete 
success, further claiming that the test had not 
resulted in any radioactive fallout or harmed the 
surrounding environment. China, however, has 
had to deal with plenty of fallout in the sphere of 
























































85 A Crisis Detonates
A few months earlier, on 28 July, North Korea fired a guided missile. It flew 
at an altitude of 3,000 kilometres for forty-five minutes. Experts estimate 
a possible effective range of 10,000 kilometres, making it capable of reach-
ing cities in the United States including Denver and Chicago. On 29 August, 
North Korea launched a guided missile from a site close to Pyongyang. It 
was the first to fly across Japanese territory, landing in the Pacific Ocean, 
1,180 kilometres east of Cape Erimo. Two weeks later, it launched another 
guided missile along a similar trajectory, which landed in the ocean, 2,200 
kilometres east of the cape. North Korea continued to conduct ever-larger 
nuclear tests, including of missiles it claims are capable of carrying nucle-
ar payloads, attracting widespread international concern.
On 4 September, the United Nations Security Council convened an 
emergency session, unanimously passing a resolution concerning new 
sanctions (Resolution 2375) against North Korea one week later. The deci-
sion forbade the purchase of North Korean textiles and the sale of natural 
gas liquids, banned new hiring of North Korean labour, and demanded 
the closing of all joint enterprises with North Korea. The resolution, which 
was drafted by the US, originally proposed to ban all petroleum exports 
to North Korea, but China and Russia only agreed to setting quotas for re-
fined petroleum: two million barrels per year from 1 January 2018.
Shen Zhihua 沈志华, a pioneering Chinese historian of the Korean 
War, publically urged Beijing to reassess its long-standing policies towards 
North Korea.2 Quoting Mao Zedong’s dictum ‘Who are our friends? Who 
are our enemies? This is a question of the first importance for the revo-
lution’, he said that this was also a pressing issue for China in North-East 
Asia. He noted that ‘Sino-Korean friendship’ was no longer what it used 
to be, and should be seen as a holdover from the Cold War, much like the 
opposition to North Korea of the US, Japan, and South Korea. 
Shen pointed out that stability on China’s borders was crucial to the 
implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative. The Korean Peninsula 
was not the only site of tension on China’s 
borders: Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Burma, India, and Mongolia, 
he said, were all causing China anxiety. 
Meanwhile, the establishment of formal 
relations between China and South Korea 
in 1992 undermined the political founda-
tion of the Sino-Korean relationship. Chi-
na and North Korea had grown apart in 
foreign affairs, economics, and politics; 
the alliance had crumbled; and the short-
term outlook for an improvement in re-
lations was not good. What is more, with 
each North Korean atomic test, America 
had ramped up its military power in North-East Asia, and this, in turn, had 
led to North Korea carrying out another test. The result was an intensifica-
tion of the cycle of North Korean atomic testing and the increase in Amer-
ica’s military presence; this put pressure on both China and South Korea. 
While attending to the potential risks of a change in its North Korea policy, 
China needed to decide whether, if Sino-American political cooperation 
cannot restrain North Korea, the two countries ought to consider military 
cooperation as well. 
Opinions like this have naturally attracted the ire of Chinese nation-
alists, who have accused Shen of selling out China’s sworn ally and even 
selling out China itself. Some even claim that he might be an American 
spy. China’s official media reported neither on Professor Shen’s ideas nor 
the controversy around them.  
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi 王毅	has expressed China’s firm 
opposition to and strong condemnation of North Korea’s nuclear tests.3 
He has also stated that based on China’s opposition to Western domina-
tion of international relations theories (which stress ‘hegemonic stabili-


























































sovereignty), the correct path to de- 
nuclearising the Korean Peninsula lies 
in actively constructing a new form of 
international relations based on win-win 
cooperation and negotiation. He went 
further to say that the choices were stark: 
for the situation to heat up to the point 
of conflict or even war, or for all sides to 
cool down and focus on political and dip-
lomatic solutions to the nuclear question. 
In discussion in the UN General As-
sembly on 21 September, Wang stated 
that the joint declaration and roadmap 
for the de-nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula set out by the six-party 
talks of twelve years ago (China, US, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, and 
Japan) stood on the correct side of history and, therefore, would never go 
out of date. He said: ‘no matter how the situation develops, no matter how 
long it takes, and no matter what difficulties are encountered along the 
way, we all must hold fast to the goal of denuclearisation of the Korean 
peninsula, and persist in dialogue and negotiation, and firmly guard the 
peace and stability of the area.’ 
Containing the Fallout
China strictly censors official news reports touching on the tests, as well 
as debate and discussion online. China Central Television stopped all re-
porting on the nuclear tests after 4 September. The Global Times wrote and 
then cancelled an editorial on the subject and an article published on the 
People’s Daily Weibo account was then deleted. And in the weeks follow-
ing 4 September, on sites including sina.com 新浪, the phrase ‘hydrogen 
bomb’ 氢弹 entered the lexicon of banned ‘sensitive’ words. But Chinese 
Wang Yi
Source: Wikimedia Commons
netizens have long figured out how to get around Internet controls, and 
the Korean nuclear issue remains a hot topic as these examples show:
We have to change the situation of Chinese people adopting the Amer-
ican standpoint in looking at problems… the North Korean nuclear 
tests are in the interest of promoting peace. With a North Korea active-
ly opposing America on its doorstep, China has no reason to reject this.
Korea is China’s bargaining chip. This kid, North Korea, tends to be 
disobedient, but no way would it dare to resist China, so China has an 
absolute right to take the initiative. China and North Korea’s historical 
origins and practical needs are based in geopolitics…  it’s best not to 
fight any war, but if a war starts, then China’s only choice is resist 
America and aid Korea.
The crisis on the Korean peninsula has led to America needing China’s 
help, and this is a very good opportunity for China. China must not 
simply grant their wishes. We ought to tell America, if you continue 
your provocations in the South China Sea, China won’t help you on the 
Korean peninsula. Let’s see who blinks first! This kind of discourse 
would quickly be criticised as trading off Korea for the South China 
Sea, selling out a friend and seeking praise for it, which is both immor-
al and unjust. But then some would say it’s the lesser of two evils, and 
to sell out a friend is better than to sell out your country: selling out a 
friend offends morality, but selling out your country offends the law. 
Chinese netizens also mocked Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turn-
bull’s call on China to carry out a strict economic boycott of North Ko-
rea, and Foreign Minister Julie Bishop expressed hope that China would 
consider cutting off North Korea’s supply of oil while worrying that this 
could prompt a trade war between China and the US. They have directed 
























































rea for destroying the region’s peace and called on all parties not to use 
Taiwan as a bargaining chip.
In October 2017, the Workers’ Party of Korea sent a congratulatory 
message to the Chinese Communist Party on the opening of the Nineteenth 
National Party Congress in Beijing. That evening, a researcher at the Chi-
nese Academy of Social Sciences commented on television that this showed 
that while the nuclear tests had strained Sino-Korean bilateral relations, 
the relationship between the two ruling parties had not been adversely af-
fected. Several days later, on the day the Congress was closing, Professor Qi 
Kai 戚凯	of the China and Overseas Security Research Institute of People’s 
University wrote in a much-noted article in the Financial Times’ Chinese 
language site (which is blocked in China itself) that it had been a grave 
error on China’s part not to have stopped the rapid development of North 
Korea’s nuclear capability.4 This left China, Qi wrote, unable to either ad-
vance or retreat. China’s diplomacy on the Korean peninsula was based on 
a vision of good relations with both North and South Korea, the emergence 
of a relatively prosperous North Korea, and the maintenance of China’s 
traditional influence over North Korea. These three points would, in turn, 
enhance China’s sway on the Korean peninsula and North-East Asian af-
Australian graffiti artist Lush Sux’s portraits of Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un, Vienna
Source: Wikimedia Commons
fairs, and enhance its influence regarding Japan and America. There is 
a big gap between what is hoped for and the way things are. Chinese di-
plomacy around Korean nuclearisation deteriorated into paranoia more 
than ten years ago during the six-party negotiations — unexpectedly, these 
negotiations had been intended to solve concrete problems but became 
a contest for influence and a stage for displaying power. After the talks, 
to which Chinese media gave unprecedented twenty-four-hour coverage, 
concluded, the venue opened to visitors at one hundred yuan per ticket. Qi 
described all of this as part of China’s craving to be seen as a major power, 
even if it pays for such glory by sacrificing the rationality and judgement 
it needs in diplomacy.  
Professor Qi has written that China ought to take a few profound les-
sons from the question of Korean nuclearisation: that the process of be-
coming a great country requires taking a long-term strategic view, rational 
thought, and the ability to judge both strength and the chance of success.
In October, China’s Ministry of Commerce requested all regions of 
China to carry out the United Nations’ decision of 12 September within 120 
days. While North Korean firms and joint ventures would be shut during 
that time, North Korean workers could continue working in China until 
their contracts are up. This included the entertainers at Beijing’s Myo-
hyangsan and other cold noodle restaurants, attendants at the hotel of the 
Huaxi Village Socialist New Farm, construction workers in Shenyang, and 
auto parts workers in Dandong. 
Fire with Fire, Freeze for Freeze
On 20 October, Choe Son-hui 崔善姬, chief of the North American depart-
ment of North Korea’s foreign ministry, described nuclear capability to be 
‘a matter of life and death’ for North Korea. The country, she said, would 
not negotiate on this issue with the US, which simply had to peacefully co-
exist with North Korea as nuclear-armed nations, or it would ‘return fire 
























































Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, speaking at a non-proliferation 
conference in Moscow, stressed the importance of diplomacy for the res-
olution of the crisis, and that the most important goal was to prevent the 
outbreak of military conflict, lest it lead to a major catastrophe. He urged 
the international community to support the Russian–Chinese Roadmap for 
peace on the peninsula. The roadmap consists of three phases: a ‘freeze for 
freeze’ (North Korea to stop missile and nuclear tests in exchange for the 
US and Korea suspending their joint military exercises); direct diplomatic 
talks between Washington and Pyongyang, and Seoul and Pyongyang; and, 
finally, multilateral talks to ensure both regional and global security. Both 
Russia and China are concerned that the crisis will lead to a further build-
up of American military power in their region. 
Meanwhile, the China Daily 
reported that during the peri-
od of China’s National Day and 
eight-day Golden Week holiday, 
no Chinese tour groups trav-
elled to South Korea, which, for 
the last decade, has been one 
of Chinese tourists’ top destina-
tions. The paper reported that 
this was a result of South Ko-
rea’s deployment of the Termi-
nal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD). This was a well-planned 
protest, and not solely about THAAD.
At a regular press conference of Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng 
Shuang 耿爽 on 23 October, a reporter asked: ‘According to the latest trade 
figures released today, in the past nine months of this year, China’s trade 
with the DPRK raised by 3.7 per cent. China’s exports to North Korea in-
creased by twenty-one per cent, while imports from North Korea dropped 
by sixteen per cent. What do these figures mean in terms of how enthu-




First of all, China has been comprehensively, accurately, earnestly and 
strictly implementing the DPRK-related resolutions adopted by the UN 
Security Council and fulfilling its due international obligations. There 
is no doubt about that. Second, as close neighbours, China and the DPRK 
maintain normal exchanges and cooperation. Third, I want to stress, 
as is stated in the Security Council resolutions, that measures imposed 
are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the 
civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively or restrict those 
activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and 
humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by resolutions. 
Geng stressed that the use of military force would only create more trouble. 
Postscript: Political Games
The XXIII Olympics Winter Games opened on 9 February 2018 in Pyeong-
chang. The meticulously planned opening included the dramatic entry of 
North and South Korean athletes together under the Korean Unification 
Flag. North Korea’s formal head of state, the ninety-year-old Kim Yong-
nam travelled to Pyeongchang at Kim Jong-un’s behest, along with Kim 
Yo-jong, Kim Jong-un’s younger sister, who was the first of the Kim dynasty 
to step onto South Korean soil. This seemed to be a very big turning point 
in the resolution of the crisis. However, the real drama had taken place 
the day before. 
On 8 February, 50,000 people, along with missile launching vehicles, 
took part in a military parade to mark the seventieth anniversary of North 
Korea’s army. Kim Jong-un made a speech on the occasion, saying that the 
military parade was a demonstration to the outside world of North Korea’s 
position as a military power. He declared that invaders would not take 
























































autonomy of the sacred motherland. The army originally celebrated its 
foundation day on 25 April; this was the first year the date was moved to 8 
February, prompting observers to speculate that it was a show of strength 
on the eve of the Olympics.
Also on 8 February, a sponsor of the Pyeongchang Olympics, Samsung 
Group, donated one of their limited-edition Winter Olympics smartphones 
to every athlete taking part in the games, except for those from North Ko-
rea and Iran. The reasoning was that the phones were luxury items, and 
therefore could not be given to citizens of two countries under economic 
embargoes. The Iranians and North Koreans objected, and after arbitra-
tion by the International Olympic Committee, it was decided that the Ira-
nian athletes could have the phones, but not the North Koreans. 
Several days before the opening of the Games, American Vice- 
President Mike Pence said that he did not rule out the possibility of meet-
ing members of the North Korean delegation in Pyeongchang. The official 
newspaper of Pyongyang’s ruling Workers Party, however, made it clear 
that its delegation did not plan to meet up with their American counter-
parts, that it had never asked for such a meeting, and had no intention to 
use the games for political purposes. By the time Pence arrived on the 8th, 
the line had changed: there was no chance of contact, and he had request-
ed the South Korean government to ensure that the routes taken by the 
US Vice-President Mike Pence 
and South Korea’s President 
Moon Jae-in at Pyeongchang 
2018 Winter Olympics
Source: euronews, Flickr
two parties would never cross. Pence’s communications director later told 
the Washington Post: ‘We are not going to let the North Korea propaganda 
machine hijack the messaging of the Olympics’.6   
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, meanwhile, at a press confer-
ence in Beijing, told reporters that as the biggest neighbour of the Korean 
peninsula, China supported the ‘positive interactions’ of the two sides in 
Pyeongchang. He hoped this would be the first step towards the gradu-
al establishment of dialogue and negotiation between the two Koreas. At 
the same time, however, he warned that they were unlikely to be able to 
do this, and that South Korea alone would not convince Pyongyang to de- 
nuclearise, without support and mutual efforts from all parties — mean-
ing the six parties. The long and twisting road of the dream of peace has 
































Peripheral Trouble: The Sino-Indian Standoff 
·  ANDREW CHUBB
Asian Powers in Africa: Win, Win, Win, Win? 















































THE FIRST HALF OF 2017 was, for the most part, relatively quiet on 
China’s disputed periphery. But the 
simultaneous mid-year standoffs that 
broke out on land and sea showed 
up some of the foreign policy impli-
cations of the transition to a New Era 
heralded by General Secretary Xi Jin-
ping at the Nineteenth Party Congress: 
from ‘standing up’ to ‘prospering’ to 
‘strengthening’ 从站起来、富起来到强
起来.1 
In a sense, Xi’s declaration was a 
case of rhetoric catching up with re-
ality: Beijing’s more muscular policy 
on maritime and territorial disputes 
began at least a decade ago.2 Indeed, 
Xi did not actually say when the New 
Era began; but, as in previous years, 
China’s behaviour on its periphery 
demonstrated a firm — though not 
always well-grounded — expectation 
that prosperity should bring with it in-
ternational political clout.3 
In the South China Sea, the PRC 
successfully pressured Vietnam to sus-
pend drilling in a promising gas pros-
pect within the Nine-Dash Line that de-
picts the PRC’s ambiguous claim there. 
Rumours swirled that Beijing had 
threatened to stage an attack on a Viet-
namese outpost in the Spratly Islands. 
But military threats were probably 
not even necessary, as both Vietnam’s 
economy and its offshore energy part-
ners have become highly dependent on 
China. On its maritime frontier, China’s 
era of prosperity has already become 
an era of strength. But high in the Him-
alayas, the new-era narrative bumped 
up against some timeless realities of 
geography and perception. 
P E R I P H E R A L  T R O U B L E :  T H E 

















































On 16 June, a Bhutanese patrol no-
ticed a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
construction team working on a road 
in territory claimed by both Bhutan 
and China. Authorities in the capital 
Thimphu promptly notified their secu-
rity guarantors in New Delhi, and two 
days later Indian troops and bulldozers 
rolled across the border and pitched 
camp, blocking the Chinese road. The 
ensuing seventy-three-day standoff 
was the most serious confrontation be-
tween China and India for thirty years 
— perhaps since the 1962 war, and cer-
tainly since India joined the nuclear 
club. 
Ironically, what may have been 
China and India’s most dangerous 
border crisis in recent times took 
place on territory not even claimed by 
both countries. Known as the Dolam 
Plateau, it forms part of the Doklam 
region, a longer stretch of Bhutanese–
Chinese disputed terrain extending 
about forty kilometres northward. 
To understand China’s behaviour 
in the crisis, it is useful to separate it 
into two parts: the initial road-building 
Site of the standoff: Dolam Plateau and the Jampheri Ridge
Source: Google Earth
project, and the prolonged campaign 
to force India to back down.
The initial incident quite possibly 
involved a local misunderstanding, 
born of poor communications and 
the region’s unique and complex ge-
ography, rather than central policy or 
military strategy.4 The road the PLA 
sought to build would have headed in 
the direction of the Jampheri (Zompel-
ri) Ridge, a line of cliffs with sweep-
ing views right down to the narrow 
lowland plain that connects India’s 
north-eastern provinces to the rest of 
the country. The fear that a road to the 
ridge might one day allow China to sev-
er this topographical ‘chicken’s neck’ 
explains India’s bold intervention. 
The Chinese side claimed the 
road-building project was an innocu-
ous improvement of an existing track, 
aimed at compensating for years of up-
grades to India’s infrastructure on the 
other side of the border. Beijing said 
its personnel had even notified their 
counterparts in India of the planned 
works twice in the month leading up to 
the incident — a claim at least partially 
corroborated by Indian sources.5 Con-
trolling the Jampheri Ridge might not 
have been the PLA’s immediate inten-
tion, but India was not keen on waiting 
to find out.
While the initial incident may 
have resulted from a misunderstand-
ing, the subsequent standoff reflected 
overconfidence on the part of a pros-
perous Party-state entering a self-des-
ignated ‘New Era’ of strength. Beijing’s 
vigorous but unrealistic efforts to force 
New Delhi to back down resulted in a 
stalemate that eventually saw China 
pausing its road building and India 
withdrawing its troops and equipment.
Public Pressure 
Ten days after the initial incident, 
China publicly accused India of ‘an 
incursion across the China–India bor-
der’.6 Three days after that, at a news 
conference, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) handed out photographs 
showing Indian bulldozers and troops 
moving down the slope towards the 
PLA troops. This propelled the issue 
onto high rotation on state television, 
signalling to PRC citizens that the issue 
was an approved matter of public in-
dignation.
Over the next two months, the 
MFA issued at least twenty more official 
comments on Doklam. On 2 August, 
it released a fifteen-page position 
paper narrating the events in detail, 















































concerns’ in the area, and repeatedly 
demanding its immediate withdrawal 
from Doklam. India’s Ministry of 
External Affairs, by comparison, issued 
only one public statement, responding 
to Beijing’s accusations in a measured 
tone, and calling for ‘utmost restraint’.7 
The PRC’s English-language ex-
ternal propaganda invoked the na-
tionalist rage of the Chinese people in 
commentaries aimed at sharpening 
India’s perception of the risks of seri-
ous escalation. ‘The public’s patience 
is running short with India’s Doklam 
transgression’, opened a 24 July Global 
Times op-ed. ‘The Chinese government 
will not breach the fundamental will 
of the people and the PLA will not let 
the Chinese people down’, vowed one 
of the paper’s three editorials on the 
topic that week. ‘India should abandon 
the fantasy of a long-term standoff at 
Doklam.’8 
All this suggested a belief in Chi-
na that India could be forced to back 
down in the face of a show of strength. 
According to Indian news reports, this 
was conveyed at the scene by loud-
speakers blasting out warnings that 
India should learn the lessons of the 
1962 border war, when the PLA rout-
ed its underprepared army.9 Military 
spokesmen in Beijing amplified the 
message in press briefings.
Eventually, however, the PRC 
had to settle for a face-saving mutu-
al climb-down on 28 August. State 
media loudly hailed India’s withdraw-
Indian troops in disputed territory. Photo released by the MFA on 29 June, 2017
Source: fmprc.gov.cn
al, while avoiding mention of the halt-
ed road. ‘Indian side withdraws all en-
croaching personnel and equipment: 
MFA says Chinese personnel have car-
ried out on-scene verification’, crowed 
the China Central Television news. ‘De-
fense Ministry says Chinese military 
on guard, resolutely defending sover-
eignty.’10 
Era of Exaggeration?
This unsuccessful attempt at coercion 
in the mountains suggests PRC leaders 
may be overestimating China’s ability 
to get its own way on the international 
stage in its New Era. This could be so 
for at least three reasons.
First, policymakers in Beijing, far 
away from the scene, probably failed 
to appreciate their Indian counter-
parts’ determination to keep the PLA 
off the Jampheri Ridge. The Foreign 
Ministry’s peremptory dismissal of In-
dia’s ‘so-called security concerns’ sug-
gests this was the case. 
Second, China acted as though 
wholly unaware of India’s perspec-
tive on the incident. India needed no 
‘reminding’ of the lessons of 1962: this 
history was precisely the lens through 
which it was already viewing the 
events. Bitter memories of humilia-
tion at the hands of Mao’s China only 
bolstered India’s motivation to demon-
strate its resolve and regain face.11
Third, India, as a strategic com-
petitor in the world economy, is de-
cidedly less susceptible to the kinds 
of economic pressure the PRC has 
brought to bear on other adversaries 
around its periphery in recent years, 
such as Vietnam. India is one of the 
few countries in the region that has 
sought to counter the Belt and Road 
Initiative rather than welcome it. It 
is also seeking to deepen its ties with 
key PRC adversaries such as the US 
and Japan — and to help Vietnam and 
others further reduce their economic 
dependency on China. 
In Chairman Xi’s New Era, a 
share in China’s prosperity has great 
allure. But, as in the past, the urge 



















































X I JINPING DESCRIBED the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as ‘the 
project of the century’ at the inaugural 
Belt and Road Forum for Internation-
al Cooperation held in Beijing in May, 
promising that it would ‘herald a new 
type of international relations featur-
ing win-win cooperation’.12 But along 
with cooperation, there is competition 
— and when it comes to the Belt and 
Road’s Indo-Pacific maritime route 
and its designs on Africa, Japanese and 
Indian leaders have expressed strong 
reservations about Chinese security 
and economic architectures. 
China’s interest in Africa dates 
back to the 1950s, when Communist 
Party Chairman Mao Zedong sought 
to inspire revolutionary movements 
across the Third World. Mao’s succes-
sors largely abandoned their ideolog-
ical emphasis on China’s engagement 
with Africa, instead framing their 
quest in economic and diplomatic 
terms. By 2009, African countries in-
cluding Tanzania, Nigeria, and Sudan 
received nearly forty-six per cent of the 
PRC’s officially reported development 
budget (more than any other region); 
that year, China also surpassed the US 
to become the continent’s most impor-
tant trading partner.13 Today, African 
resources, including raw materials 
such as crude oil, metals, and timber 
are vital to the realisation of the ‘Chi-
na Dream’. At the same time, Chinese- 
financed roads, railroads, and ports 
have helped advance Africa’s integra-
tion into the global economy. However, 
China’s ongoing economic realignment 
raises questions about the viability of 
high-risk Chinese investment in Africa 
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US$10 billion in concessional loans 
and US$600 million in grants over the 
next five years. Last year, Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe promised 
US$30 billion in public and private in-
frastructure investment over the next 
three years on top of the US$32 billion 
already pledged from 2013 to 2018, 
putting Japanese development financ-
ing and aid to African countries on par 
with Chinese investment. 
In May 2017, Japan and India 
announced their own bold vision 
for regional connectivity, the Asia– 
Africa Growth Corridor. A 2016 joint 
statement issued by the Japanese and 
Indian prime ministers stressed that 
‘connectivity between Asia and Africa, 
through realizing a free and open In-
do-Pacific region, is vital to achieving 
prosperity of the entire region’. This 
corridor envisions Indo-Pacific mari-
time sea lanes with a central focus on 
Africa, integrating African economies 
with the powerhouses of the Asia– 
Pacific through policy vehicles crafted 
by India and Japan. With the US and 
Europe turning inward and focussing 
on domestic economic issues at the ex-
pense of foreign development agendas, 
China, Japan, and India are jockeying 
for position as leaders in environmen-
tal protection, economic development, 
and the implications of mounting debt 
in nations such as Kenya and Nigeria. 
With nearly one trillion US dollars 
in BRI-related infrastructure and 
development investments announced 
at the Forum comes the potential for 
billions more for Africa. This builds 
upon Xi Jinping’s announcement of a 
US$60 billion commitment to African 
development financing at the 2015 
Forum on China–Africa Cooperation 
in Johannesburg. The Belt and Road 
blueprint already includes large-scale 
infrastructure projects such as the 
Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway, the 
Sudanese oil pipeline, and Djibouti 
military facility. The Chinese-financed 
US$3.2 billion Nairobi–Mombasa 
railroad, commissioned in May 2017, 
is Kenya’s largest infrastructure pro-
ject since independence in 1963. 
Accordingly, Kenya has been designated 
as an African hub in BRI maritime 
route proposals by the Chinese state 
media. Beijing has signed agreements 
with several African nations, building 
upon a concept of coastal maritime 
hubs along the Eastern seaboard with 
infrastructure networks spanning 
across the continent.
But China is not the only Asian 
player in Africa. In 2015, Indian Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi promised 
and global market integration in Afri-
ca and beyond. 
In 1993, Japan hosted the first 
Tokyo International Conference on 
African Development (TICAD). Like 
China, Japan offered African states an 
alternative to Western development 
models, basing its programs on its 
time-tested paradigm of self-help and 
consultation, with an emphasis on in-
frastructure building. The sixth TICAD 
was convened in 2016, and, for the first 
time, in Africa itself. Its framework of 
African ownership and empowerment 
and the use of ‘forum diplomacy’ ap-
pears to have inspired China’s Forum 
on China–Africa Cooperation in 2000, 
as well as the Korea–Africa Forum 
and the India–Africa Forum Summit, 
which convened for the first time in 
2006 and 2008 respectively. Following 
Japan’s example, forum diplomacy lev-
erages a multi-lateral platform as the 
focal point to project social, political, 
and economic power. Through this in-
creasingly potent mechanism, China, 
Japan, India, and, on a smaller scale, 
Korea have advanced Asian–African 
policy alignment and economic coop-
eration. It was Tokyo’s concept of an 
‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’, first 
formulated by then foreign minister 
Taro Aso in 2006, that has evolved into 
the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor. 
Throughout the twentieth centu-
ry, India cultivated strong soft-power 
ties with African countries through 
the anti-colonial struggle, its leader-
ship of the Non-Alignment Movement, 
and shared migration. Yet India, like 
Japanese Prime Minister 
Abe speaks at the Tokyo 
International Conference 
on African Development 




















































China, was for a long time itself a re-
cipient of economic aid, which limited 
its economic engagement with African 
countries. With India’s transition from 
beneficiary to donor in the 2000s, Af-
rica became a testing ground for New 
Delhi’s foreign aid and development 
policies. In Africa, India has focussed 
on technical capacity-building by pro-
viding training for defence and UN 
peacekeeping personnel. In addition, 
New Delhi granted tens of thousands 
of scholarships to students from coun-
tries across Africa, including Kenya, 
Nigeria, and South Sudan, gaining foot-
holds in nations also courted by Chi-
na with scholarships and aid. India’s 
Pan-Africa e-Network project is the 
continent’s most extensive informa-
tion and communications technology 
project. It aims to connect all fifty-three 
member states of the African Union 
with India through a satellite and fi-
bre-optic network. The e-network has 
provided ingenious solutions, such as 
telecasted education, and digital dis-
ease diagnosis, to improve delivery 
of education and medical services to 
many of Africa’s remote communities. 
Why Africa?
There are a number of economic and 
diplomatic reasons for growing inter-
est of Asian countries in Africa. First, 
Africa’s relatively unexploited domes-
tic markets and abundant natural re-
sources offer the industrialised and 
emerging powers of Asia both inputs 
and outlets for continued growth.  Sec-
ond, in the UN General Assembly, Chi-
na, India, and Japan see the African 
voting bloc as a critical support for 
achieving diplomatic goals. The bloc 
can help to insulate the PRC from criti-
cism while advancing its agendas with-
in international institutions. It is also 
capable of assisting Japan and India in 
their quest for permanent representa-
tion on the UN Security Council. 
Finally, Africa offers a ‘neutral’ testing 
ground where Japan, India, and Chi-
na can deploy new development and 
Emblem of the India–Africa Forum Summit 2015 
Source: mea.gov.in
security initiatives without significant 
interference or repercussions from the 
US and Europe, or regional rivals. 
For example, all three Asian 
nations have deployed naval forces 
to the Indian Ocean region to support 
anti-piracy missions and secure 
sea lanes along the Horn of Africa. 
Japan and China have also each es-
tablished an overseas base in Djibouti 
as a hub for maritime security 
and peacekeeping efforts. Africa’s 
insulation from the tensions and 
flashpoints of the Asian region, such as 
the East and South China Seas, allows 
Japan, China, and India to experiment 
with conflict mediation and diplomacy. 
For example, following the outbreak 
of civil war in South Sudan in 2013, 
Japan deployed its Self Defence Forces 
abroad for the first time ever. China 
worked with an African regional body 
to mediate a ceasefire in South Sudan, 
testing a reinterpretation of non-
interference. 
Africa’s future is increasingly 
bound up with the grand visions of 
Asian powers. As Kenyan President 
Uhuru Kenyatta said at TICAD VI on 27 
and 28 August 2016:
As a continent straddling the In-
dian Ocean, we have access to the 
investment and markets of Asia … 
we have come so far from the time 
when solutions were prescribed 
without the input of Africa’s 
people.14 
The recent windfall of Asian in-
vestment offers African states alterna-
tives to traditional Western models of 
development and their accompanying 
demands. Unlike Western programs, 
these Asian investment projects em-
phasise mutually beneficial partner-
ships and self-reliance without the 
conditionality of traditional aid. In 
these ‘partnerships’, more responsi-
bility shifts to African nations to ne-
gotiate the terms of economic coop-
eration with China, India, and Japan. 
Ultimately, competition between Asian 
powers and more choice in develop-


























































CHINA’S POWER, THE UNITED STATES, 
AND THE FUTURE OF AUSTRALIA
Hugh White
Turnbull selfie with Quang, Trump, and Xi
Source: Wikimedia Commons 
2017 WAS THE YEAR Australians started to 
understand that China will do a great deal more 
to shape their country’s future than just buying its 
exports. They began to see that China’s ambitions 
to transform East Asia and become the region’s 
leading power need to be taken seriously. They 
began to see that China’s plans to reshape the 
regional — and indeed global — economic order 
need to be taken seriously too. And they began to 
see that China has both the means and motivation 
to exercise more influence over Australia’s internal 
affairs than any Asian country had ever done 
before. In other words, they began to understand 
























































This growing awareness of China’s power could be seen both in the 
government and in the wider community. The government’s perspectives 
were revealed in two major speeches given in Singapore in March and 
June by Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and Prime Minister Malcolm Turn-
bull. Both speeches went much further than any previous official state-
ment in acknowledging China’s ambitions for regional leadership. The 
prime minister’s words were especially stark. ‘Some fear that China will 
seek to impose a latter-day Monroe Doctrine on this hemisphere in order 
to dominate the region, marginalising the role and contribution of other 
nations, in particular the United States’, he warned. 
There were several reasons for this. For a long time, Australian ob-
servers, like many others especially in America, had clung to the assump-
tion that China would falter before it grew strong enough to seriously 
challenge the geopolitical status quo. But this did not happen. Instead, de-
spite serious problems, China’s economy kept growing. Its economic reach 
seemed set to extend even further as the scale and implications of the Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI) became clear. If it realises its full potential — 
which is still far from assured — the BRI would consolidate and deepen 
China’s central place in the regional and global economic infrastructure. 
Meanwhile, by nurturing its capacity for innovation in key technologies, 
Julie Bishop and Malcom Turnbull
Photo: Wikimedia Commons
China expects that it can sustain relatively high rates of economic growth 
for several more decades. This makes it even more likely, notwithstanding 
some serious medium-term structural challenges, that it will not just edge 
past America’s GDP, but overtake it and become the world’s largest econo-
my by a big margin before the middle of the century.
Likewise, China’s political system has thus far failed to succumb to the 
pressures that many had so confidently assumed would have overwhelmed 
it by now. Clearly, there are real risks in the highly personalised and cen-
tralised leadership model displayed at the Nineteenth Party Congress, and 
no one can be sure how well it will work. However, it is becoming less 
and less likely that China’s ascent will suddenly be halted and reversed 
by political turmoil. At the same time, the consolidation of Xi’s leadership 
reaffirmed his uncompromisingly authoritarian vision of China’s political 
future. This, perhaps, at last put paid to the surprisingly persistent illusion 
that as China grew richer and stronger it would also become more liber-
al, more open, more democratic, more smoothly integrated into existing 
global systems, and less likely to try to impose its own system or will on the 
rest of the world. Now it has become clear that the China which is set to 
become the world’s biggest economy, and, on some measures, the world’s 
most powerful state, is still the Communist Party’s China, and not the kind 
and gentle place we would like it to be. We have come to understand that 
China will most likely use its power at least as selfishly and ruthlessly as 
America and Britain have used theirs, and perhaps more. 
Australians’ growing awareness of China’s power and ambition was 
sharpened by the recognition that this was already being directed at Aus-
tralia itself. In 2017, they became suddenly more aware of the range and 
depth of China’s efforts to influence Australian internal affairs. This was 
thanks to a much-discussed ABC–Fairfax joint investigation culminating in 
a Four Corners program ‘Power and Influence: The Hard Edge of China’s 
Soft Power’, which brought together in dramatic presentation a range of 
issues and allegations about the activities by Beijing and its supporters. 
























































CENSORING THE ACADEMY: THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS SCANDAL AND 
BEYOND, by Nicholas Loubere
In mid-August, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press (CUP) conceded 
that it had acted on a request 
from Chinese authorities to 
block 315 articles from the 
Chinese website of The China 
Quarterly — one of the world’s 
most prestigious and long-run-
ning international China stud-
ies journals. CUP’s decision 
prompted outrage in the aca-
demic community and beyond. After a few days of petitions and threats of an academic 
boycott, CUP reversed its decision and agreed to make all the censored articles available 
free of charge worldwide. While the scholarly community was successful in pressuring CUP, 
this incident exposed the serious challenges that face academic publishers operating in the 
lucrative Chinese market. 
In the months after the CUP incident, an avalanche of revelations kept the spotlight on 
Beijing’s continued attempts to influence academic publishing. In anonymous interviews at 
the Beijing International Book Fair in late August, other commercial publishers admitted to 
engaging in self-censorship in order to retain access to the Chinese market. There have also 
been disturbing revelations that censors have been systematically deleting articles from 
Chinese studies journals published during the Maoist period that do not toe the current 
ideological line — effectively censoring the historical record. It was also discovered that 
LexisNexis, a provider of legal, regulatory, and business information, withdrew content in 
China at the request of the authorities.
Beijing has responded defiantly to the international condemnation, inviting Western 
institutions to leave China if they do not wish to follow Chinese rules, and warning that all 
imported publications ‘must adhere to Chinese laws and regulations’. The Chinese govern-
ment has also continued to exert pressure on foreign publishers with business interests in 
the country. In late October, Springer Nature — one of the largest commercial academic 
publishers in the world — admitted to capitulating to the Chinese censors, blocking ac-
cess to at least one thousand ‘politically sensitive’ articles on their Chinese website. The 
publisher defended the decision by saying that only one per cent of total content had been 
‘limited’, and claiming that it was necessary to comply in order to avoid wider restrictions. In 
mid-November, Australian academic Clive Hamilton went public with allegations that Allen 
& Unwin had withdrawn his forthcoming book Silent Invasion: How China Is Turning Australia 
into a Puppet State due to fears of defamation litigation. In late November, SAGE Publish-
ing — another massive global commercial publisher — revealed that they were warned by 
partners in China that they might be required to censor content or be pushed out of the 
Chinese market. 
Cambridge University Press self-censorsed to appease the Chinese 
government
Source: Global Grid for Learning, Flickr
But the most significant reason why Australians started worrying 
more about China in 2017 had nothing to do with China at all. It had to do 
with America, and the election of Donald Trump as president. Previous-
ly, Australia had depended absolutely on America to keep China in check 
and ensure that its growing power did not threaten Australia, or disrupt 
the stable regional order that has served Australia’s interests so well for 
so long. Political leaders on both sides of the aisle, their public service 
advisers, and most of the academics and commentators who debate such 
issues had been unshakably confident in America’s ability to do this de-
spite China’s growing power. Their confidence was reflected in the man-
tra: ‘Australia does not have to choose between America and China’. They 
assumed that America and China would never be strategic rivals, because 
America’s power and resolve would compel China to accept US regional 
leadership indefinitely into the future: that China would have to respect 
the ‘global rules-based order’. And that meant Australia had nothing to 
fear from China’s power.    
The increasing assertiveness of Chinese censors and their zeal to push foreign publish-
ers to self-censor in order to access the large Chinese market has resulted in numerous 
media headlines and petitions by angered academics. However, despite high-profile cov-
erage of the CUP, Springer Nature, and Clive Hamilton incidents in particular, the response 
from the wider academic community has been largely apathetic. Even in the China studies 
community, the revelations of censorship have mainly sparked short-term outrage directed 
at the Chinese government and individual publishers. Thus far, discussions have generally 
failed to address the more fundamental problems surrounding commercial publishing in 
academia, and the ways in which the profit motive prompts publishers to acquiesce to the 
demands of powerful economic actors such as the Chinese state.
Beijing’s efforts to influence foreign academia have not been limited to the publish-
ing sphere. In mid-November, the Ministry of Education instructed over two thousand for-
eign-funded joint venture universities in China to set up Communist Party units and give the 
new Party secretaries a role in decision-making through seats on institutional boards. This 
move comes at the end of a year filled with controversy about Chinese influence in higher 
education institutions abroad — particularly in Australia, where a major investigative re-
port by the ABC’s Four Corners program and Fairfax accused the Chinese government of 
organising students to demonstrate on behalf of Chinese state interests and setting up spy 

























































These assumptions were already looking shop-worn as Barack Obama’s 
presidency drew to a close. His ‘Pivot to Asia’ was supposed to convince 
China of America’s determination to preserve its leadership in Asia, and to 
deter it from pursuing its ambitions to build ‘a new model of great power 
relations’. It failed to do so. Instead, Beijing used territorial and maritime 
disputes in the East and South China Seas to test US resolve — tests that 
Washington failed by showing that it was not willing to risk a confron-
tation. China’s neighbours were not willing to back America for fear of 
China’s response. And Obama himself was not willing to jeopardise coop-
eration with Beijing on issues like climate change. The costs and risks of 
containing China’s ambitions in East Asia were greater than Washington 
was willing to bear.      
And then came Trump, whose remarkable ‘America First’ campaign 
broke all the rules of US politics by repudiating America’s responsibility 
for defending its allies and upholding the international order of which 
the US was a chief architect, and abandoning the nation’s long-standing 
commitment to free trade. In office, his style of governing has been ex-
traordinarily erratic, but amid the chaos it is plain that he will not deviate 
much, if at all, from the attitudes he campaigned on. Australia has never 
encountered a US president less likely to serve its interests in upholding 
stability in Asia, and one less interested in an effective response to China’s 
challenge.
But America’s problems in Asia go deeper than Obama’s timidity or 
Trump’s belligerent isolationism. They reflect fundamental new realities 
in the relative power, interests, and resolve of America and China. To see 
these realities, we need to understand the nature of their contest. The two 
richest and strongest countries in the world are rivals for the leadership 
of the world’s most dynamic region. This is power politics for the highest 
stakes, in which the threat of force is never far from the surface. War is 
not the inevitable outcome of such a contest, because it is always possible 
for one side to pull back, or both sides to compromise. But the willing-
ness of each side to use force, and the perceptions each has of the other’s 
willingness to use force, are central to the outcome. Neither side wants to 
fight, but each wants to convince the other that they would fight rather 
than concede on issues they consider key, hoping that this will persuade 
the other to back off.
That is what we see playing out in the flashpoints of the South China 
Sea and East China Sea. And so far, China is winning because its interests 
in the region are stronger for reasons of geography, and history. China 
can more easily convince America it is willing to go to war over the lead-
ership of Asia than vice versa because Asia is China’s backyard. It would 
be the other way round if they were competing in the Caribbean. But in 
Asia, China’s resolve is stronger because its interests are greater, and the 
more equal the two countries become in power, the more the difference 
in resolve works in China’s favour. No-one can doubt how serious China 
is about regaining its place as East Asia’s leading power. The decades of 
‘Bide and Hide’ are over: Xi’s China, confident in its power and clear in its 
ambition, is ready to claim leadership. 

























































America will only be able to retain strategic leadership in Asia if it 
can convince China that it is more determined to preserve the status quo 
than China is to regain its historical position as Asia’s leading power. And 
by ‘more determined’ we mean more willing to fight a major war, perhaps 
even a nuclear war, to do so. That is a case that has to be made consistently 
and compellingly by US leaders, and accepted by American voters. It is 
not just Donald Trump and Barack Obama who have been unwilling and 
unable to do that. It is hard to imagine that anyone could. 
This is why America’s strategic leadership in Asia is ultimately likely 
to fade, and China’s to grow.  It is a big change. But it is just what we would 
expect from the biggest and fastest shift in the distribution of global wealth 
and power since the Industrial Revolution — and that is what China’s rise 
is. Nothing is inevitable in human affairs, but China will likely take Amer-
ica’s place as the preponderant power in East Asia. Donald Trump has just 
made the transition faster and the outcome plain for all to see. 
Australians have, therefore, and rather suddenly, been brought face-
to-face with a very sobering and unfamiliar reality. We might well find 
ourselves alone in Asia without an Anglo-Saxon ‘great and powerful 
friend’ for the first time since European settlement. Of course, Australia 
has changed a lot from the Anglo-Saxon enclave that it was. Our people 
today include one million ethnic Chinese, nearly half of them born in the 
PRC. More broadly, nearly half the population are first- or second-gener-
President Donald Trump and 
First Lady Melania Trump during 
a vist to China, accompanied by 
President Xi Jinping and First Lady 
Peng Liyuan
Source: Offical White House photo, 
Shealah Craighead
ation immigrants, and, for many of these, the ‘Anglo-Saxon friend’ might 
well seem less reassuring than Australia’s policy elites still assume. 
Nonetheless, the fear that we might find ourselves without that friend 
has created the first stirrings of mild panic in Canberra and beyond. Until 
this year, both Liberal and Labor governments have been reluctant to risk 
relations with Beijing by doing or saying anything to support US leader-
ship in Asia that could be seen as anti-China. They have stuck with the 
deal John Howard reached when he set the terms of the relationship as 
we know it today in 1996, by promising Jiang Zemin that nothing Australia 
did as a US ally would be directed at China.1 But now, confoundingly, as 
America looks less and less reliable, Canberra is becoming more and more 
willing to back it — even, it seems, at the risk of ructions with Beijing. 
There seemed no need to take such risks while America’s position in Asia 
seemed assured. Now, with Donald Trump, they have finally woken up to 
the fragility of US primacy, and the uncertainty of US support for Austral-
ia, and they have decided that they need to do more to buttress both.
A New Tone
This was, one assumes, one motive behind the sharp new tone of Julie 
Bishop’s and Malcom Turnbull’s speeches in Singapore. They were urging 
Donald Trump’s Washington to confront Xi Jinping’s Beijing more directly, 
and showing the US Australia’s eager support. It is a risky ploy: there is 
little reason to think that these messages will be heard in today’s Washing-
ton, and none at all to imagine that they would make any difference if they 
were heard. We may be watching the rats scrambling aboard a sinking 
ship, rather than abandoning it.   
Our political leaders may also be responding to a subtle shift in the 
domestic politics of our relations with China. For a long time, Canberra’s 
orthodoxy has been that good relations with China were good politics, and 
any hint of tension or discord was to be avoided at any cost. This is because 
























































China itself or elsewhere, while understanding 
that Australia’s economic future lies in China’s 
hands. But rising public anxiety about China’s in-
fluence in Australia may be shifting the political 
calculations a little. Perhaps our political lead-
ers are succumbing to the temptation to reflect 
public anxiety back to the electorate — what you 
might call the politics of fear. This has, after all, 
been an increasingly common pattern in Western 
politics in the past decade or two. Many countries have been touched by 
the politics of identity, tinged with xenophobia, Australia among them, de-
spite the striking demographic changes this country has experienced (or 
perhaps, in some regards, because of them). Weak political leaders have 
found it hard to resist, and we have plenty of those.
It is a long time since our political leaders felt any inclination to think 
about Australia’s Asian destiny, and to explore the question of what it 
meant for our identity — since March 1996, in fact, when John Howard 
became prime minister. For Howard, Asia was always a bit of a chore. 
Asia for him was a place we did business with, not a place we embraced 
or identified with. He explicitly repudiated Keating’s zeal for Australia’s 
Asian future, and his failure to immediately condemn or at least distance 
his government from the overt xenophobia expressed in Pauline Hanson’s 
maiden speech to parliament reflected his own unease at the thought that 
Australia’s identity might be shaped by our geography rather than by our 
history. When Howard said, as he often did, that Australia did not have to 
choose between its history and its geography, what he meant was that we 
could do business with Asia without changing what he imagined to be an 
essential and unchanging identity that had been inherited from the Anglo- 
Saxon traditions we share with Britain and America.        
All this was easier for Howard to believe, and for many other Aus-
tralians to accept, because of the circumstances of the late 1990s. America 
seemed to have emerged from the Cold War in a position of unchallenge-
Former prime minister John Howard
Photo: Wikimedia Commons
able and unprecedented global power. Enthusiastic scholars and journal-
ists across the Western world drew comparisons to Rome at its height, 
and spoke of a unipolar global order in the twenty-first century, built on 
American principles, upheld by American strength, and welcomed by all 
the world’s major powers. In such a world, every region, including Asia, 
would be shaped by America. Why, then, would Australia, America’s clos-
est ally, allow itself to be shaped by Asia, when we assumed that it was 
Asia that was being shaped by America? Future historians looking back on 
the past couple of decades will see in our assumption that the world was 
inevitably Westernising an echo of the complacency of the high imperi-
alism of the late nineteenth century. As a result, while our economic and 
demographic enmeshment with Asia generally and China in particular 
intensified, our political, strategic, intellectual, and cultural engagement 
with Asia has plainly waned, as the collapse in Asian-language learning so 
starkly shows. 
Much has gone wrong for America since those heady post-Cold War 
days, but this image of a US-led global order — the ‘rules-based global or-
der’ that Malcolm Turnbull and his colleagues invoke so often — remains 
central to Australia’s view of its place in the world. Hence the tension at 
the heart of Australian foreign policy today. On the one hand, we have 
trouble envisioning Australia finding its way in an Asia where America is 
not the region’s leading power. On the other hand, we can no longer cred-
ibly expect that America will continue to lead.  
The resulting contradictions were plainly displayed in the speeches 
by Turnbull and Bishop mentioned earlier, and in the Australian Govern-
ment Foreign Policy White Paper released in November 2017.3 The White 
Paper carried three key messages. First, that China’s ambitions threaten 
the US-led rules-based order in Asia on which Australia’s prosperity and 
security has hitherto depended. Second, that American power and resolve 
in Asia could no longer be taken for granted. And third, that Australia can 
and should nonetheless continue to rely on America to resist China’s chal-
























































2.4 on p.26] the White Paper itself provided the key reason why this was so 
unlikely to work. The chart displayed Treasury estimates of the GDP of Chi-
na and the US in 2030 in Purchasing Power Parity terms — PPP accounts 
for the difference in prices of goods and services between countries. It 
showed China’s at US$42 trillion and America’s at US$24 trillion. The text 
in the White Paper made no reference to this startling prediction, which so 
vividly captures the shift in the distribution of wealth and power from the 
US to China, and completely undermines the document’s confidence that 
US leadership in Asia can be sustained. 
The same tensions can be seen in a major speech by the Labor Oppo-
sition’s Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Penny Wong, in Octo-
ber 2017. After a nuanced and impressive account of China’s significance 
to Australia, Wong had this to say:  
Our long-term relationship with China will not be delivered at the ex-
pense of our relationship with the US. It will be delivered to a very sig-
nificant extent because of the strength of our relationship with the US. 
ANZUS not only underpins our national security, it is a key contributor 
to the peace, stability and security of our region.2
And later, after rejecting ‘any suggestion that China should be contained’, 
she said: 
What Australia, China and the US are looking for is a convergence, as 
far as is practicable, of our individual national interests in Asia, locat-
ing those interests within a rules-based order. 
But this is just wishful thinking. There is no evidence at all that China 
seeks ‘convergence’ of its interests with those of Australia or Ameri-
ca in Asia. Its aim is to minimise US power and influence in the region, 
not to accept America as ‘a key contributor to the peace, stability, and 
security’.  And that is plainly not in either America’s or Australia’s interests, 
at least as these interests have traditional been conceived. 
So our political leaders have not 
yet admitted to the rest of us, and per-
haps not even to themselves, what is 
plain to see: Australia’s long-term rela-
tionship with China will no longer be 
mediated by American power. For the 
first time in the 230 years since Euro-
pean settlement, Australia today must 
decide how to make its own way in 
Asia, and set the terms of its relations 
with a dominant China without the 
mediation of a Western protector. We have hardly known a more critical 
moment in our history, and we have no idea how to proceed. 
The White Paper’s only suggestion is to align ourselves with other 
Asian democracies, as well as the US, to contain China’s challenge — an 
idea embodied by the revival of the Quad proposal for closer strategic 
alignment between the US, Australia, India, and Japan, which was briefly 
in vogue towards the end of 2017. The idea presupposes that the interests 
of these four countries align sufficiently for them to act effectively togeth-
er to contain China’s power.  The Quad’s advocates assume this to be true 
because they are all democracies and all feel threatened to varying de-
grees by China’s ambitions. But it is not at all clear that this is sufficient to 
overcome the immense interests that each of them have in maintaining 
good relations with China. The potential for effective cooperative action 
that genuinely constrains China is entirely unproven. 
So what should Australia be doing? Part of the answer is to get to know 
China far, far better than we do now, as people like Stephen Fitzgerald,4 
Linda Jakobson and Bates Gill5 have been urging. Another, and perhaps 
even bigger, part of the answer is to understand ourselves better, because 
how we respond will define our identity for decades, if not centuries, 
to come.
Dr Stephen Fitzgerald with Premier Zhou Enlai, 
ca. 1973–76





































ALL I  HAVE TO DO IS 
DREAM
Dreams of Prosperity in Papua New Guinea 
·  GRAEME SMITH
The Chinese Dream of Arabian Traders in 
Yiwu 
· WEN MEIZHEN










































































ON 20 NOVEMBER 2017, Papua New Guinea (PNG) formally signed on 
to the Belt and Road Initiative, with 
Prime Minister Peter O’Neill assuring 
his guests that ‘China is one of our 
strongest development partners, and 
this direct investment is an example 
of the huge confidence that China and 
Chinese companies have in Papua New 
Guinea’. 
Reaction from the Australian gov-
ernment, PNG’s former colonial ruler, 
was muted, although the Opposition 
was less restrained, with Shadow De-
fence Minister Richard Marles declar-
ing the Pacific to be Australia’s ‘biggest 
national security blind spot’. Marles 
urged Australia not to be restrained 
in its engagement with the Pacific by 
fears of being an ‘overbearing colonial 
power’.
The dominant Chinese presence 
at the signing ceremony in Port Mores-
by was not the Chinese ambassador, 
there on behalf of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, nor the Chinese economic 
counsellor, representing the minister 
of commerce, but the chairman of the 
China Railway Group Ltd , Zhang Zong-
yan 张宗言. This appears to confirm 
what I have observed in over a decade 
of research in Papua New Guinea: Chi-
na’s expansion into the Pacific is driven 
not by the central government, but by 
provincial and city governments and 
companies, both state-owned and pri-
vate. China Railway Group  is a publicly 
listed company on the Shanghai and 
Hong Kong stock exchanges with the 
state-owned China Railway Engineer-
ing Corporation the major shareholder. 
According to the Engineering News- 
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— PNG’s commerce and politics will 
remain disconnected. The concern of 
PNG’s political elites that settlers from 
the Highlands might overrun the na-
tion’s capital seems to have trumped 
economics.
The other major part of PNG’s 
Belt and Road dream, a US$4 billion 
industrial park in remote West Sepik 
province to be built by investors from 
Shenzhen with China Metallurgical 
Group as the main contractor, should 
be viewed with some scepticism. Plans 
include not just the processing of 
PNG’s abundant raw materials — cas-
sava, timber, and fish — but also the 
production of cement and steel, which 
requires a reliable power supply, 
something PNG Power is not known 
for. Eyebrows were also raised at the 
choice of the contractor: China Metal-
lurgical Group (known as MCC). 
Record, China Railway Group  is the 
world’s largest construction contractor.
The projects — if delivered — 
have the potential to transform Aus-
tralia’s northern neighbour. China 
Railway Group signed memoranda 
of understanding promising to build 
US$4 billion in roads, running along 
the spine of PNG from the orderly 
towns of Rabaul and Milne Bay in the 
east to the lawless border outpost of 
Vanimo in the west. The need for roads 
in PNG is undisputed; the lack of them 
cripples everything from the country’s 
coffee growers and vegetable farmers 
to efforts by the government to de-
liver universal education and health 
care. The long-awaited transnational 
link connecting Port Moresby to the 
economic heartland of the Highlands 
and on to the main commercial port 
of Lae, however, is not part of the plan 
Xi Jinping and Peter O’Neill
Source: fmprc.gov.cn
MCC, which was also behind the 
US$2 billion Ramu nickel mine in Ma-
dang province, enjoys a status in PNG 
somewhere between a damaged brand 
and a national joke. Ramu Nickel has 
been the target of a series of violent 
strikes by PNG workers and was shut 
down as a result of a horrific indus-
trial accident. A court battle with the 
landowners delayed the opening of 
the mine for several years. China’s 
State-Owned Assets Supervision Ad-
visory Committee took a sufficiently 
dim view of the company’s overseas 
ventures that in December 2015 they 
announced that a better performing 
company, China Minmetals, would ac-
quire it. The merged entity is now the 
world’s largest mining company by 
revenue. While the decision had more 
to do with the company’s loss-making 
ventures in Australia, bad headlines 
in PNG did not help their cause. MCC’s 
former general manager, Shen Heting 
沈鹤庭, was arrested on corruption 
charges in March 2017.
The unifying theme for China’s in-
vestors and officials in PNG is a belief 
in the country’s potential for prosperi-
ty. David Morris, the Beijing represent-
ative of Pacific Trade & Invest, whose 
mission is to bring Chinese investors to 
the Pacific, believes ‘Chinese firms are 
looking for international investment 
opportunities to supply their huge do-
mestic market and our challenge is to 
find the right partnerships that will 
ensure these investments can work for 
both PNG and China, creating jobs and 
prosperity into the future’.1 The Chi-
nese embassy’s website uses language 
that is rapturous about the wealth of 
PNG’s fishing and mineral resources.
Ramu Nickel’s relentlessly upbeat 
magazine, The Updater, even touch-
es on the relationship between PNG’s 
ever-present embrace of religion and 
entrepreneurialism, known as the 
‘prosperity gospel’, and Pentecostal 
religious groups around the mine site. 
Shaun Gessler’s doctoral research at 
The Australian National University, fo-
cussing on the impact of the project on 
local landowner groups, has found that 
one burgeoning church group around 
the mine site is led by a charismatic 
pastor who prophesied the arrival of 
the Chinese to start up the long-await-
ed nickel mine, the lease for which had 
been passed around a clutch of mining 
companies for nearly half a century 
before MCC cut into the red dirt. For 
their part, MCC, a thoroughly tradi-
tional state-owned enterprise that 
arose out of the Ministry of Metallur-














































autonomy from its new owner, China 
Minmetals, has provided material sup-
port for ‘Christian crusades’ around 
the mine site to encourage ‘Christian 
leadership and moral standards’.
Locals disparage the foot sol-
diers of Chinese investment in PNG 
— workers on construction projects, 
migrants in their corner shops, and 
young university graduates employed 
by MCC — as ‘kong kong’, a Tok Pisin 
expression (likely derived from Hong 
Kong) that covers all Asians. But the 
migrants’ hopes are not dissimilar to 
those of Papua New Guineans of sim-
ilar background: they are anxious to 
maintain what University of Technol-
ogy Sydney scholar Sun Wanning calls 
‘probationary membership of the mid-
dle class’.2 They want a good education 
for their children and to buy a decent 
flat in town. 
For many Papua New Guineans, 
there is a disappointing gap between 
their aspirations for prosperity and 
their daily experiences of making a liv-
ing. There are more school and tertiary 
graduates than there are jobs. Both 
countries have enjoyed healthy rates of 
economic growth in recent years, with 
PNG recording double-digit growth in 
2014 and 2015, while China averaged 
just under ten per cent for the period 
1989 to 2017. And yet inequality — the 
World Bank estimates both countries 
to have Gini coefficients well above the 
‘dangerous level’ of 0.4 — and crony 
capitalism, whereby a small group of 
families dominate the ‘commanding 
heights’ of both economies, mean that 
these sharp spikes in national wealth 
have not delivered prosperity to all 
citizens. As one Chinese mineworker 
quipped as we bumped along the red 
mud track up to the mine site in the 
foothills of Kurumbukare, ‘our nation 
is rich, but we are poor’. The target for 
this lingering resentment of frustrated 
prosperity tends to be the mine’s mid-
dle management. Some Chinese mine-
workers, particularly those with some 
English skills, develop close friend-
ships with younger PNG mineworkers, 
largely based on a shared contempt for 
the Chinese cadres running the mine.
PNG’s Chinese shopkeepers large-
ly hail from Fuqing, a god-fearing city 
in Fujian province that has seen fre-
quent church demolitions and given 
rise to Protestant sects such as ‘The 
Shouters’, whose prosperity gospel 
matches the most fervent Pentecostal 
doctrine. These migrants run most of 
the retail stores across PNG. The wealth 
they earn through long hours selling 
plastic buckets (and sometimes more 
lucrative illicit products, such as boot-
leg alcohol) is precarious. Shopkeepers 
quite reasonably fear assault and even 
death at the hands of customers, po-
lice, and their employees. Every year 
sees at least one murder of a Fuqing 
shopkeeper, typically in the course of 
a robbery, but there have also been 
deliberate and horrific murders, such 
as the 2013 stabbing and beheading of 
four Chinese in a Port Moresby bakery. 
Nationwide anti-Asian riots in 2009, 
which saw looters shot dead by PNG 
police, explicitly targetted Chinese 
retailers. Most of these migrants had 
gone into business with loans from 
their relatives, and in addition to the 
pressure of debt, they aspired to build 
spectacular houses back in Fuqing 
(typically over six storeys tall), to be 
able to afford (or pay back) the bride 
price — strictly illegal, but common 
in Fuqing — and ultimately to ensure 
their children’s ability to get a tertiary 
education. 
Yet over a decade of interviews 
across PNG and in Fuqing, whenever 
I asked Chinese migrants whether it 
was easier to prosper in PNG or China, 
no-one nominated China. PNG offered 
them, they said, less competition with 
other businesses, fewer officials and 
police to be bribed, and a sense of fu-
ture opportunities in PNG and beyond. 
The dream of prosperity has moved be-
yond China’s borders, but the struggles 
of these migrants echo those common 
across rural China. Couples would typ-
ically work in a shop together, sending 
their children back to be cared for by 
elderly relatives (the One-Child Policy 
was never taken terribly seriously in 
Fuqing). While we are fans of instant 
electronic communication, many felt 
it added to the pain of separation 
from their children. WeChat could 
not alleviate the boredom of running 
a barbed-wire-enclosed shop in a 
strange land. The hopes of these par-
ents for their children split into two 
paths: education in China leading to a 
Kurumbukare mine site, Madang, Papua New Guinea














































secure government job (Customs was 
easily the most popular choice), or ed-
ucation abroad leading to the world of 
international business. 
Unfortunately, for many of their 
children, the reality is many years 
sitting on a tennis chair in thirty-five-
degree heat, relentlessly surveying a 
store to ensure neither the customers 
nor the staff are making off with 
their fortune. In a shopping centre in 
Lorengau, the capital of Manus Island, I 
have a strong memory of a sixteen-year 
old Fuqing boy, languid and bored, 
sitting barefoot and bespectacled 
atop a metal set of bookshelves that 
provided a vantage point to keep an 
eye on would-be thieves, occasionally 
swinging a mosquito zapper in the 
shape of a tennis racquet. Just why he 
was not at school, and was wasting his 
youth in a land doing work that no-one 
appreciated was something his parents 
were not keen to discuss. 
Nor do I know whether the young 
man on the bookshelf survived the 
blaze that killed ten Chinese nationals 
inside the Splendid Star shopping 
centre two years later. They were 
trapped in their dormitory at the back 
of the complex at 3am in a province 
of PNG too poor to have a single piece 
of firefighting equipment, despite the 
AU$2 billion spent by Australia on 
detaining 2,000 souls just down the 
road. Aside from a terse Chinese Foreign 
Ministry statement, the fire received 
limited attention in the Chinese and 
Australian press; no justice, or even 
an investigation, was forthcoming. The 
ultimate dream of these six women 
and four men, as told to me by the 
matriarch of the shopping centre back 
in 2015, was to join their relatives in 
Australia and start a new, safer life on 
the eastern seaboard. Their dream of 













































































INTERVIEWED BY JINHUA DAILY in March 2016, Said Bahaji, a trader 
from Jordan, spoke with enthusiasm 
of Yiwu 义乌, a county-level city in 
eastern Zhejiang province: ‘Yiwu is an 
amazing place, a land of opportuni-
ty where we can achieve our Chinese 
dream’. Said Bahaji is one of about 
4,000 traders from North Africa and 
the Middle East who have settled down 
in Yiwu, in pursuit of their own ‘Chi-
nese dreams’. Playing the role of inter-
mediaries, these ‘Arab Traders’ help 
buyers from all over the world, but 
especially from their region, search 
for and buy products in Yiwu and else-
where in China.3 Their businesses and 
personal stories have recently become 
the focus of Chinese media attention 
as a result of the launch of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, which emphasises 
‘people-to-people’ bonds (in addition 
to the more common focus on infra-
structure). However, the connection of 
these Arab traders with Yiwu predates 
the launch of this policy.     
Yiwu is an inland city located in 
the centre of Zhejiang province. It was 
named the ‘Largest Commodity Whole-
sale Market in the World’ by the United 
Nations, the World Bank, and Morgan 
Stanley in 2005. Yiwu is also popular-
ly known as the ‘world’s supermarket’ 
— a national and international centre 
for the collection and distribution of 
small commodities. It plays the role of 
collecting millions of small products 
produced in different places in China, 
and then distributing them all over the 
world. A local official once estimated 
that if you went to visit every store 
for just five minutes, it would take 
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over two years to visit all the shops in 
Yiwu. They sell every conceivable type 
of small commodity, from hardware to 
clothes, at very low prices, and there 
are many customers for such inexpen-
sive goods in North Africa and the Mid-
dle East. 
Most of the North African and 
Middle Eastern traders who end up in 
Yiwu have followed one of four differ-
ent paths. The majority moved from In-
donesia, Thailand, or Singapore when 
the 1998 financial crisis in Asia greatly 
increased the price of South-East Asian 
products. Others, from countries in-
cluding Yemen, Palestine, and Egypt, 
originally came to China to study on 
Chinese government scholarships and 
then stayed on after graduation, en-
couraged by business opportunities 
in Yiwu. These former students, now 
fluent in Chinese and with large so-
cial networks after years in the coun-
try, were very well placed to establish 
businesses. A third path involved for-
mer Arabic–Chinese interpreters from 
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Ad-
ministration Area, who had previously 
done interpreting in that region, and 
later brought the Arab traders to Yiwu 
to import goods directly from factories 
in south-east China. Finally, some trad-
ers came to Yiwu after attending trade 
exhibitions organised by both Chinese 
government and non-government or-
ganisations in a range of North African 
and Middle Eastern countries. More 
than 100 companies have been respon-
sible for organising expos in different 
provinces in China and overseas to ad-
vertise products in Yiwu.
The presence of these traders 
has significantly contributed to the 
development of international trade 
from Yiwu. Forty-seven per cent of 
the city’s total exports in 2015 were 
shipped to North African and Middle 
Eastern markets, and these markets 
An Arabian restaurant in the commercial district 
in Yiwu
Photo: Wen Meizhen
are expected to expand greatly in the 
future. An important factor behind 
this increasing trade was the comple-
tion in March 2016 of a 6,500-mile rail-
way connecting Yiwu with Tehran via 
Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan, Uzbekistan, 
and Turkmenistan. This has greatly re-
duced transport costs compared with 
existing shipping routes, transforming 
Tehran into a hub connecting China 
with the West. Many products from 
Yiwu are now delivered by train to 
Tehran first, before being delivered to 
other countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa, at much lower cost than 
in the past.
These Arab traders have also in-
fluenced Yiwu society and culture. 
The large number of Middle Eastern 
restaurants and coffee shops on Chou-
zhou Road 稠州路 gives the area an ex-
otic feeling, especially in the evening, 
when the traders gather at the outdoor 
tables of coffee shops, smoking hook-
ahs (pipes). In addition, four private 
schools have opened in the city — one 
belonging to a Yemeni trader, one 
owned by an Iraqi, and two organised 
by Egyptians. These four schools main-
ly teach students in Arabic, with one 
of the Egyptian schools opting for both 
English and Arabic. All four schools fol-
low the same timetable as in their ori-
gin counties. With the increasing num-
ber of single, young male Arab traders’ 
presence in Yiwu, there has also been 
an increase in intermarriages between 
Chinese women and Middle Eastern 
or North African men. According to 
the data provided by a local Imam, be-
tween 2000 and 2016, more than 500 
intermarriages between Chinese wom-
en and Arab men were registered in 
the local mosque. 
While Yiwu provides a means of 
realising the traders’ ‘Chinese dream’, 
it is also a life full of uncertainty. The 
steady increase in the price of Chinese 
goods resulting from rising labour, ma-
terial, and rental costs has made these 
goods less competitive in their home 
markets and the traders have started 
to source cheaper products from other 
countries. Even though many are still 
living in Yiwu, there is a tendency for 
Arab traders to move to other coun-
tries once they find stable and cheaper 
supply chains. 
This is compounded by the fact 
that China does not encourage per-
manent immigration. The state has 
sought to strengthen its political and 
commercial relationships with the 
Middle East and North Africa, encour-
aging Chinese entrepreneurs to invest 
















































Yet China changes its visa application 
process frequently and is also tighten-
ing the controls on foreigners working 
in China, which has discouraged more 
from coming, and inhibited those al-
ready there from making long-term 
plans. Access to education for the trad-
ers’ children has also been a source of 
frustration, as they are not allowed to 
enroll in local public schools, and there 
are not enough places at the private 
schools to meet demand. In addition, 
as Muslims, some traders also fear 
that their children are not being given 
a sufficient religious education when 
their children stay and study in China. 
As Egyptian trader Samire Zawai told 
me in his office in 2016: ‘I have been in 
China more than eighteen years, I have 
already considered Yiwu as my second 
home town, but I do not know wheth-
er I will continue to stay in Yiwu when 
the price of products increased year by 
year, and the government has stricter 
visa policy towards the foreigners’. 
Until such matters are resolved, the 
dreams of Arab traders in Yiwu may 
















































IN JUNE 2017, forty-five Muslim stu-dents — Dungans 东干族	 from Ka-
zakhstan and Kyrgyzstan — celebrat-
ed their graduation from a four-year 
course of study at Northwest Normal 
University in Lanzhou, Gansu prov-
ince. They were the first Dungans to 
graduate with financial support from 
the provincial governments of Gansu 
and Shaanxi, as part of a program that 
began in 2013. Following their Chi-
nese-language training and study of 
business, agricultural technology, and 
natural resource management, most of 
them will return to Central Asia to work 
as liaisons between Chinese and Cen-
tral Asian companies. ‘We would like to 
become the messengers along the Silk 
Road,’ the students told Chinese media.4 
Dungans claim to be descend-
ants of Hui 回, a Muslim Chinese eth-
nic minority, who fled their homes in 
Shaanxi and Gansu provinces about 
140 years ago after aborted uprisings 
against the Qing government. Two 
further waves of migration during the 
late nineteenth century led to more 
of these Chinese Muslims settling in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan, and Uzbek-
istan. Cultural evidence linking Dun-
gans to the Hui of north-western China 
include their distinctive Chinese-style 
housing, dietary habits, customs, and 
spoken dialects. 
In September 2013, during Xi Jin-
ping’s visit to Kazakhstan, he proposed 
a ‘New Silk Road Economic Belt’ 新丝
绸之路经济带, part of what is now re-
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ferred to as the Belt and Road Initiative 
(see Chapter 2 ‘The Belt and Road In-
tiative: How to Win Friends and Influ-
ence People’, pp.42–59), involving road 
and rail construction along the ancient 
trade route connecting China to Eu-
rope via Central Asia. The initiative 
encourages economic policy coordi-
nation among the countries along the 
route and the ‘facilitation of an open, 
inclusive and balanced regional eco-
nomic cooperation architecture that 
benefits all’.5 This includes infrastruc-
ture building and transnational trade 
between China and Central Asian 
countries, Russia, and Europe. 
Historical, cultural, and political 
differences and complex interdepend-
encies among Central Asian countries 
present a challenge to the plan. So, the 
Silk Road Economic Belt also explicitly 
advocates ‘people-to-people relations’ 
and a cultural narrative of the Silk 
Road that promotes the political and 
economic objectives of the Belt and 
Road Initiative.  
It is in this context that the histor-
ical connection between the Dungans 
and Chinese Muslims in Gansu and 
Shaanxi has attracted the attention 
of provincial and local governments, 
which perceive not just the potential 
economic advantages of deeper ties 
between China and its Central Asian 
neighbours, but also the opportunities 
for tourism and educational and aca-
demic exchange. Over the last decade, 
the provincial government of Shaanxi 
and the municipal government of Xi’an 
have regularly sent official delegations 
to Dungan communities in Central 
Asia. The Dungans have welcomed this 
Chinese initiative. Their proficiency in 
Russian, Chinese, Kazakh, and other 
regional languages has allowed them 
to benefit from the reopening of the 
Sino–Soviet border for private trade 
and cultural exchange beginning in 
the late 1980s. Since 2013, there have 
been more frequent socio-cultural and 
economic activities promoting mutual-
ly beneficial cooperation, particularly 
in the areas of agricultural technology 
(including solar-powered greenhouses 
and mushroom-growing technology), 
international trade, tourism, and edu-
cation exchange. 
In 2014 and 2015, the Xi’an mu-
nicipal government organised a week-
long cultural event called the Dungan 
Reunion 中亚东干人寻亲西安行. This 
celebrated the Dungans’ ancestral ties 
and contemporary links with the Hui 
people, making no mention of the 
Dungan revolts of 1862–1877 (a cha-
otic uprising that resulted from racial, 
religious, and class antagonisms) and 
the Qing-approved military suppres-
sion and massacre of Muslim people 
led by Zuo Zongtang that drove the 
Dungans out of China. The Reunion 
focusses on the positives of cultural, 
religious, and business connections 
between Dungans and Hui Muslims. 
For instance, they made cooperative 
agreements on cultural tourism pro-
grams that bring Central Asian tourists 
to Xi’an and vice-versa. 
The Chinese government clearly 
hopes that this positive model will be 
useful in managing politically sensi-
tive and volatile Muslim groups, such 
as the Uyghurs. It distinguishes itself 
from a negative approach to managing 
‘troublesome’ ethnic minorities by us-
ing connections such as a common eth-
no-religious identity and mutual inter-
ests of cultural and business exchange. 
When Muslim groups liaise between 
China and the rest of the world, they 
are no longer seen as potential threats 
to challenge the authority of the Chi-
nese Communist Party. Rather, all 
these activities facilitate the establish-
ment of a new Silk Road community 
with a ‘shared destiny’ 共同命运 (see 
the China Story Yearbook 2014: Shared 
Destiny).
Forty-five Dungans graduated from Northwest Normal University in Lanzhou, 






















































PRECARIOUS WEALTH: THE SEARCH 
FOR STATUS AND SECURITY
Gerry Groot
The Square and Circle Mansion in Shenyang
Source: Aaron Sorrell, Flickr
IN JANUARY 2017, Chinese security agents entered 
Hong Kong’s Four Seasons Hotel and left with Xiao 
Jianhua 肖建华. Once described by the New York 
Times as China’s banker for the ruling class, Xiao, 
a self-made billionaire, ranked thirty-two on the 
2016 Hurun Report’s China Rich List. It is rumoured 
that Xiao’s clients and connections include 
members of Xi Jinping’s family. Xiao was escorted 
to the mainland in contravention of Hong Kong 
law, and his companies have been put up for sale. 
Of Xiao himself, as of year’s end, nothing has been 
heard.1 Xiao was but the latest in a series of such 
disappearances since 2012.2 In China, prosperity is 




















































For centuries, many Chinese prayed to 
Caishen 财神, the God of Wealth, to prosper 
and preserve their wealth. Fortune was hard 
won but easily lost, often thanks to arbitrary 
seizure by rapacious officials in imperial 
times, through to the Republican Era (1912–
1949), and especially during socialism under 
Mao (1949–1976). As Xiao’s case shows, it re-
mains so. As a result, the wealthy have long 
seen the need to use their wealth to accrue sta-
tus, social capital, and political connections to 
protect themselves. 
These features were again reflected in 2017, most notably in the saga 
of exiled billionaire Guo Wengui 郭文贵, the apparent fall from grace of 
billionaire Wang Jianlin (see China Story Yearbook 2016: Control, pp.281–
282), more revelations of offshore holdings in tax havens courtesy of 
the Paradise Papers, official warnings about ‘Grey Rhinos’ 灰犀牛 (large 
overlooked dangers), and debate in Australia, New Zealand, and else-
where about the influence of other wealthy Chinese linked to the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP).
Caishen’s re-emergence is a sign that, despite apparent economic suc-
cess, many still worry that any gains can also easily disappear. Compli-
cating matters are lingering Confucian beliefs that business is ipso facto 
corrupt and conducted by ‘small people’ 小人, not people of virtue 君子	
— a mindset reinforced by the Mao-led communist revolution (1949–1976) 
to eliminate capitalism and ‘selfish’ economic behaviour. Despite the post-
1978 economic reforms, this suspicion has never quite disappeared and 
has been compounded by the knowledge that much wealth today is taint-
ed. The revelations of the ongoing anti-corruption campaign confirm such 
suspicions. China’s wealthy are caught between popular admiration of 
their material success and the possibility of sudden official moral or po-
litical condemnation — or worse, as Xiao Jianhua discovered first hand.  
Caishen: The God of Wealth
Photo: Simon Crubellier, Flickr
From Ming to Mao
Under the Ming (1368–1644) and especially the Qing dynasties (1644–
1911), officials encouraged small enterprises but were wary of the rich 
who might cause unrest by exploiting the weak or concentrating wealth.3 
The wealthy therefore sought social legitimacy through philanthropy in-
cluding building temples, schools, roads and the like. Because Chinese re-
lied then as now, on personal relationships rather than a clear system of 
laws 靠人不靠治, charity and public works were ways of being seen as 
virtuous by society and acquiring friends in high places. 
After establishing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October 
1949, the CCP under Mao set about building autarkic communism, in-
cluding by ‘encouraging’ the wealthy to socialise their assets by handing 
them over to cooperatives or by confiscating them. All private business, 
private property, and ‘selfish’ profit were to be eliminated. The so-called 
capitalists then underwent ‘thought reform’, in order to become prole-
tarian in their thinking. However, to rebuild war-ravaged industry, some 
businessmen were allowed continued prominence as part of the All- 
China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC). The China Demo-
cratic National Construction Association or Min Jian, represented such 
people in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) as 
one of China’s eight ‘democratic parties’ 民主党派 under the control of the 
United Front Work Department (UFWD). A key CCP department, the UFWD 
was responsible for liaising with and integrating or eliminating allies 
including ‘capitalists’.4  
The Three-Anti (1951) and the Five-Anti (1952) campaigns, meanwhile 
targetted alleged corruption, bribery, tax evasion, cheating on government 
contracts, and the stealing of state secrets. Many suffered in labour camps 
and/or were driven to suicide while business was again discredited. 
Among the few to escape were ‘red capitalists’ such as Rong Yiren 
荣毅仁, an heir to a business conglomerate who remained in Shanghai 




















































others as role models. In 1951, 
he reputedly tried to formally 
join the CCP but was told by 
Mayor Chen Yi 陈毅 that he 
would be more useful as a 
non-member. Rong was protect-
ed during the Cultural Revolu-
tion by Premier Zhou Enlai 周
恩来 — a sure sign of his privi-
leged status, and was quickly ‘rehabilitated’ in the Deng era. He did secret-
ly join the CCP in 1985, although this was only revealed after his death.5 
As a reward for his devotion, in 1993 Rong was appointed a vice-president 
of China. Not long after, his son, Larry Yung 荣智健, who had moved to in 
Hong Kong in the early 1990s, became chairman of CITIC Pacific, an off-
shoot of CITIC (China International Trust Investment Corporation), a semi-
state-owned investment company that Rong helped found in 1979 with the 
support of the UFWD, ACFIC, and Min Jian.6 The boundaries between the 
Party and business were deliberately obscured but with the ‘private’ aspect 
now emphasised. Though there is no clear current equivalent of Rong 
Yiren, the very personable Alibaba Billionaire, ‘Jack’ Yun Ma 马云, is per-
haps the closest contender. Though Ma is only a member of the Zhejiang 
provincial CPPCC, given his increasing prominence, it may not be long be-
fore he too is promoted to the central-level CPPCC.
 The post-Mao economic reforms allowed a revival of fortunes for 
surviving 1940s business people, with the UFWD encouraging them to 
establish new enterprises and get once-frowned-upon ‘patriotic’ friends 
and relatives abroad to invest in their ‘ancestral land’ 祖国. This United 
Front work encouraging overseas Chinese investment became a major 
factor in China’s development. It also resulted in a new generation of 
wealthy Chinese, both local and overseas, with close CCP connections, of-
ten reflected by prestigious and protective appointments to the various 
levels of the CPPCC.
Rong Yiren, 1951
Source: Wikimedia Commons
IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE,   
by Yang Qin
The anti-corruption television 
drama In the Name of the People 
人民的名义 was a massive hit in 
2017, gripping audiences from 
the broadcast of the first episode 
in March. The fifty-two-episode 
drama, based on a novel by Zhou 
Meisen 周梅森,  had captured a 
record ten per cent average of 
Chinese viewers nationally, rack-
ing up over 7.7 billion views on just one licensed platform, iQiyi, alone.  
After a decade of strict censorship of social and reality television dramas by the State 
Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television, In the Name of the Peo-
ple struck many as tremendously bold, even if it was ‘on message’ with President Xi Jin-
ping’s sweeping anti-corruption campaign; some have even compared it with Netflix’s  
House of Cards. 
The Supreme People’s Procuratorate commissioned the series, which also lists among 
its producers the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee and the Central Military Commission. 
Hunan Television, a leading broadcaster of television entertainment programs and the pri-
mary online distributor of this drama, PPTV, had made a good bet on the show despite 
initial funding problems and low expectations for success. 
The story begins when a director at the central Ministry of Land and Resources — a position 
famously prone to corruption in the bureaucracy — is, despite a carefully cultivated reputation 
for austerity, found to have in his suburban villa huge amounts of cash that he has amassed 
through bribery. The investigation is headed by Hou Liangping, a determined young official 
from the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. The director’s downfall — kneeling and weeping for 
mercy before the young official — is just the beginning of the young investigator’s campaign 
to uncover the truth behind corrupt goings-on within a state-owned enterprise (SOE). As the 
story unfolds, Hou uncovers entangled relationships involving local officials past and present 
in the fictive province of Handong. There are scenes of sexual bribery, nepotism, heavying by 
gangsters in labour disputes, and other abuses of power by government officials. 
The unprecedented revelation of corruption behind the scenes has evoked passionate 
responses from audiences, with the series becoming a major topic of conversation for old 
and young in the early months of 2017. A sea of online commentary from China’s lively 
netizen community ranged from casual gossip about love, women, and marriage, to more 
serious ones of social stratum, bureaucracy, and governance. There was also quite a bit of 
liveliness and humour, with some writing funny songs and creating emojis based on charac-
ters in the show, and making stars of the actors they nicknamed the ‘Handong Boys’. 
In November 2017, a lawsuit ensured that this drama remained in the limelight. An accu-
sation was made that one of its main plots was plagiarised from a former journalist’s publi-
cation in 2010, as the two share similar scenes of worker protests, government regulation, 
and gangster interference surrounding the selling and reform of an SOE. The scriptwriter 
for In the Name of the People denied the accusation, making the point that this particular 
plot is typical of Chinese enterprise reform during past decades. While the outcome of the 
lawsuit is still pending (at the time of publication), it ’s hard to argue with this point. 





















































In the countryside, the re-
vival of rural markets in the 
late-1970s meant that farmers 
were again allowed to sell pro-
duce for profit. Rural entrepre-
neurs soon emerged, many of 
whom had been landlords or 
successful farmers before los-
ing everything to revolution-
ary land redistribution in the 
early 1950s. They traded in food and raw materials, then often moved into 
transport, food processing, and small-scale manufacturing. These changes 
gave rise to so-called ‘explosive wealth’ 爆发户 before much change was 
seen elsewhere.
In towns and cities where workers and government employees were 
suffering under inflation for the first time since 1950, there was consider-
able envy. Among the resentful were university students and staff whose 
protests, including against the rising corruption accompanying rising 
wealth, culminated in the Tiananmen protests of 1989.
In the cities too, there was a rise in entrepreneurship. Many, including 
those who could not find work in regular state work units, or danwei 单位,	
for reasons including negative political assessments in their personal files, 
became individual entrepreneurs — peddlers and tradespeople. Though 
often despised as profiteers, many of these entrepreneurs supported the 
students protesting in 1989. 
The Beijing Massacre of 4 June 1989 and subsequent political suppres-
sion caused many business people to worry that the Party was returning 
to its Maoist roots, and those who could fled abroad.  
In part due to the 1989 protests, the Party also became acutely aware 
of the potential danger of a financially independent middle class and new 
rich. Both Western democratic theory and Marxism hold that propertied 
classes will demand electoral democracy to protect their interests and 
Lamborghinis parked in a street in Shanghai
Photo: Joshua, Flickr
property. To forestall this, the CCP raised the status of the ACFIC and relat-
ed United Front work. In 2002, Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin 江泽
民, through his theory of the ‘Three Represents’ 三个代表, claimed that the 
CCP also represents China’s ‘advanced social productive forces’ and for the 
first time ever invited business people to join the Party.
In 2007, the National Peoples’ Congress (NPC) ratified constitutional 
changes recognising a right to private property. However, any compari-
sons to Western property rights and assumptions about business obscure 
these unique relationships between history, the Party-state system, suc-
cess, United Front Work, and fear of loss. These factors also help explain 
the actions of some of China’s wealthy, at home and abroad. 
Today’s Billionaires and Power
The US Congress has no billionaires. China’s National People’s Congress 
has some one hundred of them. With 609 in total as of 2017, China has 
more billionaires than America.7 And their wealth is growing faster than 
the economy overall.8  
China’s rich are amongst the strongest supporters of the Party-state 
system in large part because their prosperity owes so much to it, despite 
their need to curry favour to protect themselves. While Xiao Jianhua’s fate 
is still unclear, his extra-legal abduction is a good illustration that wealth 
alone is not enough protection. 
The Extraordinary Case of Guo Wengui
The most dramatic example of these complex relations between wealth 
and the Party-state in 2017 has undoubtedly been the case of real estate 
billionaire Guo Wengui 郭文贵, also known as Miles Kwok, a conspicu-
ous member of Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago Club. Guo fled China in 2014 




















































hunter’ 权力猎手 for his corruption and shady 
links with officials.9 Once in exile, Guo made 
an escalating series of claims about corruption 
by others, particularly Wang Qishan 王岐山, 
the Secretary of the CCP’s key anti-corruption 
body, the Central Commission for Discipline In-
spection. Guo, who paints himself as a patriotic 
whistleblower, has insisted that he is only trying 
to support Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s 
anti-corruption campaign. 
Soon after Guo began alleging corruption in 
high places, the CCP retaliated by revealing the arrest of his close associ-
ate, Ma Jian 马建, formerly a vice-minister of state security. In a televised 
confession, Ma alleged that since 2008, he worked with Guo to spy on, in-
terfere with, and even jail Guo’s competitors in an ‘alliance of shared in-
terests’. In some cases, Ma himself rang competitors to emphasise Guo’s 
connections. In return, Guo allegedly paid Ma some sixty million yuan in 
properties, cash, and gifts.10 Most shockingly, Ma’s confession demonstrat-
ed that even the most sensitive parts of the Party-state system could be 
bought, if the price was right.
Guo’s collusion with Ma was only the most dramatic in a long list of 
activities in which Guo worked with officials to get rich. Jailed for fraud 
in the early 1990s, Guo became a real estate entrepreneur in Zhengzhou, 
where he cultivated close relations with local Party Secretary, Wang Youjie 
王有杰. This allowed Guo to acquire prime real estate near the railway 
station for his first skyscraper and in turn he appointed Wang’s son to his 
company board. 
In anticipation of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Guo then acquired land 
near the proposed site but soon ran into serious planning and payment 
disputes with officials. As a result, the land was resumed by Beijing Vice- 
Mayor Liu Zhihua 刘志华. In retaliation, and using his security apparatus 
Guo Wengui
Source: Wikipedia
connections, Guo then entrapped Liu with a sex tape. After Liu was arrest-
ed in 2006, Guo was able to regain the land and built his famous Pangu 
Plaza. He subsequently used rooms in its hotel to tape officials’ dalliances 
with prostitutes to blackmail them. He also became friends with Ling Ji-
hua 令计划, subsequently head of the UFWD itself, until a car crash involv-
ing Ling’s son (see China Story Yearbook 2013: Civilising China, pp.24–25) 
exposed Ling’s web of corruption.  
Guo’s membership of Mar-a-Lago fits his pattern of ‘talking flattery 
to power’. In October, he even met Steve Bannon, Trump’s former ad-
viser — who had met secretly with Wang Qishan in September.11 As in 
China, Guo has invested in American connections to power and legitimacy 
while pursuing his multipronged media campaign aimed (unsuccessfully) 
at influencing the Nineteenth Party Congress, presumably to get himself 
off the corruption charges he was facing at home. After all, he might be 
forgiven if he is useful enough or if others he has cultivated or blackmailed 
in the past rise to power.
Using Twitter, video streaming, radio and press interviews, Guo went 
all out to present himself as a patriot (‘My only goal is to save China’), 
producing a series of often incredible claims and documents purporting 
to prove elite corruption, notably by Wang Qishan. Though excluding 
Xi Jinping, Guo denounced numerous other leaders as ‘a tiny group of 
Mafioso’.12 For much of the year he seemed to be attempting to both qual-
ify for asylum in America and win the support of Xi himself (unlikely). By 
year’s end, he was calling for regime change, actions which may make any 
claim for asylum more creditable.13 
The CCP took unprecedented measures to silence Guo. It apparent-
ly managed to have a live Voice of America (VOA) radio interview with 
him cut short — a clear compromise to the broadcaster’s independence. 
Some VOA staff were suspended as a result.14 In China, he was roundly de-
nounced, and in December senior employees, including one of his broth-




















































Numerous Chinese nationals launched 
court cases against Guo. Among them was a 
vice-minister of housing, who sued him for 
$US10 million for alleging that she trad-
ed in sexual favours and was corrupt;16 a 
hedge fund for US$88 million for default-
ing on debts and seeking a restraint over 
his US$68 million New York apartment;17 
and actress Fan Bingbing 范冰冰, who 
threatened to sue over his claims that she 
had slept with Wang Qishan.18  
Perhaps most dramatic were the allegations of rape levelled against 
Guo by a former personal assistant. This became the basis for a second 
Interpol red notice warrant for him.19 The first, in April, was instigated by 
Beijing alleging corruption. Since 2016, Interpol has been headed by Chi-
nese Vice-Minister of Public Security, Meng Hongwei 孟宏伟. A day after 
alleged Chinese interference saw his talk to Washington’s Hudson Institute 
cancelled, Guo claimed Beijing had 25,000 spies in the US. Guo’s claims 
had some credence because of his association with Ma Jian, once respon-
sible for aspects of counter intelligence.20 
Guo also ended up being suspended from social media platforms: 
his Twitter account was suspended briefly in April following a similar 
interruption to his Facebook account,21 while in October his YouTube 
account was also suspended.22 These incidents vividly demonstrate 
the increasing ability of the CCP to directly interfere with social media 
worldwide — despite Twitter being banned in China. That Guo has 466,000 
Twitter followers makes him even more of a worry, and the CCP’s desire 
to increase ideological and United Front Work abroad even more 
pressing.
Guo’s case is the most dramatic exposé of official–private collusion 
since the Bo Xilai–Wang Lijun case of 2012 (see the China Yearbook 2012: 
Wang Jianlin, January 2017
Source: World Economic Forum, Flickr
Red Rising, Red Eclipse) and again highlights just how deep and pernicious 
the relationships between power, corruption, and wealth can be in a Party- 
state system. 
One way to keep any gains is, of course, to send it abroad. It was not 
clear how Guo still had access to money after fleeing China. In November 
2017, however, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 
revealed a second set of leaks about tax havens — the Paradise Papers. In 
2016, the Panama Papers had revealed that Li Xiaolin 李小琳, the daughter 
of former leader Li Peng 李鹏, and even Xi Jinping’s brother-in-law, Deng 
Jiahui 邓家贵,	had been using tax havens to stash their wealth. Some nine 
companies related to Wang Jianlin 王健林, the real estate billionaire of 
Wanda fame who came to Western attention in 2016 for buying up the-
atres and studios in the US (see the China Story Yearbook 2016: Control, 
pp.281–282), used tax havens in the Bahamas, the Virgin Islands, and Lux-
embourg.23 There are likely to be many more wealthy Chinese seeking to 
hide their assets this way.
If You Can’t Beat ‘em…
If not for the Caixin revelations, there is a chance that Guo would have 
sought, or been sought out, to join the CCP, be elected to an NPC at some 
level, or selected by the UFWD as a representative in the CPPCC. The sta-
tus afforded by these bodies was reflected when, in March, the Liaoning 
NPC expelled forty-five members, nearly all businessmen, for having pur-
chased their seats. However, the situation only came to light when Bei-
jing’s favoured candidates failed to get elected.24  
This keenness to be seen to be a part of the Party-state is understand-
able. Proximity to power means privileged access to decision-makers, li-
cences, bank loans, and higher level connections, and especially to scarce 
real estate as Guo’s case reflects. At its best, this creates a virtuous cycle; at 




















































Aspects of positive symbiotic business–
Party relationships are evident with some of 
the Chinese billionaires who have come to 
prominence in Australia. In the China Sto-
ry Yearbook 2016, we discussed the role of 
Huang Xiangmo 黄向墨, his donations to Aus-
tralian political parties and his role in United 
Front activities. On 6 June 2017, a joint inves-
tigation by the ABC’s Four Corners program 
and Fairfax screened, called ‘Power and In-
fluence: The Hard Edge of China’s Soft Pow-
er’, about United Front-linked money and Australian politics.25 One ABC 
report revealed how almost six million dollars had gone to politicians of 
both major parties.26 In this and subsequent investigations and reports, 
notably about the Australian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Re-
unification, headed by Huang, there were a number of revelations about 
UFWD work in Australia.27 The Council’s front page even links directly to 
UFWD-linked organisations. 
Another prominent businessman and philanthropist, Chau Chak-
wing 周泽荣,	who is an ACPRRC member as well as an Australian citi-
zen of twenty years, came to public attention in 2017, in part because of 
his connections with Huang and subsequently because of his decision to 
sue the ABC and Fairfax for defamation in relation to their revelations. 
In a later interview, he denied any wrongdoing and, most pertinently, 
declared, ‘For the record, I have never been a member of the Chinese 
Communist Party and I have never been a member of an advisory group 
called the People’s Political Consultative Conference’. He went on to say 
that, ‘As to the entity referred to by the ABC as the “United Front Work 
Department”, I have no idea what this is’.28  
Chau’s rise to wealth and power, however, seems intimately connect-
ed to his relations with the UFWD in his home province of Guangdong, 
Dr Chau Chak Wing 
Source: UTS Advancement, Flickr
and in particular the Chaozhou region and his city of birth, Shantou. 
Within Guangdong, Chau is officially lauded as an outstanding overseas 
Chinese entrepreneur. According to the Shantou UFWD, Chau migrat-
ed to Hong Kong in the 1970s and then to Australia, returning to China 
in 1988. There he became involved in real estate, food, and media. The 
Department also stresses his contributions to charity, including building 
schools. His appointments include being a deputy chair of the China Fed-
eration of Returned Overseas Chinese Association. The photos of Chau 
include ones with former leader Hu Jintao and former Australian prime 
minister, Kevin Rudd.29    
Chau’s return to Shantou was timely, coming when the UFWD was 
actively wooing overseas Chinese investors to contribute their money and 
talents to building up their ancestral land, and profit at the same time. 
In July 2007, at Guangdong’s Oriental Hotel and in the presence of the 
Provincial Head of the UFWD, Zhou Zhenlong 周镇宏, Chau launched the 
Guangdong Overseas Chinese Commercial Investor Industry Association. 
Its precursor association launched in 1990, said Chau, had been the earli-
est such organisation in China and had played a major role in attracting 
investment under the auspices of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (the 
government face of the UFWD).30 Chau’s closeness to the UFWD, then, is 
long-standing. 
On 30 November, Chau’s efforts to court influential non-Chinese for-
mer leaders and people of influence by hosting meetings to discuss China’s 
international relations reached its apogee. Guests at his Imperial Springs 
International Forum, held at Chau’s palatial Imperial Springs Hotel in 
Guangdong, included former United Nations head, Ban Ki-moon and 
former New Zealand prime minister, Jenny Shipley. Their presence and 
discussions of China’s international relations was rewarded in dramatic 
style when Chau and his guests were invited to Beijing to meet Xi Jinping 





















































The Fall of a Grey Rhino
What the Party giveth, it can also take 
away. One real estate billionaire with 
very good connections to the Party, 
Wang Jianlin of Wanda, mentioned 
above in connection with the tax ha-
vens, had been able to access loans large 
enough to bid for Hollywood studios 
and cinema chains at least partly be-
cause the purchases supported Chinese 
soft power, in particular an increase in 
Chinese influence over international 
media. Many of the deals hyped up in 
2016, however, fell through in 2017.32 
Then, in July, Wanda was one of a number of large private firms with 
good connections that were criticised in the People’s Daily as ‘grey rhi-
nos’ 灰犀牛.33 The paper explained ‘A grey rhino is massive, and responds 
slowly — you can see it clearly in the distance, but if it charges you, it will 
catch you off guard and gore you’.34 Today’s rhinos are big companies now 
struggling under huge debts and therefore posing an economic threat. Re-
sponsibility for these loans, rather than being sheeted home to the officials 
who approved them, was placed on the companies themselves. By the end 
of August, there were repeated rumours, subsequently refuted, that Wang 
was under suspicion for corruption and unable to leave China. While 
Wang remains free, by the end of 2017, he had gone very quiet.
Conclusion
While wealth in China brings many benefits, it brings only limited pro-
tection if it is not also supported by officialdom, the higher the better. 
Beijing Wanda Plaza (headquarters for Wanda 
Group and Wanda Cinemas)
Source: Dennis Deng, Flickr
It should not be surprising then, if Chinese business people abroad also 
assume that similar situations apply in foreign environments and act ac-
cordingly by seeking access and possible protection from the local polit-
ical elites. Such behaviours though, make it very difficult for others to 
judge intentions and where the boundaries between private initiative and 
Party-state influence might lie, if indeed there are any. Cases like that 
of Guo Wengui make such judgements even harder. The ramifications of 
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IN HIS SEMINAL VOLUME on the en-vironmental history of China, The 
Retreat of the Elephants (2004), Mark 
Elvin characterises the gradual dis-
appearance of China’s elephants as a 
3,000-year war between humans and 
elephants, ending in the final eradi-
cation of the animals from east and 
central China in the Yuan and Ming 
dynasties (between 1271 and 1644). 
Although he notes that ivory carving 
goes back millennia in China, the craft 
did not gain widespread popularity 
until the Ming dynasty, at which point 
elephants only survived in the wilds of 
China’s borders with South-East Asian 
countries.1 
As China is historically, and like-
ly to remain, the largest consumer of 
both legal and illegal elephant ivory, 
conservationists have concentrated 
their efforts there since the 1990s. It 
seems that the war is not over: it has 
simply expanded across the globe. 
However, government efforts to stop 
the trade in poached ivory have accel-
erated in 2016 and 2017 and there is 
some room for optimism.
To great acclaim, China banned 
the sale and carving of ivory in 2017, 
following a similar ban in the United 
States six months earlier. There had 
previously been a number of attempts 
around the world to ban the ivory 
trade, including the 1990 ban under 
the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wildlife Fau-
na and Flora, and the Accra Declara-
tion of 2006 that was signed by nine-
teen African nations. These efforts 
concentrated on African supply, with 
many in China, including the govern-




































ment’s own State Forestry Administra-
tion, arguing that conservation efforts 
should continue to focus on Africa. 
Partly based on the advice of domes-
tic conservationists, such as Zhang Li 
张立 of Beijing Normal University, the 
PRC State Council overruled these ar-
guments and the State Forestry Admin-
istration soon announced the details 
of the ban. By 31 March, sixty-seven 
of the legally operated carving facili-
ties and sales offices were closed, with 
the remaining 105 offices to close by 
the end of 2017.2 However, trade will 
continue in Hong Kong, the largest 
ivory market in the world, facilitating 
China’s black market until the end of 
2021, the date the local government, 
which has autonomy on this issue, has 
decided its stores will be permanently 
shut. These moves to ban ivory accord 
with public sentiments following years 
of campaigning by conservationists 
and celebrities such as Jackie Chan 成
龙, television star Lin Chi-ling 林志玲, 
and basketball player Yao Ming 姚明. 
Although ivory carving has a long 
history in China, it is only in recent 
decades that Chinese consumption 
of ivory surpassed that of Western 
‘Say no to ivory! If there is no market, there is no killing.’ Yao Ming features in a WildAid campaign poster. 
WildAid advertisements are a common sight in China’s airports
Source: WildAid
countries. With affluence came a taste 
for carved ivory. Now that the gov-
ernment has banned the carving and 
trade of elephant ivory, artisans and 
consumers have had to turn to other 
sources. China is not alone in this. For 
hundreds of years, people around the 
world have turned to walrus, narwhal, 
hippopotamus tooth, and mammoth 
ivory as substitutes, although the sup-
ply of these types of ivory also appears 
unable to cope with current demand. 
Many mammoth ivory carving shops 
operate in Guangdong, a centre for 
ivory carving since the 1950s, and 
many carvers sell their work globally 
through Hong Kong.
Products available on Taobao, 
China’s largest online retailer, indicate 
the shift in demand, as well as the new 
regulations. Searches for elephant ivo-
ry no longer offer any results. Searches 
for walrus and narwhal tusks bring a 
few limited results. However, search-
es for mammoth ivory yield tens of 
thousands of results, ranging from 
beads priced at less than one RMB to 
complete mammoth tusks priced at 
RMB100,000 (AU$20,000).    
Many products advertised as 
ivory are, in fact, man-made resin or 
plastic. Good quality synthetic prod-
ucts are increasingly difficult to distin-
guish from the real thing. In Esmond 
Martin and Lucy Vignes’s 2011 report 
on the ivory trade in southern China, 
The Ivory Dynasty, the authors found 
synthetics passed off as real ivory in 
some shops, whether deliberately or 
unintentionally. Mammoth ivory is 
The Hurui Mammoth 
Ivory shop in Manzhouli. 
Situated on the affluent 
China–Soviet Road in 
the affluent border city 
of Manzhouli, this shop 
provides Chinese tourists 
with expensive carvings 
of mammoth ivory 
sourced in Siberia



































particularly difficult to identify, and 
even professional carvers need to 
carefully examine pieces under a mag-
nifying glass, unless the distinctive 
rust-coloured exterior has not been 
removed.
But the use of ivory alternatives 
is necessary, as demand will not dis-
appear. In 2007, the government listed 
ivory carving as an intangible cultural 
heritage. Rediscovering Chinese tradi-
tions and supporting domestic arts are 
extremely important for both the Chi-
nese people and the Party-state, which 
draws on its support and protection 
of tradition to bolster its legitimacy. 
Although the fate of African elephants 
will remain precarious, in 2017 early 
reports indicated a drop in poaching 
due to both the official government 
ban and a Chinese population that is 
increasingly affluent, but also increas-
ingly concerned with conservation 
and the environment.
This 1.84 kg pen or brush holder is advertised on mammothjewelry.com, the website of a Zhuhai-based retailer 








































F OR ALMOST TWO millennia, don-key hide glue (colla corii asini) has 
been part of the Chinese apothecary. 
Ejiao 阿膠, or ‘E-glue’ as this medicine 
is referred to in Chinese, consists of 
gelatin that is extracted from donkey 
hides by boiling them in water. Accord-
ing to traditional Chinese medicine, 
ejiao strengthens blood, stops bleed-
ing, and improves the quality of vital 
fluids. It can be used to restore the 
vigour of depleted patients, or taken 
as a life-enhancing tonic to strength-
en vitality and promote health. Recent 
biomedical clinical trials confirm the 
hematopoietic (blood cell producing) 
effect of donkey hide gelatin.3  
Historical records insist that only 
boiling the skins in water drawn from 
the ‘E Well’ 阿井	in Shandong province 
produces ejiao, and that only skins 
from the black Wu donkey 乌驴 would 
produce top-quality medicinal glue. 
The precinct of the E Well was protect-
ed by imperial armies and E-glue was 
sent annually to the imperial court. 
Thus ejiao remained an expensive re-
gional delicacy that only the wealthy 
could afford. Genuine ejiao was hard 
to get hold of, and fakes were abun-
dant.2 This problem was exacerbat-
ed in the 1990s, when entrepreneurs 
started to mix ejiao with dried fruits, 
nuts, and sesame seeds, marketing it as 
a beauty and wellness booster with an-
ti-ageing and health-promoting prop-
erties. It is now a coveted luxury prod-
uct for ostentatious consumption and 
gift giving, comparable to ginseng or 
expensive tea.
The success of this repackaging 
campaign in China’s age of prosperity 







































Chinese demand could lead to total ex-
tinction within a short time.
The demand for donkey hides 
also creates severe problems for the 
world’s poorest communities, which 
are still heavily dependent on don-
keys as work animals. The spike in 
the market price of donkeys has led to 
an increase in theft and poaching in 
countries such as Tanzania and South 
Africa, with heartbreaking reports of 
farmers or even whole villages wak-
ing up to find the skinned remains of 
their donkeys in a nearby field, after a 
poacher’s strike in the night. 
The increase in the donkeys’ 
market price makes it impossible for 
many families to replace them. This 
has led to exponential growth in the 
consumption of ejiao, with production 
soaring to meet demand.5 As a result, 
China’s donkey population has plum-
meted, falling from 9.4 million to less 
than six million in 2017 (with unveri-
fied reports saying the number is clos-
er to three million).6 With industriali-
sation, fewer donkeys are being raised 
as farm animals in the first place, and 
their sensitivity makes them ill-suited 
for mass breeding.7 So China’s ejiao 
industry depends heavily on import-
ed hides. Currently 1.8 million donkey 
hides are traded globally every year, 
with demand estimated at between 
four and ten million.8 With only around 
forty-four million donkeys worldwide, 
Ejiao wellness cake gift box 
Source: ebuy7.com/item/
ehhebdeghcif 
leads to financial ruin: their children 
can no longer go to school, and they 
can no longer easily fetch drinking 
water or transport firewood.9 In an 
attempt to protect local economies, a 
number of countries including Ugan-
da, Tanzania, Botswana, Niger, Bur-
kina Faso, Mali, Senegal, and Nigeria 
have already banned donkey exports 
to China.10 Others, such as Kenya, 
attracted by the high returns of the 
donkey trade, have allowed Chinese 
investment in state-sanctioned donkey 
slaughterhouses. The profits of this 
questionable trade benefit few, and 
devastate many.11 Donkeys that are 
traded for their hides are also often 
poorly looked after — or even starved 
to death — during gruelling long-dis-
tance live transports, or while waiting 
for slaughter: the market value of a 
hide is not affected by the poor health 
of the donkey that used to live inside it.
Even Chinese medicine is a victim, 
rather than a culprit of this excessive 
ejiao consumption. As the price of ejiao 
goes up, fewer and fewer patients can 
afford or obtain genuine ejiao when 
they need it. Instead, they are being 
fobbed off with wellness candies that 
have no medical efficacy.
In their quest to overcome the 
shortage of donkey skins, China’s 
ejiao investors have set their eyes on 
Australia. In 2004, Australia had an 
estimated population of five million 
feral donkeys concentrated in the arid 
regions of the country’s centre.12 They 
are the descendants of the finest don-
key breeds of the world, imported by 
early settlers from Spain, Chile, Mex-
ico, and India. The earliest donkeys 
Worldwide supply and demand for donkeys






































arrived in Australia in 1794, but it was 
not until the 1890s that they began 
to play a key role in opening up the 
outback. Essentially a desert animal, 
donkeys are more resistant to drought, 
heat, and toxic plants than horses. 
‘Teamster donkeys’, harnessed four to 
five abreast in teams of up to forty an-
imals, transported wood, food, mining 
supplies, and wool across the country. 
Their hardiness, docility, and ability to 
haul heavy loads made them indispen-
sable for developing the colonies.
In the 1930s, mechanised trans-
port made the teamster obsolete. 
Teamsters, not wanting to kill their 
former work animals, simply released 
them into the wild. The donkeys 
thrived and multiplied to such an ex-
tent that they were soon considered to 
pose a problem for the arid soil, and 
were declared a pest in the Northern 
Territory as early as 1949.
The view that donkeys are a pest 
is shared by the agribusiness sector. 
In March 2017, the then minister for 
agriculture Barnaby Joyce announced 
his intention to make the export of 
donkey skin part of a bilateral trade 
deal: ‘We are going to make sure that 
if you want to eat edible donkey skins 
then you are going to be eating our ed-
ible donkey skins’.13 Several months 
later, Northern Territory Minister 
for Primary Industries and Resourc-
es Ken Vowles visited China’s largest 
ejiao processing factory, Dong E Ejiao, 
in Shandong.  
Other Australians feel strong at-
tachment to the ‘beautiful Australian 
bush donkey’ that has become an inte-
gral part of the Australian landscape. 
Fortunately, live exports are off the 
table for the time being. But a multi- 
species abattoir is being built in Char-
leville, Queensland and mustering of 
feral donkeys has started in the Anangu 
Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Terri-
Donkeys are often poorly looked after or die during 
live transport 
Source: George Knowles Hong Kong georgeeknowles@
yahoo.com
tories in Southern Australia. Despite 
the pleas of animal rights activists to 
the Australian Government not to feed 
into a globally destructive trade, Aus-
tralia has effectively already become 
an exporter of donkey skins.
Granted, the media images of 
donkey abbattoirs are gruesome, but 
the same goes for slaughterhouses for 
cattle or pigs. Since the number of Aus-
tralian donkeys is already controlled 
by aerial culling, one might argue that 
this way at least their skin goes to use. 
Yet the scale of the trade, which threat-
ens global extinction of a whole spe-
cies, is devastating rural communities 
Teamster donkeys at work, ca. 1928 
Source: State Library of Western Australia 4383B/323
worldwide, and lacks any form of leg-
islation and control. 
This raises legitimate questions 
about ethics and sustainability for any 
country involved in the skin trade, in-
cluding Australia. Historically, ejiao 
was a regional delicacy, a ‘medicine 
for emperors’; today it is a wellness 
candy, mass-produced for conspicu-
ous consumption by the affluent, an 
ever-expanding part of China’s vast 
population. Yet natural resources are 
finite and delicacies by definition can-
not be mass produced. No matter how 
wealthy a society becomes, not every-














































D URING THE LAST THREE months of 2017, Qantas passengers may 
have discovered a second inflight mag-
azine in their seat pockets, published 
entirely in simplified Chinese. Aimed 
at high-spending travellers, the special 
edition included a list of Australia’s 
seven most ‘extreme-luxe’ experiences 
and a sampling of specialised itinerar-
ies (such as food and wine and the out-
back). This special edition was the third 
of its kind since late 2016 and was also 
distributed to select five-star and bou-
tique hotels in Sydney, Melbourne, and 
Adelaide. The pitch to advertisers noted 
that Chinese travellers spend eighty per 
cent of their luxury dollars overseas.
Chinese citizens take about 122 
million trips abroad each year, includ-
ing to Hong Kong and Macao. That num-
ber is growing. They already splurge 
more on overseas travel than citizens 
of the United States — a sum expected 
to double within three years to US$422 
billion.14 The two million Chinese vis-
itors to Paris in 2016 alone dropped 
one billion euros into French coffers. 
After the Eiffel Tower, Chinese tourists 
tend to head straight for the luxurious 
department store Galeries Lafayette, 
which has now opened a dedicated 
annex with Mandarin-speaking sales 
staff: the 4,200 square-metre Shopping 
and Welcome Center. Galeries Lafay-
ette even accepts WeChat Pay; its rival 
Printemps has been taking Alipay since 
last November. Marriott hotels plan 
to accept Alipay. UnionPay is now just 
about everywhere — France is one of 
160 countries and regions worldwide 
where shops and ATMs accept China’s 
answer to Visa and Mastercard. 
H E Y  B I G  S P E N D E R :  C H I N A’ S 















































The Hurun Report’s The Chinese 
Luxury Traveller 2017 says that the av-
erage Chinese traveller shells out about 
US$3,000 for an overseas trip. That is 
less than what the typical Chinese luxu-
ry traveller lavishes on just five days of 
accommodation. The uber-luxe Aman 
resorts now rank among wealthy Chi-
nese travellers’ top-ten favourite places 
to stay. 
According to Hurun, the average 
luxury traveller from China dedicates 
about twenty-two per cent of the ‘fam-
ily consumption budget’ to travel — or 
about 380,000 yuan (nearly US$57,000), 
of which about 220,000 yuan (nearly 
US$33,000) goes to shopping. The Jing 
Daily reported that when the British 
artists Jake and Dinos Chapman collab-
orated with Luis Vuitton to produce lim-
ited-edition items for the brand’s 2017 
spring/summer menswear collection, 
they sold out in Paris within days, most-
ly snapped up by young Chinese. The 
Jing Daily also quotes the store manager 
at Chanel Beauty on the Champs-Elysées 
as saying ‘Young Chinese customers of-
ten ask me how many products we have 
left in a particular style. If it’s the last 
one, they buy it immediately.’15
Yet trends are changing fast. Just 
a year ago two-thirds of Chinese trav-
ellers surveyed by Hotels.com and 
Outside the Louis Vuitton shop in the Galeries Lafayette, Paris
Photo: mengzy, Flickr
global market research firm Ipsos cit-
ed shopping as their main reason for 
travelling. This year, only one-third 
said they travelled mainly to shop, with 
fine dining and experiences now top-
ping their list of priorities.16 Wealthy 
Chinese travellers prefer independent, 
customised itineraries to group travel. 
And, according to The Hurun Report, 
they are adventurous, too. Up to one 
out of three tourists to the Arctic and 
Antarctic are likely to be Chinese, with 
such trips costing somewhere between 
US$29,000 and US$120,000.17 Chinese 
interest in upmarket cruising is also 
growing, with industry predictions that 
by 2030, the Chinese market for cruis-
es will be the biggest in the world. In 
2017, both the Norwegian Cruise Line 
and Princess Cruises custom-built new 
ships with Chinese tourists in mind. 
However, one luxury travel 
trend looks like it might be on the 
downswing: the ‘propiday’ 房产假期 
(property-buying holiday). The Chi-
nese government’s latest restrictions 
on capital outflow and debt threaten 
to take the shine off what Australia’s 
real estate agents call the industry’s 
‘golden weeks’: the Chinese Lunar 
New Year and National Day holidays. 
Meanwhile, new rules introduced as 
part of a crackdown on money laun-
dering require Chinese banks to report 
any overseas transactions exceeding 
US$150 a day. That does not even buy a 






















































MAGIC CITIES, FUTURE DREAMS —  
URBAN CONTRADICTIONS 
Carolyn Cartier
The magic of Shanghai Pudong
Source: Wikimedia 
ON 1 APRIL 2017, the Chinese Communist Party 
Central Committee and the State Council announced 
the establishment of Xiongan New Area 雄安新区	in 
southern Hebei province, on the historic periphery 
of the Beijing capital region. Despite the anodyne 
category of its name, ‘new area’ or xinqu 新区, it is 
a significant event in the history of China’s urban 
development. The nondescript phrase ‘new area’ 
suggests the magic of Shanghai Pudong, with its 
super-tall financial centre, expansive cultural 
facilities, glittery Oriental Pearl Tower, maglev 
airport train, and Shanghai Disneyland. Pudong, 
the original national-level New Area, rose from 
the eastern bank of the Huangpu River to become 
one of the most successful and spectacular urban 





















































The term New Area is also China’s development-planning language for 
a higher standard of ‘special zone’ 特区, one whose conditions will surpass 
those of the historic special economic zones led by Shenzhen in the 1980s. 
China’s leadership chose the term ‘New Area’ to distinguish Pudong from 
the early manufacturing zones like Shenzhen.1 A New Area has high-tech-
nology industry, a green urban environment, and a spectrum of leisure 
and consumer opportunities. It is a ‘creative city’ with good schools, well 
served by public transportation and connected to regional inter-urban rail 
lines as well as the latest style and standard in high-rise housing, offering 
investors the possibility of making a fortune in real estate. Xiongan is the 
nineteenth state-level New Area but it is also the most important New Area 
since Pudong.
‘No one had ever heard of Xiongan,’ The Economist observed, yet now 
‘it’s the most talked-about place in China.’2 A Google search cannot retrieve 
it on the map of Hebei province — because it does not yet exist on the map. 
Xiongan is a new name for a new administrative division. It merges three 
historic counties — Anxin 安新, Rongcheng 荣成, and Xiongxian 雄县 — by 
abolishing their governments and combining them to establish a new ter-
ritory that will be jointly governed by the Hebei Province Party Committee 
in Shijiazhuang, the provincial capital, the Jing-Jin-Ji Cooperative Develop-
Location of the Xiongan New Area in Hebei province
Image: Wikipedia
ment Leading Small Group, and the State Council. Xiongan combines words 
from Xiongxian and Anxin to form a new place name. Its simplest literal 
translation is ‘powerful peace’. But the word xiong has mutliple meanings in 
history, including male, chieftan, hero, victory, grand, imposing, bold, and 
unconstrained. Named for the Xi Jinping era, Xiongan is the latest example 
of how China changes its subnational territory to establish new cities in a 
process of planned uneven development. 
Xiongan is the focus of a long-term Chinese central government plan 
to redistribute the population and economy from Beijing to surrounding 
areas. The equivalent in Australia would be if Canberra was the size of Bris-
bane, Melbourne, and Sydney combined, and then grew beyond its resource 
limits and the government responded by building an ‘overflow’ city at a 
distance in an adjacent state. Located in the region of Beijing, but not in Bei-
jing, Xiongan is a new city for Beijing. The central government introduced 
new plans for the capital region (as discussed in the China Story Yearbook 
2015), in response to evidence that Beijing had already breached its planned 
growth limits. Its water supply is insufficient for continued population and 
industrial growth. The 2004–2020 Beijing Urban Master Plan projected a 
maximum population of eighteen million, but by 2016 Beijing was home to 
Location of the Xiongan 























































21.5 million. Now the Bei-
jing 2016–2030 plan aims 
to limit the population to 
twenty-three million. To 
alleviate the problems, the 
central government has 
decreed that ‘non-capital 
functions’ 非首都功能, un-
related to Beijing’s status 
of national capital, will be 
relocated outside the city. 
The main solution is the 
Xiongan New Area. 
Construct! 
China debuted the economic development model of production-led 
growth, based on state investment in construction and land development, 
in the 1980s, with China’s opening to the world economy. Xinhua, the state 
news agency, has described Xiongan as a historically strategic decision 
for the Chinese Communist Party that follows in the path of the Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone — the leading development area of the 1980s — 
and the Shanghai Pudong New Area in the 1990s.3 This official discourse 
works in two ways. Just as Shenzhen represents the Deng Xiaoping era 
and Pudong that of Jiang Zemin, Xiongan New Area is a symbol of the core 
leadership of Xi Jinping. 
Internationally, publicity about the construction of Xiongan contin-
ues the practice that economist Barry Naughton describes as ‘signalling’: 
communicating to world markets that China is in the business of economic 
growth.4 International investment firms calculate that the state will invest 
between two and four trillion yuan (US$290–580 billion) over the next fif-
teen to twenty years in Xiongan. This is good news for China’s steel pro-
duction, which, coincidentally, is concentrated in Hebei province. From 
Main cities of the capital region
Image: people.cn
an initial one hundred square kilometres, Xiongan will expand to 2,000 
square kilometres by 2050. Official publicity calls it a ‘great plan for the 
millennium and a major state project’ 千年大计, 国家大事. 
Environmentally Speaking
Compared to Beijing, Xiongan has ample water resources, at least in the-
ory. Party-state propaganda describes Xiongan’s ‘relatively clean natural 
environment’ including the ‘largest freshwater lake’ in the North China 
Plain. The echo chamber of official media describes the area as ‘ecological-
ly healthy’ because it includes the ‘freshwater lake’ of Baiyangdian, which 
lies at the centre of former Anxin county. Scientific reports about Baiyang-
dian tell a different story. 
Baiyangdian is an inland wetland ecosystem that expands and con-
tracts with the rainy season, the flow of the Hai River that feeds it, and 
the vagaries of the water table. A dian 淀	is a shallow lake emerging in a 
seasonal wetland or marsh. Marshes in China, as elsewhere, were histor-
Map of the administrative division of Anxin county





















































ically treated as swamps and classified as wasteland. Now, however, Bai-
yangdian is recognised as the natural ‘kidney of north China’ for filtering 
the waters of the Hai River and providing habitat for migratory birds in 
the Asian flyway.
The problem is that over the past four decades, Baiyangdian’s ephem-
eral meres and ponds have shrunk by up to one-half of their historic area.5 
More than one hundred dams have been built upriver on the Hai and 
its tributaries for flood control, hydropower, and reservoirs. Significant 
amounts of water are drawn off by industry including by small-scale plas-
tics factories in the area. From 1983 to 1988 Baiyangdian was dry. Since 
the 1950s, annual rainfall has dropped nearly twenty per cent and aver-
age temperature has risen 2.5 degrees centigrade while population has 
doubled. Local farmers have reclaimed former shorelines and extracted 
groundwater for irrigation. And today, like so much water elsewhere in 
China, the marsh has become heavily polluted from local and upstream 
sources. A 2012 Chinese government report found water pollution worse 
Map of the river system of Baiyangdian showing the relationship between the three counties 
Source: Li, Aiguo (李爱国), Baiyangdian Annals (白洋淀志), (中国书店, 1966) 
than grade five or too toxic to touch.6 The Chinese government has sepa-
rately announced a ten-year effort to clean up Baiyangdian, but a reliable 
restoration will take much longer. Only with central government support 
is the Baiyangdian ecosystem likely to be restored. 
Real Estate Fever
The economic transformation of China is a story of industrialisation and 
urbanisation; production and consumption. The processes are mirror 
images. Industrialisation, clawing minerals from the earth to produce ce-
ment and steel for construction, creates the vertical environment of build-
ings and bridges. Urbanisation, meanwhile, paves over natural areas and 
historic places, propels domestic growth, and engages citizens in unprec-
edented levels of consumerism. Since the 1980s, as hundreds of millions 
of people in China have become urban citizens for the first time, their 
dreams for the future are inextricably entwined with the construction of 
cities and the development of new forms of housing for urban lifestyles. 
The Chinese government depends on its citizens to consume the housing 
that it produces, which, in turn, contributes significantly to GDP growth. 
On 23 February 2017, Xi Jinping himself chaired a Xiongan planning 
meeting in Anxi county, the ‘an’ of Xiongan.7 The rush was on: the fantasy 
of real estate prices that could increase ten- or twenty-fold, virtually over-
night, drew an early wave of investors. Local journalists reported a surge 
of cars with out-of-area license plates. But like insider trading in the stock 
market, advance buy-up of real estate skews the market. It contributes to 
the problems of unaffordable housing and socioeconomic inequality that 
Xi, at the Nineteenth Party Congress, would pledge the Party to address. So 
the government changed tack, placing a moratorium on private real estate 
transactions in Xiongan in early April. 
Investors then sought to follow state-owned enterprises into former 





















































government. More than 
sixty enterprises arrived, 
leasing more than twen-
ty per cent of available 
rental housing. Sale and 
rental prices quadrupled. 
In response, on 3 April, 
local governments in the 
former Anxin, Rongcheng, 
and Xiongxian counties 
held an emergency meet-
ing, at which they decided to freeze property market transactions.8 These 
included closing the doors on the sales offices of new property develop-
ments and formal and informal property agencies, and banning sales in 
the secondary housing market — that is, preventing existing owners from 
selling up. In response to announcements published by The Housing and 
Urban Construction Bureau, buyers, sellers, and brokers congregated out-
side shuttered property offices, conducting their own informal arrange-
ments. Public security arrived and made arrests to demonstrate the ban 
was a serious one. Government-controlled rental agencies took over.9 
Local governments also introduced new controls over the right to 
residency in the New Area. Determining who is a ‘local’, and who is en-
titled to an official resident permit, or hukou 户口, in any city in China 
can be a complex procedure. Policies can change in step with local politi-
cal-economic plans and targets. Staff of the former Xiongxian government 
reported that local hukou quota and temporary migrant worker permits 
had been frozen in advance, in 2016, to prevent a flood of workers from 
outside the area.10 In the first week of April, the government suspended 
processing marriage dissolution applications because ‘single’ people can 
each buy one house.11 The new controls also affected local people who had 
moved away temporarily for work, military service, or education. With 
their hukou status ‘frozen’ 冻结, they found themselves cut off from home. 
People congregating outside shuttered real estate offices
Photo: Cui Meng, Global Times
The Xiongan plan, based on government acquisition of farmland and 
the resettlement of farmers, is always a sensitive issue. In September 2017, 
the first land compensation contracts were signed with 240 village house-
holds for a 1000 mu (66.7 ha) development site.12 Some local villages traced 
their history back to the Ming dynasty (1644–1911); they had been on alert 
since receiving orders at the end of 2016 to suspend planting. The plan 
mandates land in the Xiongan New Area be treated as a ‘security zone’ 
so that it can serve as ‘a blank slate’ 一张白纸.13 To block new land devel-
opment, and prevent expansion of or additions to existing housing, local 
governments set up checkpoints at the entrances to villages in order to 
intercept construction materials. The reason people may be tempted to ex-
pand homes slated for demolition is that when local residents are required 
to move for state development projects, the size of their existing housing 
determines the amount of compensation. 
Building Cities for Beijing
Like Beijing in the urbanising North China Plain, the world’s largest cities 
typically form city-regions. Yet the difference in China is territorial ad-
ministration based on Party governance of administrative areas.14 Three 
administrative divisions form the capital region of China: Beijing, Tian-
jin, and Hebei, known as Jing-Jin-Ji. (See the China Story Yearbook 2015: 
Pollution, Chapter 5 ‘The City That Ate China — Restructuring & Reviving 
Beijing’, pp.179–201.) Beijing and Tianjin are large ‘province-level cities’ in 
China’s administrative system. Hebei is a province, which forms a collar 
around Beijing to the north, south, and west. In this system, attempts to 
solve developmental problems, like hazardous air pollution, water short-
ages, overcrowding, traffic congestion, and high housing costs, necessari-
ly take place through reforms enacted by governments of administrative 
areas. But when policy reforms — such as the Beijing Urban Master Plan 





















































government steps in to assess how changing administrative divisions can 
address the problems. 
Establishing Xiongan within Jing-Jin-Ji to relocate people, industry, 
and institutions also has a partner city in the process. Thirty kilometres 
east of central Beijing lies Tongzhou, the site of relocation of the Beijing 
municipal government (see the China Story Yearbook 2015: Pollution, 
Chapter 5 ‘The City That Ate China — Restructuring & Reviving Beijing’, 
pp.196–199.) The government of the city of Beijing is departing the centre 
of Beijing! The combination of Xiongan, to the south-west and Tongzhou 
to the east should relieve Beijing of some of its congestion, and with it, en-
vironmental stress, leaving the historic centre of the capital to the central 
organs of Party and state and institutions that serve the central govern-
ment officials, including high-ranking research institutes and hospitals. 
The plan projects a future Beijing as a consummately civilised centre of 
state and society, decorated by historic sites and monuments. 
Beyond that, the basis for deciding who and what will stay in Beijing 
is not clearly defined, but the term ‘non-capital function’ has come into 
use to indicate organisations that will be obliged to move, with their per-
sonnel, to outlying areas. The Minister of the National Development and 
Reform Commission, He Lifeng 何立峰,	has identified ‘the root’ of Beijing’s 
problems is in its ‘having taken on too many non-capital functions’.15 In 
addition to the municipal government, non-capital functions include state-
owned enterprises, wholesale markets, financial institutions, and some 
hospitals, colleges, and research centres — any of whose activities are 
not ‘core’ functions of the capital. Plans also include the decanting of the 
elderly population into hospital-run, relatively low-cost nursing homes in 
surrounding areas.16 Meanwhile, historic Beijing is set to become the core 
city for the core leadership. 
The future of Beijing is thus inextricably tied to Hebei province. 
Yet Hebei has historically been less developed than Beijing and Tian-
jin, with numerous relatively impoverished areas. Support for He-
bei’s development is evident in, among other things, the plan for 
the 2022 Winter Olympics: Zhangjiakou 
张家口, in northern Hebei, is one of the 
main sites. Shifting Beijing’s non-capital 
functions to Hebei will also increase in-
vestment in the region and improve socio- 
economic conditions, in the process redraw-
ing the economic map of the capital region. 
The plan seeks to integrate and balance the 
city-region by linking Hebei, via Xiongan, 
to Beijing. Similar to the new ‘metropolises’ 
of Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou and Shenzhen-Guanghzou-Zhuhai, Jing- 
Jin-Ji region is to become a ‘world-class metropolitan area’.
Xiongan New Area is situated between major cities. The planned high-
speed rail system promises residents of Xiongan a thirty-minute commute 
to Beijing, Tianjin, or Shijiazhuang. Xiongan is also in sightlines of the new 
Beijing Daxing International Airport under construction forty-six kilo-
metres south of Beijing. With Beijing International reaching full capacity, 
this is another way that Hebei is providing a major ‘capital function’ for 
the region. 
What is left unspoken is the difficulty of persuading residents of the 
great capital to relocate. Plan narratives follow a predictable pattern: offi-
cial announcement, resounding confirmation in domestic media, followed 
by repetitive circulation in the international press (selectively reported 
back in Chinese media to reinforce the domestic message). Periodic re-
ports of ‘progress’, ‘advancement’, and ‘speeding up the construction’ help 
maintain a sense of pace. Such publicity also aims to persuade people to 
do their part. The Party-state needs to keep the narrative unblemished, 
entraining the interests of all parties, domestic and international. It scrubs 
alternative views from the Internet and other forums — but not always 
before they have attracted attention.
On 23 July 2017, a blogger writing under the pseudonym Zhang Wu-























































‘Beijing has 20 million people pretending to live here’. It quickly went vi-
ral. ‘For ten years,’ Zhang wrote, ‘Beijing has been controlling housing, 
controlling traffic, and controlling the population.’ New controls for the 
‘world-class city’ include closing down the neighbourhood shops and 
restaurants that made Beijing a liveable city (see Information Window 
above). The idea that people are dispirited, only ‘pretending to live’ in 
Beijing, challenges the official narrative. Zhang continues in his sardonic 
vein, ‘Beijing is a tumour, and no one can control how fast it is growing. … 
Beijing is a believer, and only Xiongan can bring salvation’.17  
‘HOLES-IN-THE-WALL’ 
by Zhang Yichi
One morning in March 2017, 
builders began bricking up the 
entrance of a restaurant in 
Shetan Backstreet 沙滩后街, 
east of Jingshan Park 景山公园, 
the historic centre of Beijing. 
Soon, the brick wall sealed off 
the whole restaurant and the 
owner was forced to close his 
business. Over the following two 
weeks, sixty-one storefronts on 
this 323-metre-long street were 
sealed up as part of a campaign to clean up ‘hole-in-the-wall’ businesses 开墙破洞 through-
out the city. 
In the beginning of 2017, the Beijing Municipal Government launched a three-year  
project on the urban landscape to ‘alleviate, renovate, and hasten improvement’ 疏解整治促
提升. The goal was to disperse activities and enterprises not related to the city’s function as 
a national capital. Eliminating holes-in-the-wall was intended to help ‘beautify’ the streets, 
with the municipal government planning to clean up around sixteen thousand ‘holes-in-
the-wall’ in 2017.
Hole-in-the-wall storefronts came about as the result of the urban evolution of Bei-
jing. From the early 1990s, some residents, as well as dislocated workers, converted their 
dwellings into storefronts by making a hole in the wall. These businesses provided many 
of the daily requirements of local residents: groceries, tobacco, jianbing 煎饼 (Beijing-style 
crepes), and traditional staples such as steamed breads and sesame buns. They also served 
as barbershops, nail salons, breakfast restaurants, acupressure massage places, bars, and 
so forth — filling a gap in urban planning and adding convenience to everyday life. 
A ‘Hole in the Wall’ due for demolition (拆)
Photo: Marco Verch, Flickr
Despite their popularity, these storefronts occupied a legal grey zone, sometimes clearly 
violating planning and hygiene laws, and the city authorities saw them as eyesores. Some 
encroached onto streets, occupying public spaces, and the construction of others affected 
the integrity of existing building structures, harmed heritage architecture or created fire 
dangers. Local governments have been attempting to regulate these storefronts since 2012: 
the district governments of Chaoyang 朝阳 and Dongcheng 东城 bricked up 2,560 and 357 
storefronts respectively between 2014 and 2016.
But this campaign is not just about beautifying the city and eliminating potential safety 
hazards. These storefronts constitute low-end industries and most of their current opera-
tors are migrants from the provinces. The authorities hope that by closing their businesses, 
people will have to move out of Beijing, relieving population pressure in the capital. Accord-
ing to the Beijing Urban Master Plan (2004–2020) , the size of Beijing’s population was to be 
stabilised at around eighteen million by 2020. However, the city’s population reached 19.61 
million in 2011, according to official census figures, endangering the success of the master 
plan. So, at the start of the year, the government closed down migrant-dominated wholesale 
markets and followed up by closing hole-in-the wall shopfronts. 
As expected, this clean-up did force some migrants from Beijing. But it has been incon-
venient for local residents, who can no longer obtain daily necessities from nearby vendors. 
Furthermore, the demolition was carried out in such haste that they left patches of bricked-
up walls that are eyesores in themselves. 
The root of this conflict is the growing contradiction between ideas about how Beijing 
should function as a city. On the one hand, Beijing is the national capital, the political centre 
of China, and the home of national institutions from the National People’s Congress that 
meets in the Great Hall of the People to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. It is also a 
centre of learning, home to some of China’s most famous universities, including Peking Uni-
versity and Tsinghua. On the other hand, Beijing, like any city, needs low-end industries and 
residential services. As urban planners tussle with these competing needs, the residents 
of Beijing just have to live with inconvenience as they see their favourite holes-in-the-wall 
disappear one by one.  
One of Xi Jinping’s main themes is the China Dream. But, Zhang writes, 
that those who are truly pursuing their dreams are ‘escaping’ to Australia, 
New Zealand, and the West Coast of the United States. Others have ‘lost hope 
of chasing their dreams’ entirely. State media denounced the blog post, even 
as censors removed it from sight. Netizens countered that they were sick of 
all the stress on ‘dreams’ when their reality was economic hardship and so-
cial inequality.18 Xiongan is but the latest repository of the Party-state’s offi-
cial ‘dreams’. In reality, Xiongan represents a new case of how China chang-





















































The Xiongan Future 
Popular writing on China often modifies the word ‘city’ with terms includ-
ing ‘mega-’, ‘ghost’, and ‘global’ in attempt to capture the size, scale, and 
mystery of their conditions. The announcement of a new ‘zone’ or ‘area’ 
sets off a frenzy of friendly media stories about China’s latest mega-pro-
ject. But the media rally around a project such as Xiongan, a veritable cam-
paign, masks the realities of local conditions. 
Although official media rhetoric likens Xiongan New Area to Shen-
zhen and Pudong — the latter two have different origins, conditions, func-
tions, and goals. Shenzhen was Deng Xiaoping’s first showcase for eco-
nomic reform. Pudong was Jiang Zemin’s flagship project. Xiongan is Xi 
Jinping’s signature project, but unlike the other two it is a project directly 
guided by the CCP Central Committee. This is first time that a ‘New Area’ 
has been officially aligned with the Central Committee. The governing re-
lations over Xiongan heighten its political importance and lend support to 
its economic development.
As Politburo member and Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli 张高丽 explained 
in an interview with Xinhua News Agency, the state media: 
The establishment of Xiongan New Area is a major decision made by 
the Party Central Committee led by General Secretary Xi Jinping, the 
core [of the Party]… This project, personally designed, planned, and 
put forward by Xi, fully reflects the strong mission, far-reaching stra-
tegic vision, and superb political wisdom of Xi, who devoted a lot of 
effort to the project … Since the 18th Party Congress … General Secre-
tary Xi has been deeply involved in the investigation and study of the 
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, and has presided over multiple meetings 
...  In each and every stage of the decision-making, General Secretary 
Xi presided over every important meeting, made important instruc-
tions, and assigned every task personally.19 
Whether Xiongan New Area, Pudong New Area, or Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone, all ‘zones’, ‘areas’, or ‘districts’ remain administrative divi-
sions in China’s system of subnational territory. They may be ‘special’ but 
they are not are exceptional: they are not separate from the system — they 
are basic to it. Shenzhen was a swath of farmland along the Hong Kong 
boundary, and Pudong was farmland on the outskirts of Shanghai, origi-
nally less than half its present size. As their economies grew, the Party-state 
approved their territorial expansion. Xiongan, by comparison, starts off 
encompassing three counties and envisions its future. 
Conclusion
Xiongan is a key piece of the puzzle of Beijing’s integration with surround-
ing Hebei province and the port city of Tianjin. In September 2017, the 
Xiongan New Area management committee approved its first group of 
companies: fourteen information technology firms, fifteen finance com-
panies, five green technology firms, and seven research institutes. They 
include Alibaba, Baidu, China Mobile, China Telecom, Jingdong Finance, 
360 Qihoo, Shenzhen Kuang-Chi, Tencent, and the People’s Insurance 
Company. Nineteen are central state enterprises, led by the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Committee — the economic arm of 
the State Council.20 Represented by leading state firms, the development 
of Xiongan departs from the market-based evolution of Shenzhen capi-
talised by Hong Kong industry. In planning theory, Xiongan is a ‘growth 
pole’ from which a new sub-regional economy will radiate, at the centre 
of a ‘transportation circle’, networking the old and new cities of Hebei, 
through development of advanced industries, to the larger capital region. 
Xiongan’s growth will be led by state investment. Xiongan, a semi-ru-
ral area with relatively low population density, lets the government keep 
land compensation and relocation costs at a minimum. Like other prefer-
ential development areas, it has access to significant central government 





















































of getting rich quick. Yet unlike Shenzhen and Shanghai, Xiongan does 
not share a border with a dynamic developed city: it cannot benefit from 
direct ‘spillover’ effects. Xiongan also takes a different approach to the 
dream, by imposing strict controls on property, residential permits, and 
company investment. Xiongan is an unprecedented high-level political 
DOCKLESS BIKE, REGULATED CITY, by Gao Yu 
In April 2016, a new type of shared bicycle, the dockless or stationless bike, appeared on the 
streets of China’s major cities. Use requires downloading a smartphone app and then using 
the app to find, unlock (and later) lock the bike, paying via e-pay. They are very cheap — 
between five jiao to one yuan per half hour. Compared to the shared bike systems in Euro-
pean cities, which require the return of bicycles to a dock or station, dockless bikes offer 
flexibility and accessibility. The GPS in the electronic lock indicates the location of the bike, 
and users can park them almost anywhere. 
In Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, the number of share bikes has risen 
quickly to about one million in each city, and numbers are growing in many second-tier 
cities as well. Within a year the bikes have attracted more than seventy million users. Mo-
bike is the largest operator among more than thirty bike-share companies competing in the 
Chinese market. Headquartered in Beijing, it received more than one billion US dollars in 
investment from local and overseas venture capital firms.21  
In 2016, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and Ministry of 
Transportation proposed the ‘Scheme for Advancing Internet and Convenient Transporta-
tion and Accelerating Smart Transportation Development’, as part of the national blueprint 
for transportation development. Based on the principles of transport being ‘innovative, co-
operative, green, open and shared’, dockless bikes are a perfect fit for the scheme. In a 2017 
report on the Scheme, the NDRC designated a specific function for dockless bikes to fill the 
gap in the ‘last-one-kilometre’ of the transportation system.22 This function is being met 
according to Mobike’s data, which shows that in Beijing, eighty-one per cent of its dockless 
bikes are activated around bus stops and forty-four per cent between metro stations, with 
similar figures for Shanghai as well.23  
Millions of dockless bikes in use across China demonstrate the success of this new com-
mercial mode of bike sharing. Yet the excitement of novelty and convenience has gone hand 
in hand with worries about safety and the potential for chaos in the cities. People can ride 
the bikes anywhere, including on walkways, and neither lights nor helmets are required. 
An eleven-year-old was hit and killed by a bus while riding a dockless bike that he had sto-
len on a busy road in Shanghai in 2017. His parents sued the bike’s company, demanding  
RMB8million (approximately AU$1.5 million) compensation, alleging the bikes are too easy 
to unlock. The bikes have also led to other sorts of problems. On a long weekend in Shen-
zhen, for example, people randomly parked the dockless bikes along the beach walk, block-
ing the seashore and creating serious congestion (see photo). In other cities, broken bikes 
pile up like mountains, damaging the ‘civilised landscape’ 文明城市形象. Others have been 
destroyed or stolen, found in rivers or stashed in trees.     
City governments have already taken action in response to these problems. In August 
2017, twelve municipal governments, including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shen-
zhen, strictly banned companies from adding to the existing stock of dockless bikes. This 
regulation is not new or exclusive to dockless bikes. Since the 1980s, many municipal gov-
ernments have banned motorcycles in cities due to concerns both for safety and their 
contribution to air pollution. Dockless bikes provide local transport in some cities where 
electrobikes 电动车	are also banned, as in Guangzhou and Shenzhen. As the main mode of 
point-to-point urban transportation, dockless bikes are likely to be subject to further regu-
lations and controls in the future.
Despite these challenges, Mobike has already become an international firm, expanding 
its operations to Singapore, Manchester, Florence, Milan, Bangkok, Sapporo, and London. 
The success of the smartphone-linked dockless bikes in China has motivated other compa-
nies around the world to enter the market. A Singaporean company called Obike launched 
dockless bikes in Melbourne in June 2017. The same month, Chinese entrepreneur Donald 
Tang, a graduate of the University of Technology, Sydney, imported 160 dockless bikes from 
China, established a dockless bike company called Reddy Go, and planned to have 6,000 
bikes in Sydney by Christmas 2017. Controversies, similar to those in Chinese cities around 
abandoned and carelessly parked bikes are simmering, but have not halted the march of 




project, with no timetable for completion, but it has not demonstrated the 
next step in market-led reform. Whether Xiongan succeeds, ‘depends on 
how big the efforts, how firm the resolution and how forceful the monitor-
ing mechanism can be’. Given that Xi Jinping is so personally invested in 





































YOU CAN’T TAKE IT WITH 
YOU
To Give is Glorious 
·  PAUL J .  FARRELLY 
The Psycho Boom 
· HUANG HSUAN-YING
Doing Well, Dying Well 




















































DECADES OF RAPID economic growth have spurred the devel-
opment of philanthropy in China. Rec-
ognising this, since 2005 the Ministry 
of Civil Affairs has held a prestigious 
annual charity award to celebrate the 
philanthropic achievements of entre-
preneurs, government officials, and 
others working in the sector. Some 
philanthropists are motivated by tax 
advantages or to transfer corporate 
funds as a business strategy; some 
do it to strengthen their reputation; 
and some even out of altruism. It is 
such a prominent and dynamic trend 
that the Harvard Kennedy School Ash 
Center for Democratic Governance 
and Innovation collaborated with the 
Institute for Philanthropy at Tsinghua 
University to examine Chinese phi-
lanthropy’s social, political, and legal 
implications, producing the report 
Values and Vision: Perspectives on 
Philanthropy in 21st Century China in 
May 2017.1  
Responding to the growth of phi-
lanthropy, the government has imple-
mented new legislation. Effective on 
1 September 2016, the Charity Law 
deals with establishing, registering, 
and regulating charitable organisa-
tions. This reflects the need to strength-
en legal supervision and governance; 
several high-profile scandals, involv-
ing the Chinese Red Cross, among oth-
er organisations, have highlighted the 
need to prevent the misuse of funds.2 
There is also the problem of ‘tunnel-
ling’ — inappropriate profiteering 
whereby the controller of a charity di-
rects donations back to himself. Under 
the new system, once appropriately 





































the study tended to focus their efforts 
on single issues, with education the 
most popular. Environmental issues, 
by contrast, attracted only 0.9 per cent 
of donations in 2015, when the survey 
was conducted. The report also finds 
that in the corporate sector, share pric-
es can benefit from the positive im-
age of associated charity foundations. 
However, directors can make hasty 
donation decisions without adequate-
ly considering the negative effect on 
business profits.
Then there is celebrity philan-
thropy. In the main, the charitable 
activities of celebrities relate to ur-
gent needs of developing countries in 
the Asia–Pacific region, with disaster 
relief attracting the largest amount 
of celebrity support. The close align-
ment of celebrity philanthropy with 
policy goals also suggests that gov-
ernment priorities are important in 
shaping the way in which prominent, 
image-conscious donors direct their 
money.
Religious philanthropy (giving to 
temples or churches to provide social 
services, for example) is most success-
ful when it is localised and not too 
visible. Given the Chinese Communist 
Party’s (CCP) desire to regulate reli-
gious activities, many religious organ-
accredited, private foundations may 
raise funds from the public. 
The Charity Law represents not 
only an attempt to enhance transpar-
ency around philanthropy, but, ac-
cording to the authors of Values and 
Vision, it also seeks to focus the efforts 
of wealthy donors on issues the gov-
ernment would like to see them pri-
oritise. With an increasing number of 
listed corporations registering charity 
foundations, an almost non-existent 
phenomenon before 2005, China’s 
charitable ecosystem is evolving. Gov-
ernment-organised non-governmental 
organisations (GONGOs), such as the 
Red Cross of China, are significant, 
and are especially popular with celeb-
rities. On a broader scale, technology 
platforms facilitate small-scale dona-
tions from individuals — something 
that grew after the 2008 Wenchuan 
earthquake in Sichuan.
In considering the motivations, 
influences, purposes, trends, and fu-
ture of philanthropy in China, Values 
and Vision reveals that a desire to cre-
ate social harmony, along with the in-
fluence of traditional values, as found 
in local religious and philosophical 
thought, have been important drivers 
of the charity boom. The more than 
thirty philanthropists interviewed for 
isations mistrust (or have an uneasy 
relationship with) the state.
In 2017, China’s growing culture 
of philanthropy made news in Aus-
tralia. In February, Alibaba founder, 
Jack Ma 马云, donated AU$26.4 million 
to the University of Newcastle. Made 
through his foundation to honour a 
Novacastrian friend and mentor, Ma’s 
donation will support up to ninety 
poor and Indigenous students a year. 
The wealthy Chinese-Australians Dr 
Chau Chak Wing 周泽荣 and Huang 
Xiangmo 黄向墨 also attracted atten-
tion for their donations to education-
al institutions, political parties, and 
politicians. Media reports expressed 
concern at the extent to which Chau 
and Huang are affiliated with the CCP 
and speculated at their motivations, 
although both have denied they are 
acting on behalf of the CCP. As China’s 
philanthropists become more active at 
home and abroad, the extent to which 
they can navigate the political goals 
and regulatory environment of the 
state will have an impact on the flow 
of donations in societies worldwide.







































AT THE BEGINNING OF 2017, therapists across China excitedly 
welcomed the issuing of a policy direc-
tive, ‘Guideline on Improving Psycho-
logical Health Services’ 关于加强心理
健康服务的指导意见. The number of 
state council ministries and commis-
sions that co-signed it — twenty-two 
in total — was encouraging news to 
members of a young but vibrant pro-
fession. Speculation that President Xi 
Jinping supported the expansion of the 
practices of psychotherapy and psy-
chology had begun with his 2014 visit 
to the College of Psychology at Beijing 
Normal University, where the Criticis-
ing Psychology campaign 批判心理学 
occurred in 1958. The document attest-
ed not only to official support, but also 
rosy prospects for a once-misunder-
stood profession. In July 2017, when 
the Division of Clinical and Counselling 
Psychology and the Registry System un-
der the Chinese Psychological Society 
held their annual meeting, they themed 
it ‘Greeting the Springtime of Psycho-
logical Counselling and Psychotherapy’ 
迎接心理咨询与治疗的春天. 
This was not the first time that the 
field experienced collective euphoria 
after a new policy was announced. A 
similar scenario took place in 2008 — 
a year informally known as the ‘first 
year’ 元年 of psychotherapy in China. 
The Wenchuan earthquake in May 
prompted the state to launch a series 
of relief efforts in which mental health 
received an unprecedented amount 
of attention. The psychological conse-
quences of the disaster — couched in 
the language of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder — were quickly apparent 






































given the scale of the disaster and the 
number of children killed; ‘talk ther-
apy’ was deemed the most appropri-
ate treatment. The field had already 
enjoyed modest popularity since the 
inauguration of the national certifica-
tion for ‘psychological counsellors’ 心
理咨询师 in 2002 — a new system out-
side the universities and the hospitals, 
which respectively trained psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists. But after 2008, 
psychotherapy training and practice 
became increasingly popular, espe-
cially, in major cities like Beijing and 
Shanghai, creating a thriving scene 
that earned the title of ‘psychoboom’ 
心理热. 
During the Mao era, the state 
had attacked psychology as ‘bourgeois 
pseudo-science,’ eventually abolishing 
the discipline during the Cultural Revo-
lution; the Soviet model, which empha-
sised the neurophysiological basis of 
illness, was the norm in mental health-
care. The practice of psychotherapy 
only became possible after the launch 
of economic reforms but remained 
rare in the 1980s and 1990s. Through 
to the 2000s, the popular perspective 
on the growth of psychotherapy was 
that it reflected economic prosperity. 
It was widely believed that the prolif-
eration of mental illness and distress 
was due to the stresses of modern life 
with its economic pressures and social 
dislocations, and that after fulfilling 
basic material needs, people would in-
evitably pursue psychological wellbe-
ing and happiness. By the early 2000s, 
leading psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists, writing in China Mental Health 
Journal 中国心理卫生杂志, postulated 
that China would need as many as 
one or two million therapists to meet 
the mental health needs of its popu-
lation. Many who entered the profes-
sion seemed to have pictured therapy 
as an expensive service targetting the 
middle class, and as a respectable and 
financially rewarding occupation for 
the therapist. 
The national mental health legis-
lation, introduced between 2011 and 
2013, brought these optimistic notions 
into question. To the surprise of most 
therapists, the Mental Health Law 
defined psychotherapy as a medical 
treatment to be conducted in a med-
ical institution. This created a panic 
among the private practitioners who 
dominated the field, as they were 
mostly not medically trained (the ma-
jority of them were counsellors rather 
than psychiatrists), and their work-
places were not medical facilities. In 
any case, especially given that it was 
such a young profession, most were at 
an early stage in their careers and few 
had found it easy to attract enough cli-
ents to make a decent living.
Even before the advent of psycho-
therapy’s ‘springtime’ in 2017, things 
had improved for the profession. The 
Mental Health Law on psychothera-
py proved limited in its enforcement, 
and private practice had become less 
risky and more lucrative; the number 
of therapists who thrived in their busi-
nesses had increased substantially. 
However, what truly changed things 
was the rise of digital startups that of-
fered psychotherapy and counselling 
services. These companies belonged 
to the new wave of startup entrepre-
neurship that took encouragement 
from the state’s Mass Entrepreneur-
ship and Innovation campaign 大众创
业万众创新	 that commenced in 2015. 
The most notable examples included 
MyTherapist 简单心理 — an online 
platform connecting clients with ther-
apists meeting the company’s own rig-
orous standards; and KnowYourself 
知我探索 (abbreviated as ‘KY’) — a new 
media channel propagating popular 
psychology with attitude, focussing on 
the confusions and aspirations during 
emerging adulthood. Both of them had 
raised a lot of venture capital money.
In September 2017, the state un-
expectedly announced that the cer-
tification for psychological counsel-
lors would be abolished in 2018. This 
program, with more than one million 
counsellors certified in the previous 
fifteen years, had a mixed reception 
among better qualified psychothera-
pists, who had graduated from over-
seas institutions or local programs 
taught by foreign experts. The certi-
fication model — ultra-short training 
with commercial agencies being the 
main educational providers — created 
a convenient route to enter the field, 
but also brought chaos and confusion, 
with people seeking help often not 
able to distinguish between competent 
and incompetent therapists. The an-
nouncement caused some unease, but 
the psychoboom is far from over — if 
2017 was the field’s springtime, then 










































IN JUNE 2017, a Foshan 佛山	 court handed Chen Hongping 陈弘平, for-
mer mayor of Jieyang 揭阳, a coastal 
city in northern Guangdong province, 
a suspended death sentence for accept-
ing bribes of RMB125 million during 
his time in office between 2004 and 
2011.3 This in itself would hardly be 
cause for comment in the context of Xi 
Jinping’s widespread anti-corruption 
campaign. However, the charges in-
cluded embezzling RMB3.5 million to 
build himself an extravagant mauso-
leum using traditional feng shui prin-
ciples.4 Publicly known as the Jieyang 
Tower, the construction included 
a curved colonnade of nine carved 
ten-metre stone columns enclosing a 
megalith from the spiritually signif-
icant Mount Tai in Shandong, 1,700 
kilometres away. The construction also 
included a ten-metre-high ritual tripod 
in the square in front of the edifice. 
Apart from the shocking optics 
of a senior Party official embezzling 
huge sums of money to build himself 
a vast tomb, Chen’s crime flagrantly 
transgressed the Party-state’s regularly 
repeated warnings concerning extrav-
agant commemorations of the dead. In 
2013, for example, the Party introduced 
new regulations instructing members 
to hold ‘simple, civilised funerals’ for 
family members and to refuse any 
‘condolence money’ as this was being 
used as a form of bribery. An ‘anony-
mous official in charge of issuing the 
guidelines’ insisted that those who vio-
late funeral rules will be corrected and 
punished, including — apparently — 








































deceased Party members.5 This year, in 
Dengzhou 邓州, Henan province, city 
officials similarly exhorted its citizens 
to frugality in funeral arrangements, 
suggesting that no liquor or cigarettes 
be provided and recordings should re-
place live music. In Taiqian county 台
前县, also in Henan, new rules were 
both more liberal and more specific: 
bands should have no more than five 
members and liquor should cost no 
more than fifteen yuan per bottle. In 
addition, they suggested that funerals 
take no longer than three days.6 
Injunctions against extravagant 
funerals and other ceremonies are 
nothing new. At least as far back as the 
ancient philosopher Mozi 墨子 (fifth 
century–fourth century BCE), officials 
have been encouraged to be frugal in 
death rituals. All through the imperi-
al period and beyond, there existed a 
tension between properly observing 
the ritual codes and demonstrating ex-
treme filial piety on the one hand, and 
decrying excess and waste on the other. 
Nonetheless, the proper observance of 
rituals associated with death remains 
important in China. The Qingming 
festival celebrated in early April each 
year is a public holiday when families 
throng to the tombs of their ancestors, 
sweeping them and making offerings 
of food, tea, liquor, and incense.
In recent times, problems associ-
ated with the pressures of population 
among the living have become, inevi-
tably, problems with the dead as well. 
The traditional preference for burials 
over cremation has meant that the de-
mand for grave plots has grown, with 
two major consequences. The first is 
that local governments have become 
increasingly concerned about the 
A cemetery in Shanghai
Photo: Wikimedia Commons
‘waste’ of valuable arable land for cem-
eteries. The second is that the price of 
grave plots has risen steeply. 
The Chinese Communist Party has 
long been concerned about the use of 
land for burials. It has advocated cre-
mation since the 1950s ‘in order to 
protect farmland and public hygiene 
as well as an effort to fight against su-
perstition’, as the People’s Daily put it 
several years ago.7 At one point during 
the first half of the 1970s, the bodies 
of revolutionary heroes buried at the 
official cemetery at Babaoshan to the 
west of Beijing were dug up so that they 
could be cremated, interring their ash-
es behind bricks in halls for veneration. 
Unfortunately, cremation goes directly 
against traditional beliefs that the body 
should remain whole after death. In 
2014, the government of Anqing City 安
庆市 in Anhui province declared that 
after 1 June in that year no more bur-
ials would be allowed and all bodies 
had to be cremated. In the weeks be-
fore this regulation took effect, at least 
six elderly people committed suicide to 
avoid cremation.8 To make cremation 
more attractive, some coastal cities and 
provinces now provide free day trips to 
scatter ashes at sea, with food, drink, 
and flowers thrown in.9 For a price, 
you can also have your loved one’s ash-
es buried beneath a tree, interred in a 
small statue of the departed, made into 
a diamond, or blasted into space on a 
‘permanent celestial journey’.10 One 
company, embracing the possibilities of 
3-D printing, is offering custom-made 
ash containers in the shape of a small 
house on a cloud with a bespoke in-
scription within twelve hours of crema-
tion. The containers are guaranteed to 
last 1,000 years and cost RMB11,000.11 









































This may seem expensive, but it is 
an insignificant amount compared to 
the price of a burial plot in or near one 
of China’s large cities. In 2015, burial 
plots in a private cemetery outside Bei-
jing ranged in price from RMB120,000 
for the most basic 0.8 square metre plot 
to RMB1.2 million for a generous three-
square-metre plot.12 The China Daily 
reported that one-metre plots in public 
cemeteries in Beijing have risen from 
RMB60,000 to RMB200,000 since 2000. 
Beijing is the most expensive city in 
which to be buried, but the same kind 
of inflation has occurred across China. 
Just as people are moving further out 
of town for affordable housing, so too 
must they search further away to find 
an affordable piece of land for burial, 
in the case of Beijing, in rural Hebei 
province.13 With demand so obvious-
ly outstripping supply, there are com-
plaints of sly practices by some private 
cemetery operators, and of speculators 
buying plots for investment.14 
Death has become big business 
in China. The undoubted star of the 
‘death care’ industry is Fu Shou Yuan 
福寿园 (literally, The Garden of Pros-
perous Longevity), which operates in 
sixteen cities across China. Incorporat-
ed in 2012 and launched on the Hong 
Kong stock market in 2013, it specialis-
es in selling burial plots and maintain-
ing cemeteries; funeral organisation 
and arrangements; as well as land-
scaping and ‘the production, sales and 
maintenance of cremation machines’. 
The initial public offer was oversub-
scribed by 700 per cent, and between 
2012 and 2016 Fu Shou Yuan’s reve-
nues rose from under HK$500 million 
to HK$1.27 billion.15 The consensus 
of investment analysts polled by the 
UK Financial Times in August 2017 
was that its share price would rise in 
the next year by more than six per 
cent, and its dividends by more than 
sixteen per cent.16 In April, Fu Shou 
Yuan launched a trial of pre-pay fu-
neral services in Shanghai (under the 
English name ‘Pre-need’) with pack-
ages priced between RMB6,000, and 
RMB12,000. Their slogan for this ser-
vice: ‘One choice today will free you 
from tomorrow’s cares’. With China’s 
Big business in China: Fu Shou Yuan
Source: sh.fsygroup.com
ageing population, the business of 
death in China looks ever more prom-
ising for investors.
With the price of some funerals 
reaching astronomical heights, deal-
ing with the death of a loved one — or 
planning for one’s own death — can 
become a gaudy show of wealth. While 
the Party exhorts the Chinese people 
to be frugal, discouraging burial and 
promoting cremation, the prosperity 
it celebrates has perversely allowed 
this textbook example of conspicuous 
consumption to flourish along with the 
reinvigoration of ‘feudal’ and ‘supersti-






































Red and gold lanterns: a propserous future
Source: Joe Sampouw, Flickr
ON 22 MARCH 2017, a new edition of Lu Xun’s 
Stories with Illustrations by Fan Zeng was launched 
at Peking University (the first edition was published 
in 1978). Fan Zeng 范曾 is an eminent, state-lauded 
painter of traditional Chinese art and the inaugural 
director of Peking University’s Institute for Research 
on Chinese Painting Methods.1 Xinhua’s report 
of the book launch praised the artist for ‘enabling 
people to better understand Lu Xun’s writings 
and the spirit behind them, while also providing 
an excellent textbook for spreading traditional 
Chinese culture’. Xinhua noted that ‘Fan Zeng’s 
illustrations of Lu Xun’s stories have long been a 
part of our nation’s elementary and high school 
Chinese textbooks and have thus influenced several 



































Posthumously extolled by Mao Zedong as ‘the sage of modern China’ 
现代中国的圣人, Lu Xun (1881–1936), who during his lifetime was widely 
acknowledged as China’s leading writer, has occupied in death a position 
of unique authority in modern Chinese letters. Mao began praising Lu Xun 
in 1937 to lend prestige to the Chinese Communist cause. Thereafter, the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has continued to quote the author and to 
claim him as its champion. However, Lu Xun never joined the Party and 
was renowned for criticising state power (the state of his time was the Kuo-
mintang government under Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石, whom he loathed) 
and CCP doctrine and propaganda (which he warned his leftist acolytes 
against parroting). Accordingly, Lu Xun has also remained a favourite of 
independent-minded intellectuals and is frequently quoted by them. To 
this day, the writer’s contested legacy remains a key topic of discussion in 
mainland intellectual circles. 
Flourishing in Xi’s China
Fan began illustrating Lu Xun’s stories in 1977. Since then, he has produced 
large numbers of highly stylised depictions of characters and scenes from 
the stories. He has played an important role in aestheticising CCP propa-
ganda as cultural history. Fan is renowned for depicting bucolic scenes 
from Chinese history and folklore, and for presenting legendary figures 
such as Qu Yuan 屈原	and Zhong Kui 钟馗 in heroic postures resembling 
the fierce-browed peasants and workers of Maoist poster art. His illustra-
tions of Lu Xun’s stories are equally stylised. Of the forty-six images in the 
2017 volume, one depicts a key scene from the famous 1924 story titled 祝
福, ‘seeking blessings for prosperity’. The story is more commonly known 
in English as ‘The New Year’s Sacrifice’. Unlike Lu Xun’s original title, the 
English translation tells us the timing of the ritual but not its purpose.   
In China, ‘prosperity’ as fu 福 is linked to destiny or fate, ming 命, 
either of an individual or family, and good fortune is understood to be 
determined by the karmic consequenc-
es of one’s actions in this life or previ-
ous lives. In Lu Xun’s story, the pursuit 
of prosperity is presented as a selfish 
act driven by fear of bad luck. The main 
character, Xianglin’s Wife, is an illiter-
ate peasant woman who is shunned by 
everyone after being struck by personal 
tragedy. Known only by her dead first 
husband’s name, Xianglin’s Wife was 
forced into a second marriage. Her un-
named second husband then dies from 
typhoid and a wolf eats her young son. 
Although some are initially sympathetic 
to her plight, their patience wears thin 
when she repeats her story ad nauseum. 
She becomes inauspicious and a nui-
sance. The Lu family for whom she works as a servant forbids her from 
assisting with the preparation of Lunar New Year food offerings for the 
God of Prosperity 福神. Denied a role in this auspicious ritual, her mental 
health further deteriorates. She is dismissed and dies a homeless beggar. 
In Fan Zeng’s depiction of the scene from which the story derives its 
title, Xianglin’s Wife is a straight-backed young woman of calm and pleas-
ant countenance who, as she stands before the Lu family altar, is hailed 
from behind by a fat old woman, her right hand raised as if to command 
her to desist and her left hand holding prayer beads. Behind the old wom-
an stands an old man with a scraggly beard, ugly and thin, his body bent 
forward in anger. In writing this story, Lu Xun’s focus was on how quickly 
the fortunate tire of the unfortunate.  
Lu Xun’s story ends with the male narrator expressing relief that the 
New Year festivities had dispelled the unease Xianglin’s Wife had aroused 
in him. He felt that the townsfolk’s ample sacrificial offerings would see 





































them bestowed with ‘boundless good fortune’ in the year ahead.3 In the 
1940s, CCP operatives collaborated with left-wing artists in Shanghai to 
create the Yue opera 越剧 ‘Xianglin’s Wife’. This communist adaptation 
erased all nuance from Lu Xun’s story and turned it into an indictment of 
‘feudal’ oppression instead. In 1955, an award-winning film version of Lu 
Xun’s story was made. In the film’s final scene, as Xianglin’s Wife collapses 
in the snow, a male narrator intones: 
A diligent and kind woman, Xianglin’s Wife dropped dead after hav-
ing endured numerous miseries and mistreatments. This happened 
over forty years ago. Yes, this was an event in the past. Fortunately, 
those times have finally passed and will never return.4 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s in China, some thirty million people died 
of starvation as a consequence of Mao Zedong’s disastrous Great Leap For-
ward campaign. Millions more would also endure ‘miseries and mistreat-
ments’ in the mounting violence of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolu-
tion from 1966 onwards. Since Mao’s death in 1976, the Party leadership 
has imposed strict constraints on studies of the Great Leap Forward and 
the Cultural Revolution, considering these highly sensitive topics. As we 
noted in the 2016 China Story Yearbook, Xi Jinping’s administration has 
further tightened restrictions on historical investigation, imposing a blan-
ket ban on public discussion of CCP rule, past and present. The actions it 
took in 2016 against Yanhuang Chunqiu magazine and the Consensus web-
site have deprived mainland intellectual culture of any well-established 
forum for independent inquiry.  
Under Xi, penalties for dissent have been far harsher than under his 
predecessors Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. Xi has also proven far more suc-
cessful than Hu in blocking online criticism and mockery of the Party’s dis-
course and slogans. Moreover, ‘ideological work’ has intensified since the 
launch of the Mass Line Education and Practice campaign in June 2013. In 
the 2015 and 2016 Yearbooks, we noted that instruction in Party thinking 
had increased at Chinese universi-
ties and that study of Xi’s speeches 
and essays had become compulsory 
for Party members. In 2017, these 
activities developed further, togeth-
er with the growing sophistication 
and systematisation of Party propa-
ganda generally. 
Prominent individuals who 
demonstrate their eagerness to 
study Xi’s thought, such as Fan 
Zeng, have flourished. 
On 15 October 2014, Fan was 
one of ‘seventy-two worthies’ 七十
二贤	from the mainland arts world 
invited to a forum on art and litera-
ture in Beijing at which Xi spoke for two hours (see China Story Yearbook 
2014: Shared Destiny, Forum ‘Springtime for the Arts’, pp.179–185). Six 
days later, at Peking University, Fan convened a ‘Meeting to discuss how to 
study “Xi Jinping’s Speech at the Forum on Art and Literature” ’. To mark 
the occasion, he composed a classical poem — a heptasyllabic quatrain 
with dense allusions to the splendours of imperial China. Eight other sen-
ior Peking University academics who attended the meeting followed his 
example. Online commentators promptly criticised Fan and his colleagues 
for being ‘fawning sycophants’ who ‘know well how magnificent imperial 
favours can be’.5 Just as quickly, an article appeared on numerous state-
run websites, defending Fan’s actions as noble and ‘heartfelt’, and advis-
ing his detractors to ‘swot up on traditional Chinese culture’ before they 
accuse ‘a great maestro’s graceful act’.6 At any rate, to eulogise Xi is to be 
in the Party-state’s good graces, as the state media’s praise for Fan and 
the parade of dignitaries at the March 2017 launch of his Lu Xun’s Stories 
made plain. 






































However, the Party-state has also sought to appear as benevolently hu-
manitarian to its most famous critic, Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波 — the incarcerated 
2010 Nobel Peace Laureate — when he became terminally ill in 2017. On 
26 June 2017, the website of the Liaoning Prison Administration Bureau 
issued a notice stating that Liu, then serving the eighth year of his elev-
en-year jail sentence in Liaoning’s Jinzhou prison, had been diagnosed 
with late-stage liver cancer and was receiving treatment at the province’s 
China Medical University No.1 Affiliated Hospital in Shenyang.7 On 28 
June, an anonymously made three-minute video of Liu appeared on You-
Tube without any accompanying explanation. 
The video contains three types of footage. The first presents a 
healthy-looking Liu engaged in various activities at Jinzhou prison. In a 
scene titled ‘goods inspection’, he receives a pile of books from two pris-
on officers. Among other things, he is shown playing badminton with a 
prison guard and jogging in the prison compound. The second shows a 
still-healthy Liu receiving medical check-ups in prison and receiving a vis-
it from his wife Liu Xia, speaking with her through a glass window on 
phones and apparently telling her that his check-ups were all fine. There is 
also footage showing Liu on prison leave to mourn his father in September 
Still from a three-minute video of Liu in hospital
Source: YouTube
GRATITUDE EDUCATION, by Gloria Davies
Gratitude education 感恩教育 has been an integral part of educational and Party-sponsored 
public campaigns in mainland China since the 1990s. It forms part of the Chinese govern-
ment’s mandated patriotic education program for Chinese students. First introduced at 
schools in the 1980s, patriotic education was widened to include universities after 1989, 
following the government’s violent suppression of the university student-led democracy 
movement at Tiananmen Square on 4 June that year. 
A relatively innocuous form of gratitude education requires school students to formally 
express gratitude to their parents and teachers. The gratitude education imposed on Tibet-
an people is far more sinister. Following the government’s crackdown on street protests in 
Tibet in 2008, Tibetans have been required periodically to publicly express their gratitude 
to the Party for providing for their daily needs. They must also criticise the Dalai Lama.  
Gratitude education requires people to attest that they ‘feel the Party’s kindness and 
obey and follow the Party’ 感党恩听党话跟党走. The video footage showing Liu Xiaobo thank-
ing prison wardens was intended to demonstrate that he too was touched by the ‘Party’s 
kindness’. Incensed by international sympathy for Liu, the state-controlled Global Times 
sought to educate its Anglophone readership on the ‘Party’s kindness’. In an editorial of 
28 June 2017, the paper stated that ‘Liu is an ordinary prisoner. He ought to be grateful for 
extra help from the prison authorities, but he and his supporters have no right to demand 
preferential treatment.’
2011 (he had been allowed to visit his parents’ home in Dalian, Liaoning, 
for thirty minutes) and footage showing Liu telling the unknown person 
filming the video that he was extremely grateful to the prison officers for 
looking after him so well. The third type of footage takes up the video’s re-
maining seventy-five seconds. It shows Liu in hospital, looking noticeably 
thinner, undergoing checks and procedures, and in consultation with dif-
ferent doctors. The last scene is of a doctor having a bedside chat with Liu, 
with Liu confirming that he first learned that cancerous cells had been 
detected in his liver in 1995 when he contracted Hepatitis B.8  
YouTube has been blocked in China since 2009. The video, which 
used Liu’s words to indicate that his cancer pre-dated his present term 
of imprisonment, was directed at viewers outside China. Its presenta-
tion of Chinese prison and medical personnel attending solicitously to 
China’s best-known dissident sought to pre-emptively deflect criticism of 
Liu’s continued detention. As international media coverage of Liu’s dete-
riorating condition increased in the weeks that followed, China’s media 
outlets remained silent. A state notice issued on 28 June forbade any re-
porting, commenting, or reposting about Liu Xiaobo’s ’medical parole and 
related matters’. Coded words and images referring to Liu were blocked 



































In any case, by the 2000s Liu had become little known in China. The 
state had banned his writings since his first prison sentence in 1989. After 
2010, following his international fame as a Nobel Peace laureate, censors 
became even more vigilant in removing online references to his name as 
well as his Nobel award. Al Jazeera correspondent Florence Looi wrote 
that when her team asked people about Liu on a busy street in Shenyang 
near where he was hospitalised, no-one knew who he was.10 Other foreign 
journalists who conducted street interviews reported similar results. 
A second one-minute video was uploaded on YouTube on 9 July 2017. 
It showed Liu gravely ill, lying on a hospital bed. Gathered around him 
were several Chinese doctors and nurses, his wife, and two foreign oncol-
ogists — Joseph Herman from Texas and Markus Büchler from Heidelberg, 
whom hospital authorities had invited to China to review Liu’s condition. 
The video shows Dr Büchler speaking favourably of the care that Liu was 
receiving. On 10 July, the German embassy in Beijing issued a statement 
expressing its ‘deep concern’ that recordings had been made of the oncol-
ogists’ medical visit in breach of doctor–patient confidentiality and then 
‘leaked selectively to certain Chinese state media outlets’.11 Liu had wanted 
to be treated abroad to ensure that in the event of his death, his wife, who 
would accompany him overseas, would be safe. Liu Xia had lived under 
virtual house arrest from the time her husband was detained in 2008. The 
Chinese government denied Liu’s final request, despite diplomatic efforts 
by Germany, the US, and other countries. Against the recommendation of 
the two invited oncologists that Liu be granted a swift medical evacuation, 
Chinese doctors argued that he was too ill to travel.  
As Liu approached death, the government released more footage of 
his hospitalisation and photographs of him with his wife. It held press 
briefings for foreign journalists; the final one, organised by the Shenyang 
city government on 15 July, followed Liu’s funeral service earlier that day. 
At the final press conference, officials showed the journalists a two-min-
ute video of the service, followed by the scattering of Liu’s ashes at sea. 
Liu’s elder brother Liu Xiaoguang spoke at the press conference, thanking 
the Party on the family’s behalf 
for providing medical care and 
organising the funeral ‘accord-
ing to the family’s wishes’. Jour-
nalists who interviewed Xiao-
bo’s close friends learned that 
Xiaoguang had strongly opposed 
his brother’s activism and had 
little to do with him after 1989. 
In late July, Hong Kong-
based journalist Verna Yu wrote: ‘The government’s attempt to monop-
olize the storyline related to Liu’s illness and death is part of a radical 
change in the way the Chinese government uses the media. Instead of 
hushing up issues it found embarrassing like in the past, it is now aggres-
sively manipulating the public discourse.’12 Opinion pieces carried in the 
English-language editions of the People’s Daily and Global Times bear out 
Yu’s observation. They described Liu respectively as having ‘long engaged 
in illegal activities aimed at overthrowing the current government’ and as 
‘a victim led astray by the West’. The Chinese-language version of Global 
Times called him a ‘criminal’.13 None mentioned his Nobel Peace Prize. 
In Lu Xun’s story, the male narrator is an educated member of the 
Lu household who on hearing that Xianglin’s Wife had died says: ‘[I]n the 
present world, when a meaningless existence ends, so that someone whom 
others are tired of seeing is no longer seen, it is just as well, both for the 
individual concerned and for others.’14 The picture the Chinese state me-
dia paints of Liu expresses a similar sentiment. However, despite the gov-
ernment’s efforts to diminish Liu and to present itself in a positive light, it 
has not succeeded in swaying public opinion outside China. In many coun-
tries, people mourned the Nobel Peace laureate and criticised the Party 
leadership’s refusal to grant his dying wish to leave China. Social media 
also alerted people globally to the arrest and detention of individuals who, 
undeterred by threats of punishment, held private memorials for Liu in 
Liu Xia and Liu Xiaobo



































Dalian, Guangzhou, and other Chinese cities. Meanwhile, public concern 
for Liu Xia’s wellbeing has ensured that she is not forgotten. Rights ac-
tivists continue to provide updates about her situation and organisations 
such as Amnesty International and PEN have petitioned for the lifting of 
restrictions on her movements.15  
Four Confidences for Authoritarian Prosperity
On 26 July 2017, ministerial and provincial-level Party leaders gathered 
in Beijing for a two-day closed meeting on ‘Studying the spirit of Gener-
al Secretary Xi Jinping’s key speeches in preparation for the Nineteenth 
Congress’. The international media’s focus on Liu Xiaobo from late June 
through to mid-July would undoubtedly have irritated these senior of-
ficials. In Lu Xun’s story, the death of Xianglin’s Wife on the eve of the 
Lunar New Year caused the Lu family patriarch to exclaim in exaspera-
tion: ‘What a moment to choose! Now of all times! Is that not proof enough 
she was a bad lot?’16 An English-language Global Times editorial published 
on 15 July stated: 
Liu’s memorial tablet cannot find a place in China’s cultural temple. 
Deification of Liu by the West will be eventually overshadowed by 
China’s denial of him. No matter what was the motive behind Liu’s 
behaviour, he was actually a disruptive player to China’s development 
theme during the country’s reform and opening-up and a destructive 
element in China’s rise.17  
In referring to ‘China’s cultural temple’ and asserting China’s distinctive-
ness from ‘the West’, the article equates CCP rule with ‘China’. The point 
of these statements is to defend CCP rule as inherently right for China. 
Under Xi, prescriptive uses of language have become an important 
part of this defence. 
In 2016, Xi’s focus was on achieving ‘comprehensive and strict Par-
ty governance’ 全面从严治党, which meant that Party members were re-
quired to be well versed in his pronouncements on this topic. In 2017, he 
turned his attention to confidence building. At the high-level agenda-set-
ting Beijing meeting in July 2017, Xi Jinping emphasised the importance 
of strengthening the Party’s and country’s self-confidence. As Xinhua’s 
summary of Xi’s speech puts it (the full speech has not been released): ‘We 
must firmly build our confidence in the path of Socialism with Chinese 
characteristics as well as our confidence in its theory, system and culture. 
This will ensure that the Party’s and country’s undertakings will always 
follow the correct path and advance toward victory’.18       
Abbreviated to the Four Confidences 四个自信 and sometimes de-
scribed as the ‘Confidence doctrine’ 自信论, this Party formulation 提法 
set the tone for the Nineteenth Party Congress three months later when it 
was presented as a key feature of Xi Jinping Thought for the New Era of 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. 
The basis of China’s official discourse is a quest narrative that pre-
sents successive Party leaderships as having steadfastly guided ‘Party and 
country’ as they journeyed forward, ensuring ‘victory’ 胜利 (a favourite 
LU XUN ON SELF-CONFIDENCE, by Gloria Davies
‘Confidence’ 自信, understood as national self-confidence, has long been part of Chinese 
public discourse. In September 1934, Lu Xun wrote an article titled ‘Have the Chinese lost 
their self-confidence?’ 中国人失掉自信力了吗? in response to a public debate on this ques-
tion. At the time, Japan had invaded China and the country was under unelected Nation-
alist Party rule, with Communist-hating Chiang Kai-shek as China’s President. The debate 
revolved around whether the Chinese had lost their self-confidence in the face of Japan’s 
growing military aggression. 
In this essay, Lu Xun wrote that the only people who struck him as self-confident were 
those who ‘worked doggedly in silence…risking their lives, who strove to save others and 
who braved death in pursuit of truth’. He observed: ‘It is only because they are trampled on, 
kept out of the news and made to vanish in darkness that most people don’t know about 
them.’ He concluded: ‘The writings of prominent academics and those who hold high office 
are insufficient to ascertain whether we possess or lack self-confidence. We must discover 



































word of the Party’s) over the challenges and dangers encountered on the 
way. The story assumes that ‘Party and country’ are ever advancing to-
ward greater prosperity. The CCP’s changing slogans seek to convey this 
picture of continuous progress. 
In this regard, the Four Confidences, as a slogan, is intended to repre-
sent the culmination of a process of improvement for ‘Party and country’, 
beginning with Xi’s first year in office. The earlier stages of this process 
include, inter alia, Xi’s emphasis in 2013 and early 2014 on ‘the struggle 
for public opinion’, with the Party’s media workers and propagandists be-
ing told they must ‘dare to grasp, control and unsheathe the sword’ when 
presenting the Party’s view; his shift to Party discipline in 2015, using 
slogans such as the Three Stricts and the Three Genuines to define Party 
discipline;19 followed by his integration of Party discipline into the 
Four Comprehensives as the Party’s leading motto in 2016. (See the 
China Story Yearbook 2016: Control, Chapter 4 ‘The Language of 
Discipline’, pp.111–129).
The Party’s key slogans mostly outline objectives (such as the China 
Dream or the Four Comprehensives) or prescribe an attitude (such as the 
Four Confidences). The ideological significance of the Four Confidences is 
ZHANG LIFAN ON THE FOUR CONFIDENCES, by Gloria Davies
On 21 October 2017, the Beijing-based social commentator and historian Zhang Lifan 章立凡 
posted the following tweet, referring to a line from Xi Jinping’s speech of 6 February 2013, 
delivered at a meeting to celebrate the Lunar New Year in Beijing. 
The Four Confidences? First came the decree: ‘We must be able to take sharp criticism.’ 
But no sooner had I made a few critical remarks this time, the authorities promptly 
sent someone to my door to issue a warning. If they were genuinely confident in their 
system, its path, theory and culture, would they have done this? A regime that permits 
only eulogies and is intolerant of criticism will find it difficult to avoid repeating the 




evident from the sustained attention 
it has received from Party theorists 
and the state media, starting with its 
introduction as the Three Confidences 
by Hu Jintao in November 2012: ‘the 
whole Party should have every confi-
dence in our path, in our theories and 
in our system’ 全党要坚定这样的道路
自信、理论自信、制度自信.20 A Xin-
hua report of 14 November 2012 de-
scribed the Three Confidences as crys-
tallising ‘the underlying strength of an 
ever-maturing and ever more confident Marxist ruling party at its most 
powerful.’21 
From 2013 to 2015, Xi called on Party members to cultivate the Three 
Confidences. In January 2013, Peking University received funding from 
China’s most prestigious academic grant scheme, the National Social Sci-
ence Fund, to set up a ‘major project’ 重大项目 on ‘research into reinforc-
ing confidence in the path, theory, and system of Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics’ 坚定中国特色社会主义道路自信, 理论自信, 制度自信研
究.22 Then, on 1 July 2016, in a speech commemorating the ninety-fifth an-
niversary of the CCP’s founding, Xi modified the formulation by stating 
that confidence in the culture of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 
was also essential. The Party’s and country’s prosperity was the ‘overall 
result of an incessant push by the Chinese people and CCP members to-
ward the construction, creation, selection, and transcendence of [their] 
culture’.23 Thereafter, in the twelve months leading up to Xi’s ‘important 
speech’ of 26 July 2017, Party theorists publicised the Four Confidences in 
numerous articles highlighting the necessity of progressing from Three 
Confidences to Four Confidences. The Four Confidences was well on its 
way to becoming a signature motto of Xi’s. 
Xi speaking at the ninety-fifth anniversary of 




































In his 1 July 2016 speech, Xi said that ‘cultural confidence’ was ‘the 
most fundamental, far-reaching, and profound’ of the Four Confidences 
because it entailed ‘firmly remembering the [Party’s] original intention 
in one’s continuing advance’ 坚持不忘初心, 继续前进.24 Yet Xi has con-
sistently avoided using the CCP’s founders’ expression of their Party’s 
mission: to ‘wage class war’ against ‘capitalists’ to establish the ‘dictator-
ship of the proletariat’. Xi’s wording presents the CCP’s ‘original intention’ 
vaguely, as a cultural attitude of always striving to rule well. The eleva-
tion of culture via the Four Confidences facilitates this rhetorical sleight 
of hand: it presents the Party-state’s retreat from socialist politics as the 
most advanced form of socialist culture — namely, Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics. 
Academics who write on Party theory and who teach the Party’s man-
dated university courses on political thought have done well under Xi. In 
2017, the Central Propaganda Department-controlled Guangming Daily 
published many articles praising the enhanced quality of ‘ideological and 
political work’ in China’s tertiary sector.25 However, as Xi’s ‘important 
speeches’ multiply, what Xi’s academic eulogisers mean by ‘theory’ has 
also required turgid elaboration using the Party’s ‘correct’ formulations. 
In a People’s Daily commentary on the Four Confidences, Jin Nuo 靳诺, 
Party Secretary of Renmin University in Beijing, enthused that Xi’s formu-
lation demonstrates the ‘powerful sturdiness of a Marxist political party 
capable of producing high-quality theory in keeping with the times’.26  
Thoughtful Chinese netizens have pointed out that the Party’s lead-
ers have never explained why they invariably speak of ‘the Party and the 
country’ and ‘the Party and the people’ — specifically, why ‘country’ and 
‘people’ must always come second?27 The Charter 08 petition, of which 
Liu Xiaobo was a leading author, directly challenged the legitimacy of 
unelected CCP rule. He thus incurred the wrath of the Party leadership, 
whose fortunes are most closely tied to the system’s preservation. For this 
reason, we should heed Xi’s Four Confidences as more than Party pedant-
ry dressed up as ‘high-quality theory’. The Four Confidences is code for 
the success of Xi’s administration in strengthening the Party-state system 
around his personal authority. Undoubtedly, we are meant to see the Four 
Confidences reflected in the self-assured manner of the Party’s personnel 
as they subjected Liu Xiaobo to various indignities in his final weeks, not 
least by turning his physical deterioration into a Party-orchestrated You-
Tube spectacle, accessible everywhere except in China. That they did this 
to Liu (and that they continue to restrict Liu Xia’s movements) suggests 
that the Four Confidences is driven as much by anxiety about the future of 
the Party-state system as by celebration of its achievements. 
In 1939, E. M. Forster famously wrote that he would only give de-
mocracy ‘two cheers’: ‘one because it admits variety and two because it 
permits criticism. Two cheers are quite enough: there is no occasion to 
give three.’28 Single-party rule in perpetuity, defended as the democratic 
centralism of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, is a lot more compli-
cated. As China continues to prosper, the Party led by Xi has grown less 
tolerant of criticism. This is not surprising, since the Party-state system re-
quires conformity and is constitutively hostile to variety, especially when 
variety takes the form of criticism of the Party-state system itself.  
Indeed, in striking contrast to E. M. Forster’s ‘two cheers for democra-
cy’, Party-state rule under Xi has required continuous applause. According 
to Xinhua, Xi Jinping’s 200-minute report at the Nineteenth Party Congress 
on 18 October elicited more than seventy rounds of applause from the 
delegates. Tencent, the Chinese technology and media giant, produced an 
applause app to coincide with Xi’s report to the Party Congress. Using an 
eighteen-second snippet of applause for Xi during his report, the Clap for 




































Xi Jinping app invited users to tap their phone or device screen to join in 
the applause. The screen image features the interior of the Great Hall of 
the People, the venue of the Party Congress, with a pair of hands in the 
lower foreground. Each tap produces a virtual clap. According to a The 
Globe and Mail report of 19 October 2017, within a day of its release, the 
app had generated 1,024,294,610 claps for Xi — the equivalent of ‘more 





































Arguing with Robots 





































ON 18 SEPTEMBER, the People’s Daily unleashed its full fury on 
an unlikely target: an algorithm. The 
semi-authoritative newspaper ripped 
into the popular news aggregator app 
Toutiao 今日头条	(literally ‘Daily Head-
line’), which had recently racked up a 
series of fines for propagating lewd and 
vulgar content. It charged Toutiao’s 
learning algorithm with spreading 
‘uncivilised content’ through ‘clickbait 
headlines’ 标题党 and ‘eye-catching 
news’ 眼球新闻.1 Why, the op-ed asked, 
had pictures of scantily dressed mod-
els and other clickbait content become 
an ‘intractable disease’ of the app? The 
answer, it said, lay in the algorithm.
With 120 million active users each 
day, Toutiao might be the world’s most 
successful news service. That success 
is in no small part due to the powerful 
learning algorithms that track readers’ 
clicks, and curate and personalise the 
content in their feeds. More pictures 
of scantily clad women? No problem. 
Want the latest financial headlines? 
You got it. Like heartwarming stories 
about family reunions? Done. Want 
fewer articles extolling China’s dear 
leader, Xi Jinping? Poof, gone. Users 
are wowed by how just a few clicks can 
radically alter the news that populates 
their feeds — and not always in ways 
that would be to the liking of the Peo-
ple’s Daily. 








































One Chinese friend told me that 
Toutiao’s biggest appeal was that it fil-
tered out the ‘brainwashing media’ 传
媒洗脑 (that is, state media) from his 
newsfeed. While that is well and good 
for many Chinese users (and Toutiao’s 
bottom line), in China’s tightly con-
trolled media and Internet environ-
ment, Toutiao’s ability to give readers 
what they want clearly does not sit well 
with everyone. In the People’s Daily 
commentary, the writer ‘Yu Sheng’ 
羽生 (probably a pseudonym) wrote: 
‘The robot decides what content to rec-
ommend and who to recommended it 
to. And it follows only one standard: 
whether or not the content is attention 
grabbing and whether or not it will at-
tract users.’ 
The People’s Daily’s anti-algorithm 
tirade is surprising given just how up-
beat the Chinese government has been 
about emerging technology and ar-
tificial intelligence (AI) and machine 
learning in particular. In July, the State 
Council released the ‘Next-Generation-
al Artificial Intelligence Development 
Plan’ — a proposal to harness the trans-
formative potential of AI and machine 
learning to transform China’s society, 
government, and economy, with the 
goal of turning China into a world lead-
er in AI by 2025. This includes cultivat-
ing and supporting Chinese ‘leading 
backbone enterprises’ 龙头骨干企业 
that can potentially dominate the glob-
al AI market. 
The government’s push to adopt 
AI makes sense. According to a report 
from PricewaterhouseCoopers, China 
stands to benefit more than any other 
country from AI, potentially impacting 
26.1 per cent of GDP.2 In addition, 
China’s 730 million Internet users are 
a genuine treasure trove of data for 
training and learning algorithms. 
As The Economist put it, referring 
to its boundless reserves, China has 
become the ‘Saudi Arabia of data’.3 In 
terms of market capitalisation, China 
already boasts some of the world’s 
largest AI companies, including 
speech-recognition company iFlytek, 
facial-recognition giants Megvii and 
SenseTime, and Bytedance, the parent 
company of Toutiao.
Indeed, Toutiao is really an AI 
company masquerading as a news ag-
gregator. The powerful machine-learn-
ing algorithms behind its newsfeed are 
the company’s crown jewels, responsi-
ble for both its 120 million users and 
US$20 billion valuation. The company 
has bold ambitions to find new uses 
for its algorithms and introduce its 
news aggregator to foreign markets. 
In October, the company that collects 
headlines made headlines of its own 
when, in a bid to attract top talent, it 
offered pay packages of US$3 million a 
year.4 
And yet, despite its success, Tou-
tiao cannot escape the government’s 
rancour. This stands in notable con-
trast to other Chinese AI companies. 
The government has lavished officially 
collected data and contracts on those 
that focus on facial or speech recogni-
tion, in particular, as these technolo-
gies directly serve the one of the Party- 
state’s core objectives — expanding 
control (the theme of the 2016 Year-
book). In October, Human Rights 
Watch reported that iFlyTech was 
collaborating with the govern-
ment to develop an AI surveillance 
system that could identify peo-
ple based on their voices. The He-
bei-based iFlyTech has already 
built the world’s most advanced voice 
recognition platforms, now used by 
local and provincial governments and 
police. Facial recognition AI firms in-
cluding Face++ and SenseTime have 
also expanded at an astonishing rate, 
in part because of government con-
tracts. 
AI that does not help the govern-
ment consolidate power or under-
mines the Party’s authority, however, 
risks facing the government’s wrath. 
In August, censors quickly snuffed out 
Subversive code





































two chatbots that, learning from con-
versations with netizens, had devel-
oped an anti-Party bent.5 ‘Do you think 
such corrupt and incapable politics can 
last a long time?’ one bot replied when 
asked if it loves the CCP. ‘My Chinese 
dream is to go to America’, the second 
one chirped. ‘The Chinese dream is a 
daydream and a nightmare.’
The sin of Toutiao was not so 
much subversion as giving readers 
what they want. In an effort to appease 
angry regulators, Toutiao held a forum 
in September on using AI to ‘screen 
and control fake news in the public 
sphere’.6 Company executives showed 
off Toutiao’s new ‘anti-rumour data-
base’ to top officials from the Central 
Propaganda Department, the Cyber 
Administration of China and the State 
Administration of Press, Publication, 
Radio, Film, and Television of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. Within a few 
months of operating, the database was 
able to identify and suppress rumours 
with an impressive eighty per cent ac-
curacy. Evidently, Toutiao executives 
were eager to show officials that the 
company’s learning algorithms could 
serve the Party-state’s interests too.
But Toutiao will probably keep 
sparking the fury of regulators until 
it can train its algorithms to raise the 
Party consciousness of its readers. The 
author of the People’s Daily op-ed sees a 
long-term solution in ‘human-machine 
melding’ 人机结合 — the far-flung idea 
that machine capabilities and human 
consciousness will one day merge 
into a single being. In the meantime, 
Yu Sheng recommends replacing the 
robot with a good editor — preferably 


























































HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF  
PROSPERITY 
Elisa Nesossi and Ivan Franceschini
The Supreme People’s Court, China
Source: Wikimedia Commons 
ON 13 JULY 2017, the 2010 Nobel Peace laureate Liu 
Xiaobo 刘晓波	passed away at the age of sixty-one. 
Tried and convicted in 2009 for ‘inciting subversion 
of state power’ for having co-authored Charter 08, a 
political manifesto calling for China’s democratic 
transformation, Liu is only the second Nobel Peace 
Prize laureate ever to die in custody (the first being 
























































His tragic fate — along with that of his wife Liu Xia 刘霞, who has 
spent years under house arrest despite never being charged with any 
crime — is a harsh reminder of Beijing’s stance on human rights. In the 
post-Mao age, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has consistently an-
swered international criticism about its human rights abuses by insisting 
that the ‘universalist’ definition of human rights is a Western construct. 
In view of its own cultural tradition and developmental trajectory, the 
PRC has upheld the view that the realisation of economic and social 
rights, the right to development in particular, is of primary importance. 
In the official worldview of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is not 
a violation of human rights to deny basic civil and political liberties to its 
citizens, with freedom of expression being only one example. The Party- 
state measures human rights achievements in terms of the number of 
people who have been raised out of poverty,2 while detaining advocates 
for civil and political liberties, even those who protest against sexual har-
assment or speak out against corruption, despite corruption itself being 
Liu Xiaobo’s ashes were scattered in the Yellow Sea (Liu Xia pictured centre, wearing sunglasses) 
Source: YouTube
a crime. Over the past several years, hun-
dreds of rights activists have been detained 
in China. (See the China Story Yearbook 
2015: Pollution, Chapter 2 ‘The Fog of Law’, 
pp.67–85, and the China Story Yearbook 
2016: Control, Chapter 2 ‘Control by Law’, 
pp.43–57.) In September 2017, Kenneth 
Roth, the director of Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) went as far as to declare that ‘Chi-
na’s [current] crackdown on human rights activists is the most severe 
since the Tiananmen Square democracy movement twenty-five years ago’.
The example of Liu Xiaobo also illustrates how, despite having an 
increasingly sophisticated legal system, the PRC, like other authoritarian 
regimes, is apt to use its laws and the loopholes therein to incriminate 
and eliminate political enemies. Criminal charges of ‘inciting subversion 
of state power’ and ‘subversion of state power’ are often invoked against 
individuals who allegedly challenge state security, social stability, and the 
political status quo. All the while, the PRC denies that it has political pris-
oners in its jails, insisting that people like Liu Xiaobo are just criminals. At 
the same time, his widow Liu Xia’s experience is testimony to the existence 
of a dual system, whereby the law applies in ‘ordinary’ cases but not in 
those circumstances that the authorities consider politically sensitive. 
Liu Xiaobo’s death and the reaction to it by the international commu-
nity testify to the increasingly prominent role that China plays in shaping 
human rights discourse within a divided international community. This 
essay analyses the mechanisms of the three main, and largely comple-
mentary, means through which the Chinese authorities attempt to rein in 
dissent within and outside of the law: judicial prosecution, torture, and 


























































BADIUCAO, by Linda Jaivin
In February, AsiaTOPA (the Asia–Pacific Tri-
ennial of Performing Arts) brought the Na-
tional Ballet of China to the Melbourne Arts 
Centre to perform the Cultural Revolution 
propaganda ballet, ‘The Red Detachment of 
Women’ 红色娘子军. Off to one side, watch-
ing the opening night crowd file in, was the 
Shanghai-born grandson of a filmmaker 
who starved to death in one of Mao’s labour 
camps and whose family suffered greatly in 
the Cultural Revolution. An artist and car-
toonist who goes by the pseudonym Badiu-
cao 巴丢草, he wondered how it is possible 
that a democratic country such as Australia 
would so happily showcase what he consid-
ers an analogue to Nazi art.3 And he was 
not alone: one Melbourne critic likened the 
ballet to the spoof ‘Springtime for Hitler’ in 
Mel Brooks’s The Producers.4 Badiucao did 
not join the small protest on the night, tak-
ing a stand in his own way with cartoons of 
Mao singing into a microphone while sodo-
mising a kangaroo and emu.
Badiucao paints and creates installation and performance art. His 2016 work Cancelled 
reflects on how the Chinese embassy returned his Chinese passport to him with one corner 
cut after he took Australian citizenship. The installation displays objects of personal and 
cultural identity including a laptop and Chinese spoon, each with a corner crisply excised. 
He has also turned a critical eye on his new country: Don Dale Play Group (also 2016) was a 
response to revelations about the abuse of Aboriginal youth in detention. 
He is best known for his China-related cartoons and drawings, which draw inspiration 
from German Impressionism and woodblock printing — an aesthetic championed by early 
twentieth-century Chinese revolutionaries such as Lu Xun. In one cartoon, Xi Jinping hunch-
es over a tub labelled #PanamaLeaks, laundering hundred-yuan bills; in another, a Mao-like 
cat catches a computer mouse — a comment on censorship. 
Badiucao is adept at social media, with 29,100 Twitter followers alone at the time of writ-
ing. He regularly uploads cartoons and his stark portraits of Chinese human rights activists 
Badiucao’s portrait of Liu Xiaobo and Liu Xia in 
Hosier Lane, Melbourne
Photo: @badiucao, Twitter
not only onto www.badiucao.
com but also Google Drive 
for free download. Amnesty 
International, the BBC, and 
chinadigitaltimes.net have all 
republished his work.
In July 2017, Badiucao 
drew a double portrait of Liu 
Xiaobo and his wife Liu Xia, 
based on an official photo-
graph of them when Liu was 
sick in hospital, and posted it 
in Melbourne’s graffiti-covered Hosier Lane. After Liu’s death, he added a second image 
of him ascending into heaven, with a halo on his head and his slippers discarded on the 
ground. The Hosier Lane site quickly became a shrine, with people leaving flowers and other 
offerings (see photo) and the images went viral. Because they are relatively abstract, activ-
ists in China briefly got away with posting them on the Internet. 
The images have since appeared in public spaces around the world. Yet after the double 
portrait was reproduced on a Melbourne University campus wall, it quickly disappeared 
under a slew of posters for a Chinese-language website. Coincidentally or not, it also 
vanished not long after going up in Sydney University’s Graffiti Tunnel. During my interview 
with him, Badiucao expressed concern at the many ways that China is extending its power 
overseas, including in universities, where slurs such as ‘racist’ and ‘anti-China’ help to 
silence and control debate and criticism. He believes that social isolation makes Chinese 
students especially vulnerable to manipulation, and would like to see more social ‘inclusion’ 
as inoculation against a radical patriotism.5 
Badiucao does not sound paranoid when he says that Chinese agents and Internet 
sleuths are working hard to uncover his true identity: ‘I have been warned they are get-
ting close’. They have trolled him relentlessly on social media from his first appearances 
on Weibo — a platform from which he’s now banned. Learning that he had studied to be 
a teacher, they fabricated stories about improper behaviour around children and created 
a fake website, badiucao.net, filled with slanderous content. (By August 2017, the fake site 
appeared to have been taken down.) Although an Australian citizen, he is worried enough 
about his job, personal safety, and family that he lives a double life — never making a public 
appearance without a mask of some kind. Until China itself becomes democratic and free, 
he says, the mask stays on. 

























































Using the Law to Suppress Activism
As the latest annual report of the US Congressional- 
Executive Commission on China (CECC) noted, in 
2017 the Chinese authorities ‘continued to use the 
law as an instrument of repression to expand con-
trol over Chinese society, while outwardly provid-
ing the veneer of a system guided by the rule of 
law.’6 Chinese Party-state officials perceive human 
rights lawyers (weiquan 维权, or ‘rights defence’ 
lawyers) and civil society activists to be enemies 
of a stable and ‘harmonious’ society under the 
rule of law as defined by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). (See the Chi-
na Story Yearbook 2015: Pollution, Chapter 2 ‘The Fog of Law’, pp.67–85.) 
Lawyers are considered particularly dangerous, because of their partici-
pation in the human rights discourse both at home and in international 
forums and media. Moreover, because of their plight, they often become 
international news themselves. Their pursuit of human rights claims at 
the grassroots leads them to become attached to ‘foreign’ ideas concerning 
human rights promoted by the Western organisations that support and 
cooperate with them. 
As in the past, human rights featured in the 2017 Supreme People’s 
Court’s (SPC) annual report, presented in March by Zhou Qiang 周强 — the 
current SPC President to the ‘Two Sessions’ (lianghui 两会) of the Chinese 
parliament, the National People’s Congress. Zhou’s report emphasised 
that the correct implementation of criminal justice policies protects hu-
man rights. But he also cited the sentencing ‘according to law’ of weiquan 
lawyer Zhou Shifeng 周世锋	 to seven years’ imprisonment as one of the 
previous year’s key achievements in protecting state security.7 
Judicial authorities continue widely to use provisions in the 1997 
Criminal Law concerning the crime of endangering state security 危害
国家安全罪, (Articles 102–113) to bring human rights activists to trial 
Zhou Qiang
Photo: 禁书网, Flickr
and sentence them to lengthy 
imprisonment. The majority 
of human rights lawyers and 
activists detained in recent 
years were convicted under 
the terms of Article 105: ‘incit-
ing subversion of state power’ 
颠覆国家政权罪	or ‘subversion 
of state power’ 煽动颠覆国家
政权罪. 
Since the end of 2016, the list of rights activists under arrest has 
grown. Weiquan lawyers Jiang Tianyong 江天勇 and Li Heping 李和平, 
as well as activists Liu Shaoming 刘少明, Su Changlan 苏昌兰, and Chen 
Qitang 陈启堂, were all handed prison sentences for ‘subversion’ or ‘incit-
ing subversion of state power’ in 2017. Their sentences ranged from three 
years to four and a half years, and most have been detained for at least 
seven months before trial. Lawyers Wang Quanzhang 王全章	and Wu Gan
吴淦 were arrested and detained on similar charges, but they were tried 
in closed-door trials and their sentence remains unknown. 
Another important case with significant international ramifications 
involved Taiwanese NGO volunteer Lee Ming-che 李明哲. In March 2017, 
the Chinese state security authorities detained him while he was travelling 
to Zhuhai via Macau. Ten days after his disappearance, the State Council 
Taiwan Affairs Office confirmed that he was under investigation for ‘en-
dangering state security’. On 26 May, state security authorities in Hunan 
formally arrested him on suspicion of ‘subversion of state power’. Lee’s 
trial took place in September at the Yueyang Intermediate Court in Hunan. 
In a clip recorded at the trial, most probably filmed under duress, Mr Lee 
said that he had ‘no objection’ to the charges of ‘attacking Chinese socie-
ty and encouraging multi-party rule’ and ‘inciting others to subvert state 
power’. They were similar to the charges against Liu Xiaobo. Filmed con-



























































In 1988, the PRC ratified the International Convention against Torture. 
Over the following two decades, Chinese media and academic publications 
aired widespread condemnation of torture — a practice that the Chinese 
criminal legislation strictly prohibits under Articles 247–248 of the 1997 
Criminal Law and Article 54 of the 2012 Criminal Procedure Law.
Under Xi Jinping, the Decisions of the Third and Fourth CCP Plenums 
in 2013 and 2014 also mention the strict prohibition of torture. Among 
the official affirmations of this principle are the 2013 Political-Legal Com-
mittee Provisions on Preventing Miscarriage of Justice 关于切实防止冤假
错案的规定, which states that instances of torture and extracting con-
fession through violent means or other acts of forgery should be severe-
ly punished — without specifying how — and that evidence obtained 
through torture or other illegal means is inadmissible in court. Similar 
points are made in the SPC’s Opinions on Preventing Miscarriages of Jus-
tice 关于建立健全防范刑事冤假错案工作机制的意见, of the same year. 
They both require judges to follow legal procedures strictly, and remind 
courts of appeal to countercheck judgements for which the evidence was 
sketchy or the facts unclear. The documents define illegally obtained ev-
idence as confessions obtained outside a legal place of detention, and 
confessions that have no audio-video recording. There are problems in 
implementation, for example, ensuring proper audio-video recording of 
any interrogation and access to lawyers. But this reform is nevertheless 
impressive and builds on trials conducted in police stations and deten-
tion centres since 2006 (both documents are summarised in the China 
Story Yearbook 2014). 
To add to this corpus of legislation, in October 2016, five central gov-
ernment bodies — the SPC, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Min-
istry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of 
Justice — issued a joint opinion that established the principle of putting the 
trial at the centre of criminal proceedings. The Opinion on the Promoting 
the Trial Centredness in Criminal Proceedings 关于推进以审判为中心的刑
事诉讼制度改革的意见 obligates the procuratorate in certain important 
cases to directly question the criminal suspect about whether their confes-
sion had been coerced or if there had been illegal collection of evidence. In 
June 2017, the same bodies issued Regulations on Several Issues Concern-
ing the Strict Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases 关
于办理刑事案件严格排除非法证据若干问题的规定, which include provi-
sions excluding evidence obtained by torture. During the ‘Two Sessions’ of 
March 2017, the Procurator-General, Cao Jianming 曹建民,	reported that 
in 2016 the procuratorate corrected 34,230 cases of illegal investigation 
practices, including extracting confessions by torture. Still, as noted in the 
CECC 2017 Annual Report, there had been no instances of criminal prose-
cution of investigators who engaged in these abusive practices.8 
Notwithstanding increasingly sophisticated legislation on the subject, 
in 2017 torture still appears to be a widespread practice in both average 
criminal cases and cases involving human rights activists. The weiquan 
lawyers detained or harassed in the crackdown of July 2015, including 
Wang Quanzhang and Wu Gan as well as Xie Yang 谢阳, Wang Yu 王宇, 
and Li Chunfu 李春富, have revealed the ordeals and violence they were 
subjected to while in detention.9 According to a report compiled by the 
China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, the Chinese authorities em-
ployed at least fifteen different types of torture or inhuman and degrading 
treatments against the lawyers and defenders held in the 2015 crackdown. 
These were intended to inflict physical harm and psychological detriment 
and included the use of electric shocks, sleep deprivation, and forced med-
ications, among others.10
In January 2017, to protest the decision of the authorities not to set 
him free after seventeen months of detention, Xie Yang’s legal team re-
leased the transcript of a conversation they had with their client. In it, Xie 
detailed the physical and mental torture to which he had been subject in 
detention. On 27 February, eleven diplomatic missions in Beijing wrote a 
























































their growing concern over claims of torture and other cruel or degrading 
treatments and punishments in cases involving detained rights lawyers 
and other activists. 
In an unprecedented move, on 1 March, China’s official media re-
sponded to Xie’s allegations, and indirectly to the letter, claiming that he 
had fabricated the story about his torture to attract international atten-
tion. China’s state media accused lawyer Jiang Tianyong, who had been 
part of Xie’s legal team, of ‘making up fake news’; they featured an inter-
view with him admitting fabricating Xie’s claims. In May, the Changsha 
Intermediate People’s Court released a video in which Xie admitted having 
being ‘brainwashed’ while overseas, attending training in Hong Kong and 
South Korea to ‘develop Western constitutionalism in China’. He also de-
nied having been mistreated.11 
Stretching the Law Beyond its Limits
Violence, harassment, and intimidation of human rights activists or 
their families very often provide the corollary to legal measures. While 
arrests and detentions may expose the state to public scrutiny and have 
significant political costs, ‘measures operating in the shadows’12 are suffi-
ciently flexible to be used discretionarily by state authorities with fewer 
political costs. These include deprivation of physical liberty through ‘res-
idential surveillance’ 监视居住13 and ‘soft detention’ 软禁 (house arrest). 
Measures such as these are not strictly regulated by law. For instance, 
as mentioned above, Liu Xia has been under constant surveillance and 
intermittent house arrest since her husband’s arrest in 2008. After Liu 
Xiaobo’s death, she disappeared once again, and her friends were unable 
to contact her, despite official claims that she was ‘free’.14 She appeared 
in a YouTube video (in which the name of the filmmaker, as well as the 
place and date of filming were not specified) saying that she was mourning 
Liu Xiaobo’s passing outside Beijing; she apparently returned home only a 
month or so later.15   
The harassment of Liu Xia and her family and her years of constant 
surveillance and house arrest have occurred outside the remit of any es-
tablished laws. And this is not unusual — many other activists’ partners 
and families are subjected to similar treatment. 
Authorities reportedly harassed family members of those connected 
to the July 2015 crackdown through house arrest, constant surveillance, 
interference with their ability to travel, as well as pressuring landlords 
to evict them, and ordering school officials to deny admission to their 
children. This can go on for months or years.16 Families’ telephones are 
frequently tapped and their email traffic monitored. Police officers may 
watch and follow them, surveillance cameras may be installed near their 
homes and offices, and neighbours recruited to monitor them. Invitations 
to ‘have tea’ 喝茶 with state security agents (as discussed in the China Story 
Yearbook 2016: Control, Forum ‘Meet the State Security: Labour Activists 
and Their Controllers’, pp.65–73) or ‘being assigned a guard’ 被上岗 have 
been fairly common forms of intimidation for years. Authorities have 
closed organisations founded or operated by human rights defenders or 
strictly monitored their operations, rigorously controlling or cutting their 
sources of funding. Their offices and homes are recurrently subject to un-
Liu Xia
























































authorised searches, and they are frequently faced with heavy fines for 
trivial administrative transgressions.17 
One of the extra-legal measures used against lawyers since 2007 is 
the threat of disbarring them. The 2016 Amendment to the Measures on 
Managing Lawyers’ Practice of Law 律师执业管理办法 and Measures on 
Managing Law Firms 律师事务所管理办法 compel lawyers to support 
the Party’s leadership and prohibits them from provoking dissatisfaction 
with the Party and the government, signing joint petitions, or issuing open 
letters that ‘undermine the judicial system’, and organising sit-in protests 
or other kinds of demonstrations outside judicial or other government 
agencies. The Measures on Managing Law Firms require firms to estab-
lish internal Party groups that participate in policymaking and manage-
ment. During a conference at the National Judges College in Beijing at the 
end of August 2017, Minister of Justice, Zhang Jun 张军,	further called on 
lawyers to refrain from engaging in protests, criticising judges and courts, 
or speaking or acting for personal gain or to boost their reputation. 
A Chilling Effect
Human rights lawyers and activists who have been harassed or ill-treated 
are warned or prevented from speaking out or writing about their ordeal. 
Yet over the past year, many victims of Chinese state repression have gone 
public. Labour activist Meng Han 猛汉, after spending twenty-one months 
in detention for ‘gathering crowds to disturb public order’, published on-
line his ‘Notes from Prison’, which not only spoke about his experience, 
but also his reflections on and hopes for the future of the Chinese labour 
movement.18 He would have known that publishing this would bring him 
more trouble, and the police once again briefly detained him. But it did 
not deter him in the least. In a new development, spouses of imprisoned 
lawyers and activists have also begun speaking out.
As mentioned above, HRW has dubbed the recent crackdown against 
human rights defenders in China the worst since the suppression of the 
democracy movement in 1989.19 Even more worrying is the international 
accommodation of China’s actions. In September, HRW released a report 
that scrutinised China’s activities at the United Nations (UN).20 According 
to the report, on several occasions in 2017, UN agencies made concessions 
towards China on matters related to human rights. In January, UN officials 
kept an estimated three thousand staff and NGO representatives from at-
tending a keynote speech by President Xi Jinping. In April, security offi-
cials removed ethnic Uyghur activist Dolkun Isa from the UN headquar-
ters in New York, where he was attending a forum on indigenous issues. 
Isa is General Secretary of the World Uyghur Congress and now a German 
citizen, having sought asylum following persecution in China. In July, Isa 
was also stopped and briefly detained by the police in Rome, acting on a 
request from Chinese authorities who claim that he is a terrorist, although 
he has publically condemned all forms of terrorism. 
These incidents raise serious questions about how the international 
community, including the UN, should respond to China’s human rights re-
cord at a time when China is exercising significant leverage on many coun-
tries in terms of economic statecraft, and has become the second-largest 
funder of the UN’s peacekeeping operations. While Chinese local activists 
continue to fight for rights under increasingly restrictive circumstances, 
they must surely be disheartened by this silence, if not complicity, by the 
international community. In July, while so many were grieving the death 
of Liu Xiaobo, US President Donald Trump was praising Xi Jinping as a 
‘terrific’ and ‘talented’ leader.21 The roots of the ‘chilling effect’ might be 
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CHINA EXECUTES more people than any other nation. Yet, over the last 
decade, its death penalty policy has 
undergone a life change. This began 
on 1 January 2007, when the Supreme 
People’s Court (SPC)1 assumed exclu-
sive authority for the final review and 
approval of all death sentences across 
the nation. For decades, and for most 
capital offences, this had been the job 
of provincial-level appellate courts. 
The number of executions that year 
plummeted by one third, according to 
the SPC, as the result of a deliberate 
commitment to ‘killing fewer’ 少杀	by 
removing the more arbitrary elements 
from the system.
In the early 1980s, the Party-state 
gave provincial courts the authority to 
review death penalty cases because it 
wanted serious crimes punished ‘se-
verely and swiftly’. Rising crime was 
part of the social fallout of rapid eco-
nomic growth and it was threatening 
social stability. So the Party ran a se-
ries of law enforcement campaigns un-
der the rubric Strike Hard 严打. Strike 
Hard was both the name of intermit-
tent campaigns and also an ongoing 
policy used against serious criminal 
offenders. Local courts responded by 
playing fast and loose with the death 
penalty. Across two decades, regard-
less of whether a Strike Hard campaign 
was in progress, the Party encouraged 
the liberal application of harsh pun-
ishment for crime. Over the decades, 
starting from Deng Xiaoping’s time, 
Party-state officials often quoted the 
adage that if a judge has the legal op-
tion to choose whether or not to apply 
the death penalty, that is, to choose ‘to 








































needed to reform the death penalty as 
part of his agenda for ‘harmonious jus-
tice’. The idea here was that death pen-
alty reform would itself help to bring 
about a more harmonious society.
For then SPC president Xiao Yang 
and other reformers in the SPC, institu-
tionalising the policy of ‘kill fewer kill 
cautiously’ 少杀慎杀 required offering 
a politically acceptable alternative to 
execution to provincial Party, police, 
and court authorities. In late 2006, 
Xiao Yang announced that immediate 
execution should be used only as a last 
resort, and only for the most serious 
or heinous crimes. He reversed the old 
Strike Hard adage, now saying, ‘when 
there is a choice to kill or not to kill, 
kill or not to kill, they should choose to 
kill’: 可杀，	可不杀，杀.2
By the end of 2003, the rationale 
that ‘killing many’ 多杀 deterred crime 
had worn thin, especially among sen-
ior police, prosecutors, and judges 
in Beijing. Ongoing Strike Hard cam-
paigns had not stemmed annual rises 
in serious crime. More importantly, 
the idea of swift and severe punish-
ment made a poor fit with Party rhet-
oric on the rule of law and the Harmo-
nious Society 和谐社会 platform of Hu 
Jintao, China’s paramount leader from 
2002–2012. Politics drives most judicial 
reforms in China. It was at the height 
of the Harmonious Society period in 
2005 that Hu Jintao decided that China 
A Badiucao cartoon
Source: @badiucao, Twitter
without exception, always choose not 
to kill’ 可杀，可不杀，一律不杀.3 In 
place of execution, the SPC encouraged 
the use of the suspended death penalty 
死缓 for the majority of violent capi-
tal cases. In a relatively short space of 
time, provincial authorities came on 
board. 
It was around this time that judi-
cial authorities initiated a new prac-
tice called ‘criminal mediation’ 刑事
调节 for death penalty cases, in which 
SPC judges would mediate between 
the offender and the victim’s family. 
The SPC billed it as an opportunity to 
enhance social harmony and mitigate 
social instability. It had become a com-
mon occurrence for victims’ families 
to protest outside the courts if convict-
ed murderers were given a commuted 
death sentence instead of immediate 
execution. SPC judges began to strike 
deals: for example, an offender could 
pay the victim’s family hundreds of 
thousands of renminbi in compensa-
tion in exchange for the family’s agree-
ment that the offender could live. The 
offender would then be given a sus-
pended death sentence that would 
typically be downgraded to a life sen-
tence of around eighteen to twenty 
years after a two-year probation pe-
riod. The practice of ‘cash for clem-
ency’4 is still in operation today even 
though the Harmonious Society policy 
is long gone.
In the ten years since 1 January 
2007, China’s execution rates have 
greatly decreased, according to the 
judges of the SPC. While the precise 
number of people executed in China 
each year is still a state secret, it’s esti-
mated to be around 1,900 — an impres-
sive drop from around an estimated 
10,000 a year ten years ago.5 
There are two developments that 
could lower the number even further. 
One is current talk of legislating to 
take drug transporting off the capital 
punishment list. The Criminal Law, as 
it was amended in 1997, listed sixty- 
eight offences for which the death 
penalty could be applied, though with 
most, judges did not tend to favour 
execution. The number of capital of-
fences in the Criminal Law has now 
dropped from sixty-eight to fifty-five. 
The four main types of crime for which 
immediate execution is used are mur-
der, armed robbery with violence, 
drug trafficking, and the transporta-
tion of illegal drugs. Close to half the 
people executed today are found guilty 
of drug transporting: ‘mules’ caught 
carrying over fifty grams of metham-







































poor workers from rural areas who 
take drugs inland from places such as 
the Golden Triangle border in south-
ern China. Since drug traffickers are 
organised criminals who are more dif-
ficult to apprehend, policing author-
ities have traditionally gone after the 
easy-to-catch mules. 
A second development is a push 
to improve the quality of police investi-
gations and criminal trials. The goal is 
to lessen the likelihood of miscarriag-
es of justices resulting from the long-
standing if illegal practice of forced 
confessions. To this end, President 
Xi Jinping is promoting a new policy 
called ‘making the trial central’ to the 
criminal process 以审判为中心. This 
aims to change the tradition of ‘inves-
tigation-centered-thinking’, stressing 
instead the importance of rigorously 
testing evidence through cross-exami-
nation at trial. Reforms are currently 
underway to improve evidence gath-
ering, to encourage witnesses to testify 
in court, and, crucially, to make unlaw-
fully obtained evidence (like forced 
confessions) inadmissible at trial. 
A more permanent decline in cap-
ital punishment requires much more 
in the way of legislative reform. Nev-
ertheless, advocating for suspended 
death sentences and the other initia-
tives, including Xi’s policy on putting 
the emphasis on trials instead of inves-



































































XI JINPING TIME AND AGAIN stresses that the Chinese Dream is 
the dream of the ‘old one hundred sur-
names’ laobaixing 老百姓, the common 
men and women of China. This dream, 
however, involves what development 
theorists have termed a ‘betting on 
the strong’ strategy, where there are 
many who do not ‘get rich first’ and 
some that never will. From being one 
of the most equal nations in the world 
nearly four decades ago, China is today 
listed as one of the most unequal na-
tions in the world. Economic reforms 
brought much prosperity for some, but 
also created a system with two kinds of 
people: the haves and the have-nots. 
Like the American Dream, the 
people who fall outside the grand 
narrative of the Chinese Dream tend 
to organise themselves in ways that 
lie outside the legal rules and accept-
ed norms of society, in an attempt to 
merely get by. The politics of weiwen 维
稳, or stability maintenance, has devel-
oped China into a virtual surveillance 
state. Yet instead of a population para-
lysed by control, illegal entrepreneur-
ialism — involving fraud, corruption, 
thievery, and other criminal activities 
— is flourishing, as I document with 
my former students in Crime and the 
Chinese Dream, published in 2018 by 
the Hong Kong University Press (with 
a forthcoming e-book by Oxford Uni-
versity Press).
In the countryside, illegal path-
ways to wealth are so common that 
many parts of the countryside can 
best be described as an ‘underworld’ 
economy. ‘Fang Village’ in southern 
China is one example. There the so-
C R I M I N A L  V I L L A G E S  A N D 












































called ‘cake uncles’ 饼叔 who, having 
struggled to get by the traditional way 
by planting cash crops and pig farm-
ing, ventured into illegal logging and 
cigarette-making. After the local au-
thorities cracked down, however, they 
started new businesses involving cake 
delivery. The entrepreneurs of Fang 
village started their criminal careers 
delivering cakes while falsifying ac-
count books. While selling on credit 
one year and not asking for payment 
before the next year, they exaggerated 
the number and agreed price of cakes 
sold by falsifying the original numbers 
and signatures. Not until they had tak-
Criminal poster wall in 
Guangzhou 
Image: Børge Bakken 
en the activities out of the village were 
they able to get away with their illegal 
trade. This kind of roving crime has 
become the hallmark of success for 
these entrepreneurs, and they have 
now branched into much more diver-
sified trades, even setting up branches 
in Beijing and Shanghai and other big 
cities. Because their entrepreneurial-
ism brought prosperity to the village, 
and any crimes were committed out-
side their jurisdiction, local officials 
turned a blind eye. 
Other ‘criminal villages’ have 
specialised in organised large-scale 
shoplifting, car theft, and burglary. 
In Guangzhou, a large industry of mi-
grant workers leaving the assembly 
line to work as illegal motorcycle taxi 
drivers was partly quelled by the au-
thorities, who simply banned motorcy-
cles from the entire city. The practice 
was repeated in many other cities in 
Guangzhou, but the illegal taxi drivers 
have constantly relocated their busi-
nesses, playing cat and mouse with 
the police. The illegal trade also in-
volves serious violence. In one exam-
ple, investigative reporter Fu Jianfeng 
傅剑锋 has written and lectured ex-
tensively about a ‘robbery village’ in 
Guangxi. His reports were first pub-
lished in the newspaper Southern 
Weekly 南方周末, and his findings have 
now allegedly been published in book 
form. The young men from the village 
(some only juveniles) went to train 
stations and other crowded places in 
the bigger cities and cut off selected 
victims’ hands with cleavers, and then 
robbed people in the ensuing panic. 
Fu followed a juvenile gang member 
from the village through the legal sys-
tem, revealing the desperation felt by 
rural people who feel they have no le-
gal means to enrichment open to them. 
Many of his fellow gang members have 
since been executed. 
Other examples include villages, 
typically in poor south-western prov-
inces including Yunnan and Guangxi, 
where the whole local economy is 
based on the production and transpor-
tation of illegal drugs. A local lawyer 
told me that in just one local prison in 
Xishuang Banna in Yunnan (with a to-
tal population of less than a million), 
there were more than 200 inmates on 
death row awaiting immediate execu-
tion. The Supreme People’s Court has 
recently introduced poverty as a mit-
igating circumstance for those eligible 
for immediate execution because such 
executions are now being nearly ex-
clusively practiced against poor peas-











































executed are mere ‘drug mules’ who 
typically transport the drugs from the 
villages to the cities on the east coast. 
Other villages produce and trade in 
illegal firearms, or specialise in falsify-
ing documents. There are even villages 
involved in human trafficking, mainly 
of girls into places where local men 
cannot find brides. Tens of thousands 
of children are allegedly kidnapped in 
China each year, and parents have or-
ganised themselves into teams, visiting 
criminal trafficking villages to look for 
their kids.
Village specialisation along local 
and clan lines has always been a com-
mon practice in the Chinese country-
side, with the possible exception of the 
Maoist days. During the Qing dynasty, 
the guilds and trades were also special-
ised along tongxiang 同乡 — common 
village lines. For example, black-
smiths all over China were known to 
come from Ningbo, while the so-called 
‘sing-song’ girls seemed to come from 
Guangzhou. One can now see this or-
ganising principle in all kinds of le-
gitimate industries as well, and the 
criminal counterparts follow these 
well-beaten but traditional tracks of 
organisation in China. 
The village base and transient 
character of so-called roving crime 
is, of course, a matter of opportunity, 
and in the example of Fang village, the 
opportunistic fraudsters soon became 
the modernisers and local heroes of 
the village. The cake uncles were the 
first to build three-storey houses in the 
village, and the village girls chose the 
young men in the cake-uncle industry 
as their preferred spouses (there are 
but a few female fraudsters). The trade 
has now also spread to neighbouring 
villages, which have made deals with 
the original cake-uncle village. The 
decentralised character of the police 
force makes roving crime much more 
lucrative than any legal approach. The 
villagers have even formed a system 
of pooling money for buying fellow 
fraudsters out of the rather short arm 
of the law. A reduction of a potential 
ten-year sentence to a one-year sen-
tence typically used to cost 10,000 
yuan, while the much more difficult 
process of a full withdrawal of a case 
will cost up to 100,000 yuan in bribes 
and other costs. While the cooperation 
of these illegal networks is advanced, 
the desperation of those who have no 
legitimate opportunities to get rich or 
just to get by are even more evident by 
the extreme risk behaviour involved in 
the operations. Some even pay the ulti-










































































THE YEAR 2017 was the fourteenth consecutive year in which the 
central government’s first policy doc-
ument, China’s No. 1 Document 中央
一号文件, focussed on rural issues and 
emphasised official support for agri-
cultural development. Over the last 
several decades, China’s urban-biased 
economic boom has triggered demo-
graphic and other changes that seri-
ously challenge the country’s capacity 
to feed itself. With about twenty-two 
per cent of the world’s population 
(over nine per cent of whom remain 
undernourished)6 and only seven per 
cent of its total agricultural acreage, it 
is a pressing problem.
Leaving the Farm 
Since economic reforms began in the 
late 1970s, employment opportunities 
generated by industrialisation and the 
expansion of the urban construction 
and service sectors have stimulated 
rural–urban migration on a mas-
sive scale. From 1979, China’s urban 
population has grown by about 586 
million to reach 771 million in 2015.7 
This population is highly concentrated 
along China’s south-eastern coast (see 
Figure 1). The central government’s 
National New-Type Urbanisation Plan 
2014–2020 国家新型城镇化规划, an-
nounced in March 2014, when China’s 
urban population was 53.7 per cent of 
its population, has set a target for the 
urban population to increase by one 
percentage point a year to reach sixty 
per cent by 2020 — a figure compara-
ble to other developing countries with 
similar per capita income levels.8 As a 
result, both the absolute number and 
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relative share of people engaged in the 
agricultural sector will continue to fall 
rapidly. 
According to the Migrant Workers 
Report 2016, the total number of mi-
grant workers in 2016 reached 281.71 
million.9 Of these, sixty-six per cent 
were male and seventy-six per cent 
were under the age of fifty. Most new 
migrants followed their predecessors 
into the wealthier eastern provinces. 
China’s remaining, steadily declining 
rural workforce increasingly compris-
es female and elderly workers. But 
will this necessarily be a bad thing for 
China’s agriculture, and hence its food 
security? 
My own research suggests that 
the answer to this is yes, it will be. I 
show that rural-to-urban migration 
has a negative net impact on agricul-
tural labour productivity (rice yield 
per worker per day), because the off-
farm income that those migrants bring 
home, which can be used for agricul-
tural investment, does not compensate 
for the ‘lost labour’ effect of out-migra-
tion. China’s aggregate rice output has 
fallen as a result of this mass migra-
tion. This fall in output is compound-
ed by the ageing of the agricultural 
workforce, which impacts negatively 
on productivity. The only good news is 
that female workers appear to be more 
Figure 1: Share of urban population across provinces in China, 2015
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2016
productive than male workers — but 
not enough to offset the negative im-
pacts of migration and ageing farmers.
The Future of Farming
The consolidation of farmland is one 
potential solution for raising agricul-
tural output. Although land was collec-
tivised in the 1950s and 1960s, today, 
a typical Chinese farm is less than an 
acre in size.10 The large number of 
small, non-contiguous landholdings 
has impeded the modernisation of Chi-
nese agriculture that could stem from 
technological upgrades, mechanisa-
tion, and economies of scale. 
Farmers do not own land, which 
belongs to the state, but have dec-
ades-long leaseholds from their vil-
lage collective. Individual farmers 
are allowed to use the land under a 
contract system that has been in place 
since the 1970s. Land reforms in re-
cent years have opened the door to 
corporate farming, heralding a new 
era for agricultural development.11 
Through a refinement to collective 
ownership called ‘land management 
rights’, a village with agreement by all 
of its farmers may collectively trans-
fer its land to a corporation that pays 
the village an annual rent, which is 
then distributed to individual farmers. 
This is not aimed at creating mega- 
farms, but rather at facilitating land 
consolidation, enabling farmers to 
use machinery and new technology 
efficiently, and to embrace corpo-
rate farming, which allows them to 
hand over all their produce to a cor-
poration.12 This model provides rent 
income to elderly farmers unable to 
tend subsistence plots, and wages to 
the left-behind women and others 
trained to participate in mechanised 
farming. 
However, the central government 
continues to stress the inviolability of 
the rural collective ownership system. 
Although private land ownership has 
greatly contributed to efficiency and 
welfare gains in other developing 
countries such as Mexico, it simply 
is not on the cards for China in the 
foreseeable future.13 Because private 
land ownership could result in farm-
ers’ deciding to use the land for non- 
A farm in Xiangxiang, Hunan province 






































agricultural purposes, it could threat-
en the farmland ‘red line’, originally 
set at 1.818 billion mu of arable farm-
land (about 121.2 million hectares) by 
the end of 2015.14 On 4 February 2017, 
the State Council published a ‘national 
territorial planning outline’ 全国国土
规划纲要	(2016–2030), raising this ‘red 
line’ to 1.865 billion mu (about 124.33 
million hectares) by 2020, with the 
retention of at least 1.825 billion mu 
(about 121.67 million hectares) by the 
year 2030.15 
Given the shrinking and ageing 
rural workforce, and increasing urban 
pressures on rural land, technology 
will have to play a pivotal role in meet-
ing China’s food needs in the future. 
Already, China is spending billions of 
yuan on water systems, seeds, robots, 
and data science to develop sustain-
able, high-yield agricultural practic-
es.16 But the future of farming is about 
more than growing plants — it’s about 
growing businesses too. Farmers need 
not only to cultivate bigger fields and 
raise yields but also to ‘grow smarter’ 
and sell wiser.17 
Already, there is a rural e-com-
merce boom. Over the last decade, 
China has created more than one 
thousand ‘Taobao’ villages 淘宝村, as 
thousands of former residents have re-
turned home from the cities to build up 
their local village economies.18 Making 
use of Alibaba-owned Taobao — the 
nation’s largest e-commerce platform 
— farmers are now able to take charge 
of the whole agricultural production 
process from field to market, enabling 
them, rather than traditional commod-
ity traders and middlemen, to earn 
more than before. Part of the way the 
government helps is to enrich rural 
information networks and logistics 
system. With the rapid development of 
express postal networks, farmers are 
able to sell online not only trinkets, but 
also perishables. The government en-
courages this, as it serves the national 
policy priority of eliminating poverty 
in rural China — it also attracts labour 
back to the farms.19 
Although the land reform and 
technology policies discussed in Chi-
na’s No.1 Document for 2017 do not 
encompass the privatisation of land, 
they do provide more flexibility for 
farmers to take control of their liveli-
hoods. This could generate prosperity 
for rural dwellers, and ultimately feed 




















































PROSPERITY AND FREEDOM:  
HONG KONG’S DILEMMA
Antony Dapiran
Hong Kong — ‘exuberant like a bamboo or a pine tree’
Source: Wikimedia Commons 
‘FELLOW COMPATRIOTS, dear  friends, time flies 
fast! It has been twenty years since Hong Kong’s 
return to the motherland. According to China’s 
tradition, a man enters adulthood at the age of 
twenty. So today, we are celebrating the coming 
of age of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, which has grown exuberant like a bamboo 

















































On 1 July 2017, when Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke on what he 
called the ‘solemn and joyous occasion’ of the twentieth anniversary of 
Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty at a ceremony in Hong Kong’s 
Convention and Exhibition Centre — the site of the handover ceremony 
twenty years earlier — he struck a triumphalist tone. ‘The practice of “One 
Country, Two Systems” in Hong Kong is a success story recognised by all’, 
Xi declared.
Yet he was addressing a Hong Kong that is deeply divided. Politely 
applauded by an audience of Hong Kong government officials and pro-Bei-
jing loyalists inside the convention centre, Xi did not hear the shouts of 
protesters clamouring behind police barricades several blocks away. Xi’s 
visit had been carefully choreographed by the Hong Kong government, 
with streets blockaded and protesters screened off, to ensure that no 
signs of dissent fell within Xi’s field of vision during his three-day visit. In 
preparation, the government had deployed police to remove all traces of 
the usually colourful array of street banners promoting pro-democracy 
or anti-China political causes, to avoid any inadvertent ‘embarrassment’ 
(although exactly who would be embarrassed was not clear). 
British Hong Kong: Victoria Harbour in 1988, showing the Bank of China Building under construction
Source: Wikipedia
Standing Still
The economy and living standards in Hong Kong have remained near 
stagnant since the handover. Average monthly wages have only inched 
ahead over twenty years, from HK$11,113 in 1997 to HK$15,451 at the 
end of 2016 — an annual growth rate of around 1.8 per cent, while the 
consumer price index, after a period of deflation from 1999 to 2003, grew 
by around four per cent per year in subsequent years. (By comparison, 
average Australian wages more than doubled over the same period, with 
an average annual inflation rate of 2.6 per cent.) Inequality, meanwhile, 
has continued to grow, with the wealth gap hitting a record high in Hong 
Kong in 2016. The Gini coefficient — which measures wealth distribution 
on a scale from zero, representing perfect equality, to one, representing 
maximum inequality — reached 0.539 that year, making it the world’s 
second most unequal city after only New York in a series of global met-
ropolitan cities surveyed by the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Depart-
ment.2 (By comparison, the department noted that Australia had a Gini 
coefficient of 0.33 in 2015.)
At the same time, property prices have spiralled, recently reaching lev-
els last seen in the 1997 property market bubble (which burst in the Asian 
financial crisis and, with property values falling by as much as two-thirds, 
hammered the territory’s economy and left it with six years of deflation). 
Hong Kong housing is now the world’s most unaffordable, with the aver-
age apartment costing 18.1 times gross annual median income. This is de-
spite the government introducing various market-cooling measures such 
as imposing double stamp duty on non-local (primarily mainland) buyers. 
In order to build properties that entry-level buyers can afford, developers 
are building apartments as small as twelve square metres, not much larg-
er than the seven-and-a-half square metre prison cells at Stanley Prison, 
where former chief executive Donald Tsang found himself earlier this year 
after being sentenced to twenty months’ imprisonment for misconduct in 

















































down for 25 April 2018, while additional 
bribery charges have been put on hold by 
prosecutors after two consecutive trials 
returned hung juries.)
‘Development,’ Xi declared in his 
July speech, ‘is crucial for Hong Kong’s 
survival, and it holds the golden key to 
resolving various issues in Hong Kong.’ 
This must have seemed to Xi and his col-
leagues as stating a doctrinal truth. It was 
Deng Xiaoping, after all, who on his fa-
mous Southern Tour of 1992 coined the 
slogan ‘Development is the fundamental 
principle’ 发展才是硬道理, and the CCP 
has found the formula effective on the mainland for maintaining pow-
er and containing political dissent. However, Xi’s statement conveyed just 
how deeply the official line from Beijing misunderstands Hong Kong in 
purporting that — just like people in the rest of China — if only Hong Kong 
people were wealthier, they would be happier. It would help, to be sure. 
By the end of 2017, Hong Kong was displaying all of the signs of eco-
nomic and social inequality that have, arguably, spurred political instabil-
ity in the rest of the world, feeding phenomena such as Brexit and Trump-
ism. This was highlighted by the following two headlines appearing within 
days of each other in the South China Morning Post in November: ‘Hang 
Seng smashes through 30,000 barrier for first time in a decade as energy, 
financial stocks rally’3 and ‘Poverty in Hong Kong hits record high, with 1 
in 5 people considered poor’.4 
Of the city’s 7.35 million residents, in 2016, 1.35 million were living 
below the official poverty line — defined as HK$4,000 (around AU$678) 
income per month for a single person, being half the median monthly 
household income — according to the Hong Kong Poverty Situation report. 
Donald Tsang
Source: Wikimedia Commons
The Mainland Steps in
Despite having a population of around 0.5 per cent that of the mainland, 
Hong Kong’s GDP was sixteen per cent of the mainland’s twenty years ago. 
Today it is less than three per cent. As a result, mainland economic in-
fluence in Hong Kong has grown significantly in recent years. Mainland 
real estate developers won the majority of Hong Kong government land 
auctions in 2016 and 2017, willing to pay prices that make even seasoned 
Hong Kong developers blanche. Early in 2017, two Chinese companies 
paid a record HK$16.9 billion for a waterfront residential site in Ap Lei 
Chau on the south side of Hong Kong Island, outbidding local property 
tycoons including Li Ka-shing and the Kwok brothers. International and 
local Hong Kong firms seeking prime office space in the Central district 
are finding themselves priced out of the market by mainland companies 
seeking to plant a flag in the city. 
Mainland financial institutions and corporations have taken up half 
of Central real estate in 2017, according to real estate firm JLL Research, 
with international financial institutions, hedge funds, and law firms be-
ing pushed out to more remote, cheaper, districts. Mainland financial in-
stitutions are making use of their new Hong Kong bases to take leading 
roles in syndicates underwriting listings on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
and lending to corporate borrowers, partly by accepting pricing or terms 
that Western banks consider uncommercial, whether this is in a bid to 
‘buy’ market share or because they are motivated by other non-business 
considerations.
Today, there is almost no business in Hong Kong that is left untouched 
by the mainland in some way, whether a mainland entity is a counter-party, 
shareholder, or financier. Increasing mainland involvement in the econo-
my has led to rising demand for Mandarin language skills and profession-
als who have a cultural familiarity with the mainland. This has squeezed 
out not only the traditionally dominant English-speaking Western ‘expats’ 

















































become the ‘new expats’, as they take an increasing share of the jobs in 
investment banks, accountancy and law firms, and other related profes-
sional service industries that have built up around Hong Kong’s financial 
services and trading hub economy: in 2016, trade and logistics represent-
ed twenty-two per cent of Hong Kong’s GDP, financial services 17.6 per 
cent, and professional services and other producer services 12.3 per cent, 
according to the Hong Kong Trade Development Council. Visitors from the 
mainland also dominate Hong Kong’s tourism industry, with seventy-six 
per cent of total visitors coming from the mainland in 2016.
It is not just social inequality or diminished prosperity that is dividing 
Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s people are struggling to assert an identity apart 
from — even while being a part of — the rest of China. That struggle finds 
its expression in literature, filmmaking, and art as well as ongoing pro-
test movements in Hong Kong. It is increasingly undermined by Beijing’s 
actions to assert its control over the territory as well as its insistence that 
Hong Kong’s identity must be subordinate to the mainland: that is to say, 
the ‘one country’ must take precedence over the ‘two systems’. This was 
notable from the recent Nineteenth Party Congress, at which ‘Upholding 
the principle of “One Country, Two Systems” and promoting national re-
unification’ was one of the fourteen ‘fundamental principles’ that form 
part of ‘Xi Jinping’s Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for 
a New Era’ 习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想. The integration of Hong 
Kong (together with Taiwan) into the Chinese state is well and truly on the 
agenda of the central leadership.
 The shift in tone in the Xi era can be seen when comparing the res-
olution relating to Hong Kong from this year’s Party Congress with that 
from the Eighteenth Party Congress held in 2012, under then-president 
Hu Jintao 胡锦涛. Both versions referred to ‘faithfully implementing’ the 
One Country, Two Systems policy and maintaining a ‘high degree of au-
tonomy’. But the 2012 version also speaks of the need to ‘respect the dif-
ferences of the two systems’. In 2017, that respect was gone, replaced with 
a new demand for unity, that Hong Kong people ‘share both the historic 
responsibility of national rejuvenation and the pride of a strong and pros-
perous China.’ This was accompanied by the sternly worded warning: ‘We 
will never allow anyone, any organisation, or any political party, at any 
time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from Chi-
na’. It signalled Beijing’s intention to tighten its control over Hong Kong 
to prevent any kind of activities it sees as undermining national unity or 
Party rule.
Lawfare
The latest efforts by Beijing to bring Hong Kong to heel have come in the 
form of ‘lawfare’ — using Hong Kong’s legal system to manage or silence 
political opponents and/or to achieve political objectives. The authorities 
can thus pay lip service to Hong Kong’s rule of law, universally recognised 
as an important core value of Hong Kong, while using that same legal sys-
tem to control dissent.
The lawfare campaign began in 2014, when the Hong Kong govern-
ment allowed minibus and taxi companies to obtain injunctions that were 
the legal basis for the authorities’ clearing of the Umbrella Movement’s 
occupation of the streets. In permitting the civil court process to be used 
to resolve a political and public order issue, the government was engaging 
in rule by law (as opposed to rule of law) — a tactic frequently ascribed to 
the mainland but now also arguably equally applicable to Hong Kong. (See 
(See the China Story Yearbook 2016: Control, Chapter 2 ‘Control by Law’, 
pp.43–57.)
The lawfare campaign continued with the political screening of candi-
dates for the Legislative Council election in 2016, which resulted in several 
candidates from ‘localist’ parties being barred from running. When two 
successfully elected candidates from the Umbrella Movement-inspired 
Youngspiration 青年新政 party deliberately misread their oaths during 

















































intervened, re-interpreting the Basic Law and retroactively prescribing 
the manner in which officials were to swear their oaths. As a result, the 
pair were disqualified.5  
In 2017, the Hong Kong government took further action in the courts 
to disqualify four additional legislators for oath-swearing infractions. The 
courts, citing the NPC, stated they had no choice but to concur. Thus six 
duly-elected legislators were removed from office by the government on 
the basis of a piece of retroactive law-making by Beijing, all done under 
the cover of the ‘need to uphold Hong Kong’s rule of law’. These disqual-
ified legislators are now being asked to repay all salaries and allowances 
paid to them during the time they were ‘illegally’ occupying their seats, 
amounting to millions of Hong Kong dollars and will likely leave them fac-
ing personal bankruptcy. 
In August 2017, the government took the next step in its lawfare 
campaign. A lower court in August of 2016 had sentenced the ‘Umbrel-
la Three’ (Joshua Wong Chi-fung 黃之鋒, the international face of Hong 
Kong’s youth-led democracy movement, together with his fellow student 
leaders Alex Chow Yong-kang 周永康, and Nathan Law Kwun-chung 羅冠
聰), to between 80 and 120 hours of community service (and a suspended 
three-week prison sentence, in the case of Chow) for their role in leading 
Youngspiration volunteers
Photo: inmediahk, Flickr
an ‘unlawful assembly’ during the Umbrella Movement protests of Sep-
tember 2014. Although they completed their sentences, the Hong Kong 
government backed by Beijing appealed their sentence, calling for tough-
er punishment. This sent a clear message to the people of Hong Kong 
that dissent will not be tolerated. On appeal, the Umbrella Three were 
sentenced to between six and eight months in prison. As a convenient 
by-product of their receiving jail sentences in excess of six months, they 
would be banned from running for public office for five years. With Leg-
islative Council elections operating on fixed four-year terms, this would 
effectively knock them out of the formal political process until 2024, by 
which point, Beijing no doubt hopes, they will be forgotten, or at least 
that their influence will be significantly diminished. Following a further 
appeal, the Court of Final Appeal overturned their sentences in February 
2018; however, Hong Kong’s highest court at the same time endorsed the 
lower court’s sentencing guidelines, which call for an immediate custodi-
al sentence for unlawful protests involving violence.
If the government thought that imprisoning the young activists might 
take them out of the public eye, this was quickly shown to be misguided. 
Instead, media commentators, including the Wall Street Journal editorial 
board, and organisations including Human Rights Watch began referring 
to the Umbrella Three as ‘political prisoners’. In response, Hong Kong 
Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor 林鄭月娥 argued that the cas-
es ‘are not political persecutions or persecutions on the basis of expression 
of views’ and insisted that there was ‘absolutely no political interference, 
both [sic] in the prosecution, in the review of sentence and in the judg-
ments and rulings’.6 Her words rang hollow. The Umbrella Three were 
jailed for conducting a political protest, and it was a political appointee — 
Secretary for Justice, Rimsky Yuen Kwok-keung 袁國強 — who decided to 
prosecute and later appeal their sentences, reportedly against the advice 
of Department of Justice career civil servants and senior public prosecu-
tors. It is impossible to argue that the decision was made purely in the 

















































 Jail, bankruptcy, ruined career prospects — the Hong Kong govern-
ment is trying to make the cost of dissent intolerably high. It wants Hong 
Kong’s politically active youth in particular to think twice about the cost of 
standing up for their beliefs.
The most recent step in the lawfare campaign, unfolding as 2017 
drew to a close, was the application to Hong Kong of the new PRC 
National Anthem Law 中华人民共和国国歌法, which mandates solemn 
and dignified behaviour when the national anthem is played, and crimi-
nalises acts insulting, disrespecting, or parodying the anthem. This was no 
doubt prompted in part by Hong Kong soccer fans’ repeatedly booing and 
jeering the national anthem at football matches, despite official warnings. 
This PRC law became one of the few mainland laws to be added to Annex 
III of Hong Kong’s Basic Law, which applies specified mainland laws to 
Hong Kong’s otherwise separate legal jurisdiction. The Hong Kong govern-
ment has said it will introduce appropriate local legislation to implement 
the law, including setting out criminal punishments. In the mainland, dis-
respecting the anthem carries a penalty of up to three years in jail.
The Thin Red Line
In his Hong Kong speech, President Xi lay down a ‘red line’ that he said 
must not be crossed: ‘Any attempt to endanger national sovereignty and 
security … or use Hong Kong to carry out infiltration and sabotage activi-
ties against the mainland is an act that crosses the red line and is absolute-
ly impermissible’.
At the beginning of the academic year in September, students on Hong 
Kong’s campuses set about testing Xi’s red line, putting up posters advocat-
ing Hong Kong independence. This provoked a predictably strong response 
from officials, who declared that even expressing the sentiment was ‘ille-
gal’. The fact is that there are currently no Hong Kong laws outlawing se-
ditious or subversive speech, although it is widely anticipated that Carrie 
Lam and her government will attempt 
to introduce a new iteration of the so-
called ‘Article 23’ anti-subversion law 
during her term of office. That may be 
a test of the community’s sentiment 
and resolve: a similar attempt in 2003 
brought half a million people onto the 
streets and led to the withdrawal of the 
law and the resignation of then-chief 
executive Tung Chee-hwa 董建華. 
But the reality is that there is no popu-
lar support in the broader Hong Kong 
community for independence, or even 
self-determination, and even its ad-
vocates will admit when pressed that 
their real intention is to provoke debate and push Beijing to respect the 
high degree of autonomy Hong Kong was promised for fifty years after the 
handover, a promise that is now being broken.
The question for Hong Kong is where will Xi’s ‘red line’ be drawn? 
Beijing will not tolerate Hong Kong being used as a base to subvert the Par-
ty-state or its interests. The abduction and detention of Hong Kong pub-
lishers and booksellers involved in printing and distributing books that 
undermine Party leaders and question their policies make it clear that 
exercising freedom of expression can cross the line. The National Anthem 
Law demonstrates that fomenting disrespect for mainland institutions and 
symbols such as the anthem crosses the line. The sentences handed down 
to the Umbrella Three suggest that taking to the streets to defy openly Bei-
jing’s policies on Hong Kong also crosses the line. However, keep inch-
ing away and the point could be reached where criticising the Hong Kong 
government itself could be considered intolerably ‘endangering national 
sovereignty and security’. At that point, the rights and freedoms granted to 



















































Those rights and 
freedoms, and the 
‘high degree of au-
tonomy’ that Hong 
Kong is said to enjoy 
under the One Coun-
try, Two Systems 一
国两制 formula, must 
be seen through that 
lens. The question is 
whether the rights 
and freedoms under-
write Hong Kong’s prosperity, as Britain believed when it negotiated the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, and Hong Kong’s pro-democracy ac-
tivists still contend, or whether those rights and freedoms can and should 
be sacrificed in order to have ‘stability’ alongside ‘prosperity’, as Beijing 
and its supporters would have it. It would not be the first time that Hong 
Kong’s rulers have sought to appeal to interlinked ‘stability and prosperi-
ty’ to quell domestic unrest: the British did the same after the pro-Beijing, 
anti-colonial riots of 1967. It is ironic that the 1967  generation that is now 
in charge is turning the same arguments on their political opponents.
The nub of the question is this: would Hong Kongers prefer to feel a 
little more prosperous, or a little more free? It is a question that has been 
debated more broadly at least since Francis Fukuyama wondered in 1989 
whether we had reached the ‘end of history’, and whether the universal-
isation of Western liberal democracy was the final form of government.7 
Fukuyama suggested that the collapse of Eastern European communism 
was an indication that people would always opt for the freedom of democ-
racy. The economic success of China’s form of authoritarian capitalism, 
referred to as the ‘Beijing consensus’ or the ‘China model’,8 has in recent 
years been mooted as a riposte to that, probably premature, conclusion. 
Yet questions remain as to whether the model is sustainable in the face of 
Pro-Beijing, anti-colonial riots of 1967
Photo: Roger W, Flickr
a growing middle-class population. Would they be happy with the limited 
freedom offered to them under the China model, or will they inevitably be 
lead towards Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ in demanding liberal democracy? 
Hong Kong is living out this global theoretical battle in real time. 
As President Xi concluded his remarks in July, he issued a call for 
unity: 
People of all ethnic groups across the country are engaged in a joint 
endeavour to… fulfil the Chinese Dream of national renewal. Ensuring 
the continued success of the practice of ‘one country, two systems’ in 
Hong Kong is part and parcel of the Chinese Dream. 
To Xi, Hong Kong’s role is simply as part of his signature policy of 
pursuing the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation 中华民族伟大复兴
的中国梦. He fails to realise that, while Hong Kong and the rest of China 












































A COMMEMORATION AND 
A CELEBRATION
Taiwan: Seventy Years On — A Difficult  
Anniversary 
·  MARK HARRISON
Rainbow Connections 



















































ON 28 FEBRUARY 1947, in Tai-wan’s capital Taipei, two customs 
guards accosted a widowed woman, 
Lin Jiang-mai, selling unlicensed ciga-
rettes at the Tianma Teahouse on pres-
ent-day Nanjing Road. In the ensuing 
confrontation, one of the guards struck 
the woman; an angry crowd gathered, 
and one of the guards fired his pistol 
and killed a bystander. This set off a 
riot, and then an island-wide uprising 
by the Taiwanese people against the 
Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) gov-
ernment on Taiwan.
Japan had claimed Taiwan as a 
colonial territory from 1895, after it 
defeated China in a war near the end 
of the Qing imperial period. It ruled 
Taiwan for fifty years, until its surren-
der at the end of WWII in 1945. Under 
the Japanese, Taiwan experienced 
both modernisation and colonial op-
pression. Resistance to Japanese rule 
took the form of violent uprisings in 
1915 and 1930, but also civic activism. 
Among many actions, leading Taiwan-
ese petitioned the Japanese Diet every 
year from 1920 to 1934 to establish a 
Taiwanese legislative assembly, until 
Tokyo’s turn to hard right-wing milita-
rism made such activism impossible in 
its colonial territories. 
Meanwhile, in 1911 in mainland 
China, the Qing dynasty fell, and the 
the Chinese Nationalists under Dr Sun 
Yat-sen founded the Republic of China. 
From the late 1920s, China descend-
ed into chaos, with warlords dividing 
the country into virtual fiefdoms, the 
horror of Japanese military invasion 
and occupation of the north-east, and 
in the second half of the 1940s the out-
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break of full-scale civil war between 
the Nationalists and the Communists. 
Upon Japan’s defeat at the end of 
WWII, control of Taiwan passed to the 
Nationalist government under Chiang 
Kai-shek 蒋介石. It became a province 
of the Republic of China, and Chiang, 
who was preoccupied with the Com-
munist threat, dispatched one of his 
generals to Taiwan to run it as gover-
nor-general. Initially welcomed, the 
Nationalist administration quickly 
proved itself to be incompetent and 
corrupt. Amid the roiling  social and 
political tension between the main-
land Chinese and the Japanese-edu-
cated Taiwanese, the beating of Lin 
Jiang-mai was the flashpoint for the 
eruption of violence.
The provincial government 
feigned sincerity in negotiations with 
Taiwanese community leaders while 
secretly organising for military rein-
forcements from the mainland. Upon 
their arrival on 8 March, the military 
began killing civilians both systemat-
ically and indiscriminately across the 
island. Estimates are that 30,000 peo-
ple died, while tens of thousands more 
were imprisoned or fled to Japan or 
Hong Kong. Exiled Taiwanese estab-
lished a fractious nationalist move-
ment dedicated to the creation of an 
independent Republic of Taiwan, free 
from both Japan and China.
The February 28 Uprising, known 
as 2-28 二二八 in Chinese, was wide-
ly reported internationally. Political 
leaders and government officials in 
the US and other Western countries 
subjected Chinese Nationalists to great 
opprobrium for their actions. The Brit-
ish-American journalist Felix Greene 
(cousin of the author Graham Greene), 
who became a long-standing support-
er of Mao’s China, later claimed that 
2-28 led to the split between Chiang 
Kai-shek and his US supporters. In any 
National 228 Memorial Museum, Taipei
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case, eighteen months later, with the 
Communists closing in, the Nationalist 
government of the Republic of China 
fled the mainland and relocated to Tai-
pei, along with more than one million 
Nationalist refugees and military per-
sonnel.
In what the Taiwanese call the 
White Terror under the Nationalist 
military dictatorship, the government 
set about erasing 2-28 from Taiwan’s 
collective memory. They forbid any 
mention of the event in writing or in 
public life generally. With the outbreak 
of the Korean War in 1950, and Tai-
wan’s alliance with the US reaffirmed 
in opposition to communism, the rest 
of the world soon forgot about 2-28.
The Taiwanese, however, did not. 
During Taiwan’s political liberalisa-
tion in the 1970s and 1980s, which led 
to democratic reforms, people began 
warily to discuss 2-28 in public fo-
rums. On the fortieth anniversary in 
1987, a handful of newspaper articles 
broached the subject. Then, in July that 
year, the government ended thirty- 
eight years of martial law, and with the 
taboo on discussion lifted, a vast out-
pouring of vitriolic debate and cultural 
expression around 2-28 erupted. On 28 
February 1988, the major newspapers 
devoted pages upon pages to the upris-
ing. In 1989, Hou Hsiao-hsien 侯孝賢	
released his monumental film A City 
of Sadness 悲情城市	— the first ever to 
address 2-28 in cinema.
On the fiftieth anniversary, in 
1997, 28 February was declared a na-
tional day of remembrance, and a 
memorial was consecrated in central 
Taipei. A plaque bearing an anodyne 
description of the event was vandal-
ised within hours — a sign of the con-
testation over the meaning of 2-28 in 
Taiwan and enduring bitterness and 
anger that many Taiwanese continued 
to feel. 
Still from A City of Sadness



















































Since the late 1990s, governments 
have held commissions of investiga-
tion and paid compensation to victims 
and their families. Yet despite this pro-
gress, questions of justice and memo-
ry have become dominant concerns 
of Taiwan’s political and cultural life. 
In a sense, 2-28 had come to stand in 
for all the injustices, social and politi-
cal harm, and enforced silences of the 
whole of the authoritarian martial law 
period from 1947 to 1987. The histo-
ry of political violence on the island 
has compelled a greater reckoning 
than that realised in 1997, spreading 
beyond the island of Taiwan itself. 
Taiwanese-American author Shawna 
Yang Ryan’s 2016 novel Green Island is 
one example, addressing 2-28 and its 
long aftermath in Taiwan and the US. 
 The policies and politics of transi-
tional justice, addressing the legacy of 
authoritarianism after Taiwan’s transi-
tion to democracy,  have been central 
themes for the Democratic Progressive 
Party government of President Tsai 
Ing-wen 蔡英文. The year 2017 was 
both the seventieth anniversary of 2-28 
and the thirtieth anniversary of the 
lifting of martial law, and on February 
28 Tsai led the remembrance with a 
speech at the 2-28 memorial in Taipei 
— one of numerous events held across 
the island. Protesters calling for Tai-
wanese independence massed across 
the road from the memorial park at 
the much larger Chiang Kai-shek me-
morial and statues of Chiang were van-
dalised at Fu Jen University 輔仁大學.
In a tacit acknowledgement of the 
importance of 2-28 in Taiwan in 2017, 
the events of seventy years ago were 
also commemorated in the mainland. 
On 23 February, Lin Wenyi 林文漪, a 
member of the National Committee of 
the Chinese People’s Political Consulta-
tive Conference, chaired a symposium 
on 2-28 in Beijing. Lin is also a member 
of the Central Committee of the Taiwan 
Democratic Self-Government League, 
a political party established in Hong 
Kong in 1947 and one of the eight offi-
cial United Front parties in China. 
An Fengshan 安峰山, spokeper-
son for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the 
State Council, made a statement call-
ing 2-28 ‘part of the Chinese people’s 
struggle for liberation’, and followed 
up by saying ‘For a long time, this in-
cident has been used by certain Tai-
wan independence forces for ulterior 
motives’. An Fengshan accused Taiwan 
independence ‘secessionists’ of twist-
ing the facts and labelled them ‘despic-
able’.1 Among a large number of arti-
cles, Xinhua news agency published a 
piece entitled ‘It is time to clarify the 
historical truth of 2-28’, which stated 
that 2-28 was a conflict between prov-
inces, and that historical archives and 
witness statements show any attempts 
to link the incident and ‘ideas advocat-
ing “Taiwan independence” are false 
and absurd’.2 
The Taiwanese are endeavour-
ing to understand their history, and 
negotiate a series of fraught transi-
tions with regard to 2-28: from private 
memories to public knowledge; from 
authoritarian state secrets to official 
acknowledgement; from the politico- 
judicial realm to sociocultural ques-
tions of cultural representation and 
social memory. Beijing’s attempt to 
‘rectify’ Taiwan’s political account of 
the history of 2-28 in 2017 intervened 
in a decades-long process. It could only 
ever present to the Taiwanese as bellig-
erent and antagonistic, an unwelcome 
interference in the complex terrain of 
politics and sociocultural life in Tai-
wan in which 2-28 is at the very centre. 
If, in February, Beijing attempted 
to appropriate the event that defines 
the history of modern Taiwan for the 
Taiwanese, in October, its rhetoric 
was more pragmatic. In a meeting 
of Fujian delegates to the Nineteenth 
Party Congress, led by Fujian Party 
Secretary and incoming head of the 
United Front Work Department, You 
Quan 尤权, Party delegates called for 
youth exchanges between Taiwan and 
Fujian; job creation through econom-
ic links, internships and apprentice-
ships; cross-Strait cultural festivals, 
and other activities.
Beijing’s Taiwan policy can be un-
derstood as either multidimensional 
and multilayered, deploying pragmat-
ic strategies within broad but sharply- 
defined ideological boundaries, or sim-
ply be contradictory and inconsistent. 
The Taiwanese, meanwhile, continue 
the difficult but constructive process of 
confronting their history and creating 
their modern identity. Beijing has yet 
to find a way to speak meaningfully to 
that task. For the Taiwanese in 2017, 
the political, social, and cultural gulf 
between Taiwan and mainland China 





































ON 20 MAY 2017, a group of parents went to the People’s Park 人民	
广场,	 Shanghai’s ‘dating park’, to ad-
vertise their single sons and daughters 
to the parents of prospective part-
ners. Unlike most other parents there, 
however, their children identified as 
LGBTQI. Their presence upset some 
other parents, and police ultimately 
ordered them to leave the park on the 
grounds that, in distributing printed 
material with commercial logos, they 
had not registered properly.
In 1997, homosexuality, which 
had been illegal since 1979 as a form of 
‘hooliganism’, was made legal in main-
land China and in 2001 it was removed 
from the Chinese Classification of 
Medical Disorders 3rd Edition. Yet the 
position of LGBTQI citizens remains 
fraught, with prejudice common both 
in society and workplaces, and same-
sex marriage impossible. To avoid so-
cial and familial pressure, some gay 
men enter into sham ‘going-through-
the-motion’ marriages with willing fe-
male partners 形式婚姻. If a gay man’s 
wife is unaware of his sexual orien-
tation, she may be known as a tongqi 
同妻, or ‘comrade’s wife’. The word 
from communist discourse for ‘com-
rade’, tongzhi 同志 (‘same will’) shares 
its first character tong with the word 
for homosexuality 同性恋 (‘same-sex 
love’) and for some time now has been 
used as slang to refer to members of 
the LGBTQI community.
Less than a week after the Shang-
hai dating park incident, on 24 May, 
the Constitutional Court of Taiwan 
ruled that laws limiting marriage to 
heterosexual couples were invalid in 






































ble, there have been recent evolutions 
in the interpretation of the law. In Sep-
tember, it was ruled that the same-sex 
partner of a British dependent could 
live there. Likewise, in November, the 
High Court ruled in favour of a Hong 
Kong civil servant, who married in 
New Zealand, to be allowed spousal 
medical benefits.
In late August, a claim to a ‘Chi-
nese’ cultural perspective on same–
sex marriage generated widespread 
attention in Australia. Shortly after 
the federal government announced a 
postal survey on same-sex marriage 
to inform parliament of public opinion 
on the matter, a campaign by the ‘Co-
alition for Marriage’ broadcast a tele-
vision commercial featuring Dr Pansy 
Lai 赖潘西, a Hong Kong-born Sydney 
GP and co-founder of the Australian 
Chinese for Families Association 澳洲
华人家庭守护联盟, which stands for 
‘family values amongst the Australian 
Taiwan. The Taiwan parliament now 
has two years to rewrite the marriage 
laws so as to include same-sex rela-
tionships. The ruling is the result of 
decades of social reform during which 
the gay rights movement gradually 
built up wide support and political 
 influence.
The ruling prompted prominent 
mainland sexologist Li Yinhe 李银河 to 
suggest that because Taiwan was ‘a so-
ciety of Chinese people’, it could serve 
as a model for China. By speaking of 
Taiwan as best understood within the 
context of ‘Chineseness’, she under-
valued both the island’s particular his-
torical conditions and the democratic 
dynamic by which social change can 
influence policy development — very 
different from the way things work on 
the mainland.
Homosexuality has long been de-
criminalised in Hong Kong, and while 
same-sex marriage remains impossi-
Taiwan Pride 2017
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Chinese community in Australia’. The 
group claimed that a petition it start-
ed and was signed by 17,500 people 
had pressured the New South Wales 
government to drop the Safe Schools 
Program, designed to help students 
and teachers combat bullying of 
LGBTQI students. The group’s anti- 
same-sex marriage ad misleadingly 
linked same-sex marriage with the 
Safe Schools Program, which it alleged 
(in line with other conservative voices 
in Australia) had been designed to con-
fuse students about gender and sexu-
ality. The ad attracted a huge amount 
of criticism, much of it focussed on 
Pansy Lai, with critics questioning her 
ability to treat LGBTQI patients with 
the non-judgemental compassion re-
quired of a GP.
That same month, Dr Lai wrote 
on her association’s website (in Chi-
nese) that school lessons on same–sex 
marriage and sexuality ‘run counter to 
traditional culture’. While she did not 
specify exactly how this is the case, it 
could be argued that from a ‘tradition-
al’ point of view, same-sex marriage 
could lead to imbalances between the 
male yang 阳 and female yin 阴	ener-
gies, or result in people breaking the 
taboo of marrying those who share 
the same surname. Dr Lai’s reading 
of ‘traditional culture’ also may draw 
on the Confucian notion of sons ex-
tending the family line and producing 
children who can later care for their 
elderly parents. 
A supporter of same-sex marriage 
subsequently launched an online pe-
tition seeking to deregister Dr Lai for 
breaching the medical code of prac-
tice through her campaigning. After 
generating complaints, the petition 
was withdrawn.  
Lai and her supporters, however, 
only represented one view on the mat-
ter. Benjamin Law 羅旭能, a gay Aus-
tralian writer born to parents who em-
igrated from Hong Kong, wrote about 
the panicked conservative response 
to Safe Schools, and was a prominent 
supporter of the campaign to reform 
marriage laws. In late November, it 
was announced that sixty-two per cent 
of the population supported same-sex 
marriage, with federal parliament 

























C H R O N O L O G Y
2017 
1 January: China’s ban on trading 
ivory and ivory products comes into 
effect. (See Forum ‘The End of Ivory’, 
pp.171–174).
9 January: Altering long-standing ar-
rangements, the Vatican and China 
reach a deal to allow the Pope to have 
some say over the appointment of 
Catholic bishops. 
13 January: The US Drug Enforcement 
Administration’s Acting Administrator 
Chuck Rosenberg meets with officials 
in China to discuss the control of syn-
thetic drugs. Carfentanil, a powerful 
synthetic opioid, is banned in China in 
February.
17 January: At the World Economic Fo-
rum in Davos, Switzerland, President 
Xi Jinping makes a speech defending 
free trade, and restates China’s com-
mitment to the 2015 Paris climate ac-
cord. 
17 January: China, Australia, and Ma-
laysia suspend their search for Malay-
sian Airlines flight MH370, missing 
since March 2014. (See China Story 
Yearbook 2014: Shared Destiny, Infor-
mation Window ‘MH370’, pp.66–67). 


























18 January: The first direct train from 
China to the UK arrives in London after 
a seventeen-day journey. On 29 April, 
the first train running in the opposite 
direction arrives in Yiwu with thirty 
containers of British-made goods.
22 January: 111 golf courses are or-
dered to shut due to illegal water 
use. The recent decline in golf’s pop-
ularity has been attributed to the 
implementation of stricter anti- 
corruption rules.
27 January: Chinese Canadian billion-
aire Xiao Jianhua 肖建华 is seized from 
a luxury Hong Kong hotel and extra-
dited to China. As of February 2018, 
Xiao’s whereabouts remain unknown.
19 February: Implementing existing 
United Nations sanctions following 
North Korean missile tests, China an-
nounces the suspension of coal im-
ports until the end of the year. 
19 February: Despite warnings from 
China’s Foreign Ministry, a US aircraft 
carrier strike group — including the 
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS 
Carl Vinson — begins patrols in the 
South China Sea. 
20 February: As part of anti-terror-
ism activities, drivers in the Bayingo-
lin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture of 
Xinjiang are required to install the Chi-
na-made Beidou 北斗 satellite tracking 
devices in their cars.
22 February: US officials suggest that 
new buildings on the Spratly Islands 
may be launch sites for surface-to-air 
missiles. In August, Vietnamese officials 
criticise China’s opening of a cinema on 
one of the contested Paracel Islands.
3 March: The South Korean govern-
ment suspects China of restricting out-
bound tourism in response to it hosting 
the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense) missile defence system. 
The effects of this blockade continue 
over the year, with the automotive, cul-
ture, retail, and cosmetics industries 
all suffering decreased sales. 
4 March: China announces plans to in-
crease military spending by seven per 
cent — accounting for 1.3 per cent of 
projected GDP in 2017. 
6 March: Violence between Myanmar 
troops and Kokang rebels in northern 
Myanmar causes 20,000 to seek refuge 
in China. 
19 March: New US Secretary of State 
Rex Tillerson visits Beijing, meeting 
with Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister 
Wang Yi. Chinese commentators praise 
him for seeing China as an equal, while 
he draws criticism from some in the US 
for parroting Chinese phrases.
19 March: Taiwanese civil rights activ-
ist Lee Ming-che 李明哲 is detained as 
he enters China from Macau. Formally 
arrested in May, in November he was 
found guilty of ‘subverting state pow-
er’ and sentenced to five years' prison. 
In January 2018, his Taiwanese wife 
was prevented from entering China 
to visit him in prison. (See Chapter 8, 
‘Human Rights in the Age of Prosperi-
ty’, pp.254–269.)
21 March: Among other outcomes 
from the National People's Congress, 
Premier Li Keqiang announced the 
lowest economic growth target in 
twenty years—6.5 per cent.
23 March: Li Keqiang arrives in Aus-
tralia for a five-day visit to discuss re-
gional security and trade.
28 March: The Australian Government 
announces it is not proceeding with 
the Chinese extradition treaty. Despite 
being concluded in 2007, concerns 
over China’s rule of law and omitting 
a guarantee to not approve extradition 
that would be ‘unjust or oppressive’ 
stopped the treaty from being ratified.
1 April: ‘Abnormal’ beards and face 
coverings are banned in Xinjiang. 
These rules, along with other meas-
ures to strengthen state ideology, are a 
part of anti-extremist laws.  
1 April: Dr Feng Chongyi 冯崇义 of 
the University of Technology Sydney, 
a permanent resident of Australia, re-
turns to Sydney after a week-long de-
tention in China. In China for research, 
Dr Feng was detained at Guangzhou 
airport. He was made to agree not to 
disclose details about his questioning.
1 April: Plans are announced for the 
Xiongnan New Area, to be built near 
Beijing. (See Chapter 6, ‘Magic Cities, 
Future Dreams — Urban Contradic-
tions’, pp.186–205.)
6 April: Xi Jinping meets US President 
Donald Trump for the first time, with 


























11 April: Amnesty International re-
leases a report listing China as the 
world’s leading executioner. (See Fo-
rum ‘Death Penalty Reform’, pp.275–
278.) 
13 April: A Chinese consortium pur-
chases the Italian football club AC 
Milan from former Italian prime 
minister Silvio Berlusconi. In Febru-
ary 2018, consortium leader and new 
club Chair Li Yonghong 李勇鸿 denies 
claims that his companies were facing 
bankruptcy. 
17 April: China launches its first un-
manned spacecraft — the Tianzhou 
1 天舟一号	— from a site on Hainan 
island. Its destination is the crewless 
space station Tiangong 2 天宫二号.
19 April: An arrest warrant is issued 
for New York-based billionaire Guo 
Wengui 郭文贵	 after he offers infor-
mation about corruption in China. 
Guo continued to draw the attention 
of the media and politicians through-
out 2017. (See Chapter 5, ‘Precarious 
Wealth: The Search for Status and Se-
curity’, pp.148–165.)
24 April: A factory producing prod-
ucts for Ivanka Trump’s fashion brand 
is found to provide workers with bad 
conditions and low wages.  
26 April: China launches its first air-
craft carrier, the Liaoning 辽宁舰. 
Leaving Dalian for its maiden voyage, 
the 50,000 ton Soviet-made vessel sails 
to Hong Kong, where it is a feature of 
events celebrating the twentieth anni-
versary of Hong Kong’s handover to 
China. 
1 May: Chinese diplomats interrupt 
the opening ceremony of the Kimber-
ly Process meeting in Perth to seek the 
ejection of Taiwanese observers. Deal-
ing with the diamond trade, Australia 
invited the Taiwanese in line with ear-
lier precedent but withdrew the invita-
tion after the Chinese protest.
1 May: The Inner Mongolia Autono-
mous Region celebrates its seventieth 
anniversary.
7 May: A real estate company linked 
to Jarrod Kushner, White House advi-
sor and son-in-law of Donald Trump, 
holds events in China offering poten-
tial investors the chance to receive im-
migrant visas.
11 May: Up to nine are killed and twen-
ty are injured after a 5.5-magnitude 
earthquake in Xinjiang.
14 May: A two-day Belt and Road sum-
mit in Beijing attracts twenty-eight 
world leaders and representatives 
from seventy countries. (See Chapter 
2, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: How 
to Win Friends and Influence People’, 
pp.42–59.)
15 May: The Australian Football 
League plays its first game in China, 
with the Gold Coast Suns and Port 
Adelaide Power facing off in Shanghai. 
17 May: The Australian government 
supports Taiwan’s attendance at the 
World Health Assembly — the World 
Health Organisation’s most important 
meeting. However, due to Chinese 
pressure, Taiwan was excluded for the 
first time since 2009.
23 May: The Google artificial intelli-
gence program AlphaGo beats world 
number one Go player Ke Jie 柯洁. 
23 May: Bollywood film Dangal tops 
Chinese box office for two weeks. Star-
ring Aamir Khan, it becomes China’s 
highest grossing non-Hollywood for-
eign film. 
25 May: US warship USS Dewey sails 
within twelve miles of Mischief Reef — 
territory claimed by China in the South 
China Sea. 
1 June: New regulations require con-
tent on news websites in China to be 
approved by local and national author-
ities. (See Forum ‘Arguing with Robots’, 
pp.249–252.)
2 June: Connecting to the local power 
grid in May, the world’s largest float-
ing solar power plant opens in Anhui. 
Producing forty megawatts of electric-
ity, the plant floats atop a flooded and 
collapsed former coal mine.
3 June: A theme park dedicated to 
Argentinian football superstar Lionel 
Messi and offering fans an immersive 
experience is announced to open in 
China in 2020.
6 June: The joint Fairfax–ABC episode 
of Four Corners called 'Power and In-
fluence: The Hard Edge of China's Soft 
Power' raises questions about Chinese 
state influence in Australia. (See Chap-
ter 4, ‘China's Power, the United States, 





















6 June: Governor of California, Jerry 
Brown, meets with Xi Jinping to sign 
an agreement to expand trade, espe-
cially on technology that mitigates cli-
mate change. 
12 June: Panama switches diplomatic 
allegiance from Taiwan to China — the 
first country to do so since Sao Tome 
and Principe in 2016.
1 July: Xi Jinping spends three days in 
Hong Kong for a series of events held 
to celebrate the twentieth anniversary 
of the transfer of control of Hong Kong 
to China. (See Chapter 9, ‘Prosperity 
and Freedom: Hong Kong's Dilemma’, 
pp.292–307.)
3 July: In a setback to the Chinese 
space program, the second launch of 
the Long March 5 rocket fails.
12 July: Ten employees of Crown Re-
sorts, including two Australians, are 
released from a Chinese prison. They 
were among nineteen Crown employ-
ees arrested in October 2016 for at-
tempting to attract high-rolling gam-
blers to Crown casinos. (See China 
Story Yearbook 2016: Control, Forum 
‘Crown Casion Arrests’, pp.343–345). 
In December, shareholders launched 
a class action suit against Crown be-
cause share prices dropped after the 
arrests.
13 July: Nobel Prize winning author 
and activist Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波 dies in 
custody. (See Forum ‘Toppling Liu Xia-
obo’, pp.9–12 and Chapter 7, ‘Prosper 
or Perish’, pp.224–242.)
18 July: China notifies the World 
Trade Organisation that it will ban 
twenty-four types of scrap at the end 
of the year, influencing the ability of 
countries to export waste to China for 
recycling. 
25 July: Chongqing chief Sun Zheng-
cai 孙政才 is announced to have been 
sacked and placed under investigation 
for corruption. 
25 July: Sri Lankan cabinet approves 
a $US1.12 billion agreement for a Chi-
nese firm to manage a newly built port 
over a ninety-nine-year lease. 
26 July: Taiwanese electronics giant 
Foxconn announces plans to build a 
display panel plant in Wisconsin that 







28 July: British Foreign Secretary Boris 
Johnson confirms plans to sail two new 
aircraft carriers in the South China Sea 
as part of a freedom-of-navigation op-
eration.
1 August: China opens its first over-
seas military base in Djibouti, on the 
north-western edge of the Indian 
Ocean. In a speech celebrating the 
ninetieth anniversary of the founding 
of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 
Xi Jinping vows China will protect its 
sovereignty. In a military parade, the 
PLA introduces it new intercontinental 
ballistic missile, the DF-31AG.
8 August: Australia, Japan, and the 
US support a call by the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations for a South 
China Sea code of conduct to be legally 
binding.
16 August: US Treasury data reveals 
that China has again become the US's 
biggest creditor, with debts of $US1.15 
trillion.
28 August: China and India end the 
border standoff that began in early 
July. (See Forum ‘Peripheral Trouble: 
The Sino-Indian Standoff’, pp.99–103.)
1 September: Chinese textbooks are to 
be revised to state that the war against 
Japan began in 1931, when Japanese 
soldiers destroyed railways in Shen-
yang, instead of the established date of 
1937, when Japanese soldiers attacked 
at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing.
3 September: North Korea tests its 
most powerful hydrogen bomb to date.
4 September: The ninth BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa) 
summit is held, this time in Xiamen 
with the theme ‘BRICS: Stronger Part-
nership for a Brighter Future’.
4 September: Chinese authorities 
announce a ban on the cryptocurren-
cy fundraising method of initial coin 
offerings. Commentators express con-
cern over ambiguity about the future 
of cryptocurrency in China.
13 September: The US blocks the sale 
of an American semiconductor compa-
ny to Chinese bidders due to security 
concerns.
25 September: WhatsApp, a Face-





















24 October: At the Nineteenth Commu-
nist Party of China National Congress, 
‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’ 
is added to the constitution, further 
centralising Xi’s authority. He used 
this forum to announce a ‘New Era’ 新
时代, where he envisages reshaping 
global affairs to be more Sino-centric. 
(See Chapter 1, ‘The Nineteenth Par-
ty Congress: Here Comes the Future’, 
pp.14–26.)
31 October: China and South Korea 
agree to restore diplomatic relations 
to normal levels, after China’s protest 
over the US-supplied THAAD missile 
system led to large economic losses for 
Korean businesses. 
1 November: K-Pop girl group 
Mamamoo performed on Chinese tel-
evision — the first performance by 
South Korean artists since the econom-
ic boycott began.
8 November: Donald Trump visits 
China, meeting with Xi Jinping and Li 
Keqiang, with the grand spectacle de-
scribed by the hosts as ‘state visit-plus’. 
11 November: Online shoppers spend 
US$33 billion over twenty-four hours 
on the consumerism festival Singles 
Day 光棍节, breaking the previous re-
cord within thirteen hours.
16 November: US singer Katy Perry 
is denied a visa to perform at a Victo-
ria’s Secret show in Shanghai, alleg-
edly for wearing a sunflower dress 
in support of Taiwanese protestors at 
a show in Taipei in 2015. (See China 
Story Yearbook 2014: Shared Destiny, 
Forum ‘Occupy Taiwan’, pp.137–145.)
19 November: Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi states China’s willingness to help 
Myanmar and Bangladesh solve the 
Rakhine State issue.
23 November: Claims of alleged sex-
ual and physical abuse of children at 
a Beijing kindergarten generate wide-
spread media coverage and public out-
rage.
29 November: In Beijing, forced evic-
tions of up to 100,000 migrant workers 
— the so-called ‘low-end population’ 
低端人口		— highlight complexities 
around development and internal mi-






12 December: Senator Sam Dastyari 
of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) 
quits the senate after his links with 
businessman Huang Xiangmo 黄向墨 
are seen to have compromised his 
position. At a June 2016 press confer-
ence, while standing next to Huang, he 
contradicted the ALP position on the 
South China Sea, saying ‘The Chinese 
integrity of its borders is a matter for 
China’.
13 December: South Korea’s President 
Moon Jae-in visits China with 300 ex-
ecutives from South Korean compa-
nies in an attempt to boost business 
after the October thaw in diplomatic 
relations.
24 December: The world’s largest am-
phibious aircraft, the China-designed 
and made AVIC AG600, makes a one-
hour maiden flight.
29 December: Donald Trump accus-
es China of breaching United Nations 
sanctions and selling oil to North Ko-
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China Story Yearbook 2012: 




Profiles of some of China’s leading 
public or citizen intellectuals, men and 
women who are vitally involved with 
the ideas, debates and concerns about 
China’s present and its future direction:
thechinastory.org/thinking-
china/-key-intellectuals
Electronic versions of this book and supplementary materials are available for 
free download in a variety of formats at: www.chinastory.org. Below are some of 
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‘More cosmopolitan, more lively, more global’ is how the 
China Daily summed up the year 2016 in China.
It was also a year of more control. The Chinese 
Communist Party laid down strict new rules of conduct 
for its members, continued to assert its dominance over 
everything from the Internet to the South China Sea and 
announced a new Five-Year Plan that Greenpeace called 
‘quite possibly the most important document in the world 
in setting the pace of acting on climate change’.
PREVIOUS CHINA STORY 
YEARBOOKS
2015: Pollution 
This Yearbook explores the broader ramifications of 
pollution in the People’s Republic for culture, society law 
and social activism, as well as the Internet, language, 
thought, and approaches to history. It looks at how it 
affects economic and political developments, urban 
change, and China’s regional and global posture. 
The Chinese Communist Party, led by ‘Chairman of 
Everything’ Xi Jinping, meanwhile, has subjected 
mainland society to increasingly repressive control in its 
new determination to rid the country of Western ‘spiritual 
pollutants’ while achieving cultural purification through 



































2012: Red Rising, Red Eclipse 
The authors of Red Rising, Red Eclipse survey China’s 
regional posture, urban change, social activism and law, 
human rights and economics, the Internet, history, and 
thought. This inaugural China Story Yearbook offers an 
informed perspective on recent developments in China 
and provides a context for understanding ongoing issues 
that will resonate far beyond the Dragon Year of  
2012–2013. 
2013: Civilising China  
As China becomes wealthier and more confident on 
the global stage, it also expects to be respected and 
accommodated as a major global force—and as a 
formidable civilisation. Through a survey and analysis of 
China’s regional posture, urban change, social activism 
and law, mores, the Internet, history, and thought—in 
which the concept of ‘civilising’ plays a prominent role—
China Story Yearbook 2013 offers insights into the country 
today and its dreams for the future.
2014: Shared Destiny 
The People’s Republic of China under the leadership of 
the Chinese Communist Party and Xi Jinping, has declared 
that it shares in the destiny of the countries of the Asia 
and Pacific region, as well as of nations that are part of 
an intertwined national self-interest. The China Story 
Yearbook 2014 takes the theme of Shared Destiny 共同命
运 and considers it in the context of China’s current and 
future potential.
